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Rational and Irrational Justifications

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 16, 2010
.

This is the third and final reply to Kip’s response to my original post to him Why Consider all Desires that exist? (My first reply was Why Consider others when you don’t need to? and my second reply was All desires versus affected desires)

Kip complains that

Apart from your list of reasons why a group might not consider the desires of another group, you just assert [them].
As I said
The many answers bulleted above all fail as rational and empirical justifications for Group A’s practises.

Now I was implying that items on this bulleted list were based on fallacious reasoning. It is true I just asserted that in my original post, so here I will answer Kip’s challenge now.

The bullets I wrote are re-listed here, with an immediate off the cuff example of the type of fallacies I had in mind when I wrote this list:

  • we do not need to consider their desires
Double Standards/selective reasoning
  • their desires cannot influence us, so we do not need to concern ourselves of those desires
Appeal to Strength
  • that is the way we always do (did) it
Appeal to Tradition
  • we are stronger and can get a way with it
Appeal to Strength
  • we are more and can get away with it
Appeal to Popularity
  • we have the law on our side
Appeal to Law
  • we have God on our side
Appeal to Authority
  • their desires are not worthy of moral consideration

Begging the Question

Now the above is just a set of illustrative responses to Kip’s reasonable question. It is not mean to be exhaustive or accurate, just indicative of why I stated the bulleted list in the first place.

Further I am not denying that there can be some legitimate justifications, and already provided one in the original post, over the asbestos example. That was over a lack of present day knowledge that no reasonable person who took due care and precautions could, at that time, have known about. (Indeed, to criticise past decisions and moralities on this basis is another fallacy - hindsight bias). If and when there are such “moral” arguments, we can check to see if they are legitimate or not. Most, in my experience, are not.

Kip continues

Group A may have very many prudential reasons for ignoring the desires of Group B -- or perhaps they just don't have any prudential reasons to consider the desires of Group B. In other words, none of their desires will be fulfilled by considering the desires of Group B. Or, perhaps even, more of their desires will be thwarted by considering the desires of Group B.

When it comes to prudence, all the above listed bullets, with the examples of the type of fallacies they exhibit, come into play. Prudentially there is no reason not to use such rhetoric and sophistry to defend ones positions, especially to one’s peers who are looking for justification, any justification, in keeping the status quo.

This happens all the time and not just in issues of morality. Regardless, however prudentially rational it is to make those justifications, they are still theoretically irrational justifications.

Further whether the prudential defenders of such fallacies, (in cases only where it is clear they are fallacies, if you wish) accept these rational criticisms or not, that would be insufficient to make them change their desires. You cannot use reason to change desires only beliefs, and, only then, provided their desire to believe does not overwhelm  desires for truth and reason, which these all too often do. 

That, of course, is why we have the social forces of commendation and condemnation, honours and disgrace, rewards and penalties and so on, we have these to operate on modifying malleable desires (not just desires with moral implications but any and all). And Desirism serves as a check to ensure that what is promoted and inhibited is theoretically rationally grounded.

By having such rationally and empirically justified social forces coherently and consistently applied, these serve to change the desires people have, so there is no prudential sacrifice required, indeed the idea of sacrifice and making a decision between prudential and  moral concerns would be meaningless.  That is, in such an environment there would be no substantive difference between their prudential and moral values. This is an ideal and may never be fully achievable but it is a feasible target to aim at and is far better than what we have now.

Rational and Irrational Justifications

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 16, 2010
.

This is the third and final reply to Kip’s response to my original post to him Why Consider all Desires that exist? (My first reply was Why Consider others when you don’t need to? and my second reply was All desires versus affected desires)

Kip complains that

Apart from your list of reasons why a group might not consider the desires of another group, you just assert [them].
As I said
The many answers bulleted above all fail as rational and empirical justifications for Group A’s practises.

Now I was implying that items on this bulleted list were based on fallacious reasoning. It is true I just asserted that in my original post, so here I will answer Kip’s challenge now.

The bullets I wrote are re-listed here, with an immediate off the cuff example of the type of fallacies I had in mind when I wrote this list:

  • we do not need to consider their desires
Double Standards/selective reasoning
  • their desires cannot influence us, so we do not need to concern ourselves of those desires
Appeal to Strength
  • that is the way we always do (did) it
Appeal to Tradition
  • we are stronger and can get a way with it
Appeal to Strength
  • we are more and can get away with it
Appeal to Popularity
  • we have the law on our side
Appeal to Law
  • we have God on our side
Appeal to Authority
  • their desires are not worthy of moral consideration

Begging the Question

Now the above is just a set of illustrative responses to Kip’s reasonable question. It is not mean to be exhaustive or accurate, just indicative of why I stated the bulleted list in the first place.

Further I am not denying that there can be some legitimate justifications, and already provided one in the original post, over the asbestos example. That was over a lack of present day knowledge that no reasonable person who took due care and precautions could, at that time, have known about. (Indeed, to criticise past decisions and moralities on this basis is another fallacy - hindsight bias). If and when there are such “moral” arguments, we can check to see if they are legitimate or not. Most, in my experience, are not.

Kip continues

Group A may have very many prudential reasons for ignoring the desires of Group B -- or perhaps they just don't have any prudential reasons to consider the desires of Group B. In other words, none of their desires will be fulfilled by considering the desires of Group B. Or, perhaps even, more of their desires will be thwarted by considering the desires of Group B.

When it comes to prudence, all the above listed bullets, with the examples of the type of fallacies they exhibit, come into play. Prudentially there is no reason not to use such rhetoric and sophistry to defend ones positions, especially to one’s peers who are looking for justification, any justification, in keeping the status quo.

This happens all the time and not just in issues of morality. Regardless, however prudentially rational it is to make those justifications, they are still theoretically irrational justifications.

Further whether the prudential defenders of such fallacies, (in cases only where it is clear they are fallacies, if you wish) accept these rational criticisms or not, that would be insufficient to make them change their desires. You cannot use reason to change desires only beliefs, and, only then, provided their desire to believe does not overwhelm  desires for truth and reason, which these all too often do. 

That, of course, is why we have the social forces of commendation and condemnation, honours and disgrace, rewards and penalties and so on, we have these to operate on modifying malleable desires (not just desires with moral implications but any and all). And Desirism serves as a check to ensure that what is promoted and inhibited is theoretically rationally grounded.

By having such rationally and empirically justified social forces coherently and consistently applied, these serve to change the desires people have, so there is no prudential sacrifice required, indeed the idea of sacrifice and making a decision between prudential and  moral concerns would be meaningless.  That is, in such an environment there would be no substantive difference between their prudential and moral values. This is an ideal and may never be fully achievable but it is a feasible target to aim at and is far better than what we have now.

The Manhattan versus the Westminster Declarations

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 15, 2010
.

The UK based Westminster Declaration was unlikely created in a vacuum, and it would not be saying much to presume that the USA based Manhattan Declaration is more than likely the inspiration for it.

Now there are differences between these two apart from just length (the Manhattan one is considerably longer) as noted in my post on the press’s take on the Westminster Declaration.

Prior to the launch of this declaration I did not consider the USA version (as we can now say) relevant. Regardless I did read some critiques on it from Alonzo Fyfe, and his arguments  might well be the inspiration for my arguments from human sacrifice and religious tyranny that I certainly read from the Westminster Declaration.

I am not sure whether it is worth making a side by side comparison of the differences between the two declarations but given Fyfe’s likely inspiration for some of my insights, some readers might find it of interest to look at the analysis from both Christians and non-Christians for the Manhattan Declaration.

Alonzo Fyfe – the atheist ethicist – is one of the top atheist bloggers and a summary of his analysis can be found at The Manhattan Declaration X: Summary. There is no post of his listing all 10 of these posts but this search link provides all 10 (start reading from the bottom post for the whole analysis). His summary alone is superbly and boldly stated, with far more originality than my critique of the UK version, and certainly with no holding back of any punches. He finishes it with:

In short, the authors of the Manhattan Declaration have given us a manifesto in which they reserve for themselves the liberty to impose any demands they see fit on others, while also preserving for themselves the liberty to refuse any demands that others may see fit to impose on them. It is a manifesto of arrogance and bigotry in which the authors deny moral responsibility for their own ideas by shifting that responsibility [to] a god that they invent in their own image. [This] god they invented is not only an arrogant and bigoted god, but a god demanding massive human sacrifice in the form of premature death and suffering. The authors, of course, do not wish to admit that they are the authors of this demand for death and suffering. Here, too, they wish to shift the responsibility to a god that they have created in their own image.

Unfortunately for  the USA versions, I have not been able to find any decent analysis, rather just bloggers saying they are proud to sign these declarations. If anyone finds any critical analysis from theists, Christians and non-Christians – pro or con these declarations – could you please post a link in the comments?

However with regards to the UK version I have found an excellent critique by self-professed Christian Charles Foster writing on the Practical Ethics blog, entitled The Christian Right is Wrong.

I find it interesting to compare my fisking – written from the perspective of someone for whom Christianity has always been an alien and alienating, antiquated, archaic and absurd worldview – and that of someone who presumably grew up in it and still endorses it as someone who teaches ethics and medical law at Oxford.

His scathing review actually makes me wonder if this declaration will actually turn out to be a benefit to a secular UK as he argues that “[i]t will reduce significantly the ability of Christians to make a contribution to public life”!

He provides a very interesting take on the theological gobbledegook - that I am eminently unqualified to criticise (why else would I call it gobbledegook?) - which prefaces the declaration, when he says:

The parallels with the foundational creeds of Christianity are unmistakable, and we’re meant to see them. The clear message is: If you call yourself a Christian, you’ll agree with what’s in this Declaration. And the corollary is deafening, threatening, and equally unmissable: If you don’t agree with what’s in this Declaration, you’re not Christian at all: you’re beyond the pale, and ought to watch your eternal back. This is sheep and goats stuff.

As for the body of the declaration he provides many juicy thoughts, of which I will only quote one more:

Speaking purely as a citizen, I’m worried. If one accepts the Declaration’s reasoning, there can be no possible objection to the rule of Britain’s Muslim communities by Shari’ a law. Perhaps that should happen, but it is not as blindingly obvious that it should happen as the Declaration suggests. There’s something to discuss,  and this Declaration is saying that there isn’t - that it’s simple.

Thoroughly recommended reading. My faith in religious moderation is restored.

It is early days for the Westminster Declaration but it is interesting to note that the Manhattan Declaration has, to date, obtained 437,000 signatures since its launch on November 20, 2009. Now still in the first month of its launch the Westminster Declaration has so far gained over 22,000 signatures.

Plausibly assuming there are no substantive difference in internet access and inclinations to sign pledges across the Atlantic (that is that whatever sub-set of those who endorse the sentiments expressed in the Manhattan Declaration and signed that, would be equivalent to the sub-set of those who endorse the Westminster Declaration and sign this one), we can use the level of signatures to indicate the threat that this specific religious extremism poses here, compared to the USA. In the USA there are approximately 300 million people whilst in the UK there are approximately 60 million. On this basis we would expect that around 87,000 signatures (1/5 of the USA equivalent) would indicate an equivalent religious sentiment in the UK.

Of course we do not have data on the velocity and acceleration of signatures and it is likely that it is higher in the UK – albeit starting from a lower point - and lower in the USA (since many of those who would have signed do know about it and have already signed). So we can review this relationship in a few months, once both have had sufficient time to be known and responded to the relevant parties. I predict that overall number here will be lower than the 1:5 ratio rather than higher, I hope I am not wrong.

The Manhattan versus the Westminster Declarations

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 15, 2010
.

The UK based Westminster Declaration was unlikely created in a vacuum, and it would not be saying much to presume that the USA based Manhattan Declaration is more than likely the inspiration for it.

Now there are differences between these two apart from just length (the Manhattan one is considerably longer) as noted in my post on the press’s take on the Westminster Declaration.

Prior to the launch of this declaration I did not consider the USA version (as we can now say) relevant. Regardless I did read some critiques on it from Alonzo Fyfe, and his arguments  might well be the inspiration for my arguments from human sacrifice and religious tyranny that I certainly read from the Westminster Declaration.

I am not sure whether it is worth making a side by side comparison of the differences between the two declarations but given Fyfe’s likely inspiration for some of my insights, some readers might find it of interest to look at the analysis from both Christians and non-Christians for the Manhattan Declaration.

Alonzo Fyfe – the atheist ethicist – is one of the top atheist bloggers and a summary of his analysis can be found at The Manhattan Declaration X: Summary. There is no post of his listing all 10 of these posts but this search link provides all 10 (start reading from the bottom post for the whole analysis). His summary alone is superbly and boldly stated, with far more originality than my critique of the UK version, and certainly with no holding back of any punches. He finishes it with:

In short, the authors of the Manhattan Declaration have given us a manifesto in which they reserve for themselves the liberty to impose any demands they see fit on others, while also preserving for themselves the liberty to refuse any demands that others may see fit to impose on them. It is a manifesto of arrogance and bigotry in which the authors deny moral responsibility for their own ideas by shifting that responsibility [to] a god that they invent in their own image. [This] god they invented is not only an arrogant and bigoted god, but a god demanding massive human sacrifice in the form of premature death and suffering. The authors, of course, do not wish to admit that they are the authors of this demand for death and suffering. Here, too, they wish to shift the responsibility to a god that they have created in their own image.

Unfortunately for  the USA versions, I have not been able to find any decent analysis, rather just bloggers saying they are proud to sign these declarations. If anyone finds any critical analysis from theists, Christians and non-Christians – pro or con these declarations – could you please post a link in the comments?

However with regards to the UK version I have found an excellent critique by self-professed Christian Charles Foster writing on the Practical Ethics blog, entitled The Christian Right is Wrong.

I find it interesting to compare my fisking – written from the perspective of someone for whom Christianity has always been an alien and alienating, antiquated, archaic and absurd worldview – and that of someone who presumably grew up in it and still endorses it as someone who teaches ethics and medical law at Oxford.

His scathing review actually makes me wonder if this declaration will actually turn out to be a benefit to a secular UK as he argues that “[i]t will reduce significantly the ability of Christians to make a contribution to public life”!

He provides a very interesting take on the theological gobbledegook - that I am eminently unqualified to criticise (why else would I call it gobbledegook?) - which prefaces the declaration, when he says:

The parallels with the foundational creeds of Christianity are unmistakable, and we’re meant to see them. The clear message is: If you call yourself a Christian, you’ll agree with what’s in this Declaration. And the corollary is deafening, threatening, and equally unmissable: If you don’t agree with what’s in this Declaration, you’re not Christian at all: you’re beyond the pale, and ought to watch your eternal back. This is sheep and goats stuff.

As for the body of the declaration he provides many juicy thoughts, of which I will only quote one more:

Speaking purely as a citizen, I’m worried. If one accepts the Declaration’s reasoning, there can be no possible objection to the rule of Britain’s Muslim communities by Shari’ a law. Perhaps that should happen, but it is not as blindingly obvious that it should happen as the Declaration suggests. There’s something to discuss,  and this Declaration is saying that there isn’t - that it’s simple.

Thoroughly recommended reading. My faith in religious moderation is restored.

It is early days for the Westminster Declaration but it is interesting to note that the Manhattan Declaration has, to date, obtained 437,000 signatures since its launch on November 20, 2009. Now still in the first month of its launch the Westminster Declaration has so far gained over 22,000 signatures.

Plausibly assuming there are no substantive difference in internet access and inclinations to sign pledges across the Atlantic (that is that whatever sub-set of those who endorse the sentiments expressed in the Manhattan Declaration and signed that, would be equivalent to the sub-set of those who endorse the Westminster Declaration and sign this one), we can use the level of signatures to indicate the threat that this specific religious extremism poses here, compared to the USA. In the USA there are approximately 300 million people whilst in the UK there are approximately 60 million. On this basis we would expect that around 87,000 signatures (1/5 of the USA equivalent) would indicate an equivalent religious sentiment in the UK.

Of course we do not have data on the velocity and acceleration of signatures and it is likely that it is higher in the UK – albeit starting from a lower point - and lower in the USA (since many of those who would have signed do know about it and have already signed). So we can review this relationship in a few months, once both have had sufficient time to be known and responded to the relevant parties. I predict that overall number here will be lower than the 1:5 ratio rather than higher, I hope I am not wrong.

All desires versus affected desires

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 14, 2010
.
This a further response to Kip’s reply to my original post, this is in addition to my other reply Why consider other when you don’t need to?
Kip says
Your answer, in part, states that it is just a subset of the desires that exist to which a moral-ought is relative:
This is correct. It makes no sense to consider the desires that are not affected. However it is also important to consider desires that could be affected and not to arbitrarily exclude them prior to the analysis.

Now desires can be directly and indirectly affected. A desire has conditions of fulfilment such that these conditions are met when the proposition(s) that the desire contains are true in some states of the affairs. Some desires might have different conditions of fulfilment that are either fulfilled or thwarted in those same states of affairs. Those are the directly affected desires.

By contrast, other desires are only indirectly affected by such states of affairs. That is the state of affairs and hence the desire that brought it about, are only means or intermediate to other states of affairs that are the targets of those other desires. They are affected, as such states of affairs brought about by the desire under evaluation can help or hinder the realisation of their states of affairs, such helping or hindering being indirect.

Much of the internal critique within desirism is as to what the directly and indirectly affected desires are, particularly indirect desires. That is, accepting the desirist framework, there can still be dispute as to what the affected desires are. The phrase “all desires that exist” serves to ensure that none are excluded on a priori unsound and invalid grounds.
Clearly, then, this is not "all desires that exist". A moral-ought is relative to a subset of all desires that (possibly) exist given your qualifications above. I think this is fine, though. I think the theory still stands. But this "all desires that exist" terminology needs to be clarified to include the qualifications you've pointed out here.
I also highlighted in the original post the other internal/external usages of “all desires that exist”. The fact the only some desires are internal to the agent(s) under evaluations does not mean other desires external to them must be excluded. The primary purpose of morality is to help install and promote some desires that the agent lacks, and remove and discourage some other desires that the agents have.

Bearing this caveat over internal/external desires in mind, one could talk about “all affected desires that exist” where appropriate?

I will deal with the other qualification hinted at in the above quotes when I reply to Kip’s final point – over irrational and rational justifications in a future post.

All desires versus affected desires

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 14, 2010
.
This a further response to Kip’s reply to my original post, this is in addition to my other reply Why consider other when you don’t need to?
Kip says
Your answer, in part, states that it is just a subset of the desires that exist to which a moral-ought is relative:
This is correct. It makes no sense to consider the desires that are not affected. However it is also important to consider desires that could be affected and not to arbitrarily exclude them prior to the analysis.

Now desires can be directly and indirectly affected. A desire has conditions of fulfilment such that these conditions are met when the proposition(s) that the desire contains are true in some states of the affairs. Some desires might have different conditions of fulfilment that are either fulfilled or thwarted in those same states of affairs. Those are the directly affected desires.

By contrast, other desires are only indirectly affected by such states of affairs. That is the state of affairs and hence the desire that brought it about, are only means or intermediate to other states of affairs that are the targets of those other desires. They are affected, as such states of affairs brought about by the desire under evaluation can help or hinder the realisation of their states of affairs, such helping or hindering being indirect.

Much of the internal critique within desirism is as to what the directly and indirectly affected desires are, particularly indirect desires. That is, accepting the desirist framework, there can still be dispute as to what the affected desires are. The phrase “all desires that exist” serves to ensure that none are excluded on a priori unsound and invalid grounds.
Clearly, then, this is not "all desires that exist". A moral-ought is relative to a subset of all desires that (possibly) exist given your qualifications above. I think this is fine, though. I think the theory still stands. But this "all desires that exist" terminology needs to be clarified to include the qualifications you've pointed out here.
I also highlighted in the original post the other internal/external usages of “all desires that exist”. The fact the only some desires are internal to the agent(s) under evaluations does not mean other desires external to them must be excluded. The primary purpose of morality is to help install and promote some desires that the agent lacks, and remove and discourage some other desires that the agents have.

Bearing this caveat over internal/external desires in mind, one could talk about “all affected desires that exist” where appropriate?

I will deal with the other qualification hinted at in the above quotes when I reply to Kip’s final point – over irrational and rational justifications in a future post.

The Press on the Westminster Declaration

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 13, 2010
.
The Sunday Telegraph has published an article on the Westminster Declaration that I recently fisked: Christians launch pre-election 'declaration of conscience' on values. The sub-title of the article was
A bid to place Christian values at the heart of the general election campaign has been launched with a 'declaration of conscience' endorsed by senior figures from the Church of England, the Catholic Church and other denominations
That is a reasonable characterisation of the surface intent of this declaration. It then rather more worryingly says:
The Westminster 2010 Declaration sets out a broad range of policies that unite British churches, including support for traditional marriage and opposition to assisted suicide and euthanasia.
When I analysed the declaration it looked far more like the agenda that religious extremists would support and certainly not religious moderates. Indeed, I would hope that moderates are against and would condemn this Declaration. However if the Telegraph, which is more sympathetic to Christianity as part for the political discourse than other UK Broadsheets, is correct, then this extremism crosses sectarian lines in British Churches, so where, I wonder, are the moderates?
[The organisation behind it] has a website database that aims to reveal the ethical position of more than 2,600 election candidates on issues such as abortion and stem-cell research.
This makes quite clear the political agenda behind the Declaration. (Dare I suggest that the Skeptical Voter scrapes this data to enhance their database?)
It could prove as controversial as its American counterpart, which allows for "civil disobedience" for Christians whose faith clashes with the law.
I certainly agree there. However there is no critical analysis of the declaration rather it only quotes some Christian views that augments the intent behind the Declaration such as
Dr Peter Saunders, chief executive of the Christian Medical Fellowship and another signatory to the declaration, said: "There has been a feeling of growing hostility to the Christian faith and that Christians are being marginalised from the public square.
That should be expected in a more secular – that is religiously neutral state. Special privileges are unjustified in such a state. So it is not surprising that
Cardinal Vincent Nichols, head of the Catholic Church in England and Wales, has told a BBC documentary that Labour's laws on equality are part of a secular "doctrine" that "can be as forceful and it can be as narrow minded as the worst of a doctrinaire Christian position".
The failure to see removal of a double standard by a single standard but, instead, as still a double standard only with different preferences and biases is a common and fallacious argument (unless the double standard is not being removed, which is not the case over the equality laws, except for certain Christians who are doing their best to keep their double standards!).

Overall it offered no real criticism of the declaration, really just reporting on its existence and, I suspect, giving it the publicity it needed to gain the many signatures it now has (it had only 2,600 when the article was published and now 8 days later it has about 17,500).

The Christian media think tank Ekklesia responds to this article in Conservative church leaders launch anti-war declaration for general election. Here they alleviate my main concern highlighted by the Telegraph article, when they disagree with its asserted broad appeal of this declaration, by noting
1. It isn't broad, but seems predominantly focused on abortion, euthanasia, marriage and the ongoing 'Christian discrimination' obsession (although paying passing lip service to some 'justice' issues)
2. It isn't a set of policies, but rather a set of values that relates to a small set of policy issues
3. It doesn't unite churches. The church leaders who signed it are overwhelmingly conservative in their theology, and the section on marriage alone would split the Church of England, and alienate groups like the Quakers
Looks like I have found the moderates that the Telegraph tried to define into non-existence.

They then, rather humorously note that the pledge implies an anti-war stance
Clearly this is aimed at abortion/ euthanasia. But the pledge does seem pretty unequivocal if taken to its logical conclusion. It is hard to see how protecting "the life of every human being" and opposing "any other act that involves intentionally taking innocent human life" could for example square with any support for the invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan, or for that matter the replacement of Trident.
This is a good point which I missed and might take some of the sting out of my concern over “civil disobedience” – they would not endorse, presumably the killing of abortion doctors either?

On the other hand, what Ekklesia missed, is implication of the “innocent” qualifier, a common trick used by many religions which means they say nothing about the guilty and leave it open as to who is to decide who is guilty and what to do about them.

The other point, also missed by Ekklesia, is the implicit homophobia in the declaration, which one has to great efforts to miss. Still I do like their overall conclusion:
What it does show is the extent to which those putting the Westminster Declaration together are dualistic in their thinking, selective in their focus, and ignore some of the most central aspects of their faith that have something to say to the world around them - despite their claim to be 'representing' Christianity.
In their zeal to combat the 'marginalisation' of Christianity, they are actually doing a great deal to marginalise the faith themselves.
Meanwhile, in the Guardian, both pro and anti points of view have been presented. Andrew Brown is critical in The Multicultural Christian Right and Jonathan Chaplin responds in The Westminster Declaration Defended. Now I agree with Andrew Brown’s summary
The launch of a Christian programme for the general election and beyond is a significant political development, not a good one
However I am not sure over some of his arguments. He supplies some background to the
fairly coherent rightwing bloc in British Christianity. It is nationalist, socially conservative, suspicious of markets, critical of Islam, authoritarian … but what distinguishes it from Ukip, or even the BNP, is that it has a large and powerful black membership. The figureheads of the movement are two retired Anglican bishops, Lord Carey, who used to be archbishop of Canterbury and still carries on as if he ought to be, and Dr Michael Nazir-Ali, who resigned last year as bishop of Rochester.
Along with Cardinal Keith O'Brien, the head of the Roman Catholic church in Scotland, they are the most prominent signatories to the"Westminster Declaration" which was publicised on Sunday. But when you look down the list of 30 or so signatories, almost all of them representing groups you have never heard of, the most significant fact is that a quarter of them are black or representing black-led churches, and almost all would agree that the most dynamic Christianity in the world today is African.
Now this may all be correct or not. What matters is what the Declaration is and whom it attracts. The simplest answer is only religious Christian extremists. He is certainly confirms Ekklesia’s view that this is not of broad appeal to British Churches.

Brown insinuates an anti-Islam bent to the Declaration but it actually assumes a position of religious not just Christian liberty. Maybe they would have it otherwise but this certainly deflates any anti-Islamic reading of the declaration, if not the motivation of those behind it.
Unlike the Telegraph and Ekklesia he recognises the implicit homophobia and makes an interesting contrast to the US equivalent when he notes
But there is also a great deal that would never pass the filter of US Republican anti-political correctness
Let us be thankful for small mercies?

By contrast to my reading this declaration as a call for religious tyranny, he reads it as a call to martyrdom (which leads probably to tyranny?). He cements and, at the same time, ameliorates his martyrdom argument with
It's not clear what any of this posturing actually means in practice. But emotionally, it's quite clear. Christians in Britain are to behave as a persecuted minority, avid for injustice, watching the papers eagerly for signs that some other group is getting special treatment.
This is most certainly and troublingly true already.
What we're seeing here is the growth of Christianity as a player in multicultural politics, competing as a tribal identity for group privileges. It's ironic that the most prominent signatories of the declaration would regard "multiculturalism" as a thoroughly bad thing. I suspect that in the next few years, they will be showing us its bad side in ways that no one has up till now suspected.
An interesting and ironical twist on the issue and possibly support for why I think the claim for “religious liberty” is quite jarring in this Declaration. Still this might be a clever journalistic twist and insight but is it really important in the scheme of things?

Jonathan Chaplin in the self-same Guardian replies to Andrew Brown with
Liberals should not sneer at the Westminster declaration. It is a sign of democratic vitality, not sinister nor right wing
Instead of addressing the issues of the declaration itself he just tries to refute Andrew Brown’s take on it. In response to Brown’s, rather irrelevant in my view, “multicultural” jibe he writes
The "Westminster Declaration of Christian Conscience" is not evidence of Christianity as a "player in multicultural politics" but rather a response to the growing experience among Christians with theologically orthodox and socially conservative leanings of being unacceptably constrained or marginalized in key areas of public life. For the most part such Christians are not demanding special treatment but only a level playing field with other religions and with secular humanists. Yet matters of great importance to them – and, they are convinced, to society at large – are routinely derided as symptoms of a victim mentality.[My Emphasis]
It seems by responding that element of Brown’s critique Chaplin hopes to avoid dealing with the real issues of substance here. Brown has given Chaplin an excuse to avoid such issues. So Chaplin just restates some purported motivations behind the declaration, or of those likely to sign it. As for claims for not demanding special treatment, this is quite contrary to my reading of the declaration. One can look in vain for any argument from Chaplin to support this claim, there is none.

Rather than defend his rhetorical reading of the declaration, Chaplin picks up on other irrelevant issues promoted by Brown, such as his “alarmist stereotyping” of the ethnicity of the groups involved. Indeed Brown has given Chaplin too many reasons for Chaplin to avoid really responding to the underlying issues in the Declaration. This enables him to say “But there's nothing in the declaration to suggest that it is nationalist, authoritarian, or anti-Islamic” – well at least the later is a valid criticism of Brown, the former less so but by bringing up Brown’s “anti-Islamic” point Chaplin is hoping to collectively avoid all those issues. He fails.

The only really substantive point Chaplin engages with is over Brown’s point on homophobia, which Brown due to his focus on other issues made all too briefly. This enables Chaplin to say
Finally, to hold that heterosexual marriage is "the only context for sexual intercourse", as the declaration bluntly puts it, doesn't make you "homophobic".
Well I argue that anyone reading the declaration in a critical and unbiased fashion would have to agree with Brown (and me) and against Chaplin. However Chaplin has been given too much material by Brown to successfully avoiding having to face such issues.

Chaplin finishes with
Whether or not secular or Christian readers agree with the objectives of the declaration, discerning readers should respond by asking what interventions like this disclose about the continuing tendency of the British political system to silence or neutralise dissenting minorities. Over the last century or so it succeeded for long periods in gagging trade unionists, feminists, blacks, and gays and lesbians, and it currently silences the disabled, the elderly and religious conservatives, among others. No representative system can or should equally accommodate the demands of every single minority group, but a confident and strong democracy will seek to make space for as many of them as possible. Andrew Brown sees the declaration as a "dangerous development". On the contrary, it may be a sign of democratic vitality.
Chaplin ends with a false dichotomy. It is both a dangerous development and a sign of democratic vitality.

Now as long as Brown, myself and others are free and feel free to criticise such declarations, without fear of threats or actual violent reprisals, then both their and our democratic freedoms are protected. It is also dangerous because by taking it to its logical conclusion, by acting upon rather than talking through these points, the declaration could a significant step along the road to removing such democratic vitality from this country.

So it is up to everyone to participate in the vital democratic process of freedom of speech, including the freedom to criticise and condemn this declaration and any of those who support and sign it.

The Press on the Westminster Declaration

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 13, 2010
.
The Sunday Telegraph has published an article on the Westminster Declaration that I recently fisked: Christians launch pre-election 'declaration of conscience' on values. The sub-title of the article was
A bid to place Christian values at the heart of the general election campaign has been launched with a 'declaration of conscience' endorsed by senior figures from the Church of England, the Catholic Church and other denominations
That is a reasonable characterisation of the surface intent of this declaration. It then rather more worryingly says:
The Westminster 2010 Declaration sets out a broad range of policies that unite British churches, including support for traditional marriage and opposition to assisted suicide and euthanasia.
When I analysed the declaration it looked far more like the agenda that religious extremists would support and certainly not religious moderates. Indeed, I would hope that moderates are against and would condemn this Declaration. However if the Telegraph, which is more sympathetic to Christianity as part for the political discourse than other UK Broadsheets, is correct, then this extremism crosses sectarian lines in British Churches, so where, I wonder, are the moderates?
[The organisation behind it] has a website database that aims to reveal the ethical position of more than 2,600 election candidates on issues such as abortion and stem-cell research.
This makes quite clear the political agenda behind the Declaration. (Dare I suggest that the Skeptical Voter scrapes this data to enhance their database?)
It could prove as controversial as its American counterpart, which allows for "civil disobedience" for Christians whose faith clashes with the law.
I certainly agree there. However there is no critical analysis of the declaration rather it only quotes some Christian views that augments the intent behind the Declaration such as
Dr Peter Saunders, chief executive of the Christian Medical Fellowship and another signatory to the declaration, said: "There has been a feeling of growing hostility to the Christian faith and that Christians are being marginalised from the public square.
That should be expected in a more secular – that is religiously neutral state. Special privileges are unjustified in such a state. So it is not surprising that
Cardinal Vincent Nichols, head of the Catholic Church in England and Wales, has told a BBC documentary that Labour's laws on equality are part of a secular "doctrine" that "can be as forceful and it can be as narrow minded as the worst of a doctrinaire Christian position".
The failure to see removal of a double standard by a single standard but, instead, as still a double standard only with different preferences and biases is a common and fallacious argument (unless the double standard is not being removed, which is not the case over the equality laws, except for certain Christians who are doing their best to keep their double standards!).

Overall it offered no real criticism of the declaration, really just reporting on its existence and, I suspect, giving it the publicity it needed to gain the many signatures it now has (it had only 2,600 when the article was published and now 8 days later it has about 17,500).

The Christian media think tank Ekklesia responds to this article in Conservative church leaders launch anti-war declaration for general election. Here they alleviate my main concern highlighted by the Telegraph article, when they disagree with its asserted broad appeal of this declaration, by noting
1. It isn't broad, but seems predominantly focused on abortion, euthanasia, marriage and the ongoing 'Christian discrimination' obsession (although paying passing lip service to some 'justice' issues)
2. It isn't a set of policies, but rather a set of values that relates to a small set of policy issues
3. It doesn't unite churches. The church leaders who signed it are overwhelmingly conservative in their theology, and the section on marriage alone would split the Church of England, and alienate groups like the Quakers
Looks like I have found the moderates that the Telegraph tried to define into non-existence.

They then, rather humorously note that the pledge implies an anti-war stance
Clearly this is aimed at abortion/ euthanasia. But the pledge does seem pretty unequivocal if taken to its logical conclusion. It is hard to see how protecting "the life of every human being" and opposing "any other act that involves intentionally taking innocent human life" could for example square with any support for the invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan, or for that matter the replacement of Trident.
This is a good point which I missed and might take some of the sting out of my concern over “civil disobedience” – they would not endorse, presumably the killing of abortion doctors either?

On the other hand, what Ekklesia missed, is implication of the “innocent” qualifier, a common trick used by many religions which means they say nothing about the guilty and leave it open as to who is to decide who is guilty and what to do about them.

The other point, also missed by Ekklesia, is the implicit homophobia in the declaration, which one has to great efforts to miss. Still I do like their overall conclusion:
What it does show is the extent to which those putting the Westminster Declaration together are dualistic in their thinking, selective in their focus, and ignore some of the most central aspects of their faith that have something to say to the world around them - despite their claim to be 'representing' Christianity.
In their zeal to combat the 'marginalisation' of Christianity, they are actually doing a great deal to marginalise the faith themselves.
Meanwhile, in the Guardian, both pro and anti points of view have been presented. Andrew Brown is critical in The Multicultural Christian Right and Jonathan Chaplin responds in The Westminster Declaration Defended. Now I agree with Andrew Brown’s summary
The launch of a Christian programme for the general election and beyond is a significant political development, not a good one
However I am not sure over some of his arguments. He supplies some background to the
fairly coherent rightwing bloc in British Christianity. It is nationalist, socially conservative, suspicious of markets, critical of Islam, authoritarian … but what distinguishes it from Ukip, or even the BNP, is that it has a large and powerful black membership. The figureheads of the movement are two retired Anglican bishops, Lord Carey, who used to be archbishop of Canterbury and still carries on as if he ought to be, and Dr Michael Nazir-Ali, who resigned last year as bishop of Rochester.
Along with Cardinal Keith O'Brien, the head of the Roman Catholic church in Scotland, they are the most prominent signatories to the"Westminster Declaration" which was publicised on Sunday. But when you look down the list of 30 or so signatories, almost all of them representing groups you have never heard of, the most significant fact is that a quarter of them are black or representing black-led churches, and almost all would agree that the most dynamic Christianity in the world today is African.
Now this may all be correct or not. What matters is what the Declaration is and whom it attracts. The simplest answer is only religious Christian extremists. He is certainly confirms Ekklesia’s view that this is not of broad appeal to British Churches.

Brown insinuates an anti-Islam bent to the Declaration but it actually assumes a position of religious not just Christian liberty. Maybe they would have it otherwise but this certainly deflates any anti-Islamic reading of the declaration, if not the motivation of those behind it.
Unlike the Telegraph and Ekklesia he recognises the implicit homophobia and makes an interesting contrast to the US equivalent when he notes
But there is also a great deal that would never pass the filter of US Republican anti-political correctness
Let us be thankful for small mercies?

By contrast to my reading this declaration as a call for religious tyranny, he reads it as a call to martyrdom (which leads probably to tyranny?). He cements and, at the same time, ameliorates his martyrdom argument with
It's not clear what any of this posturing actually means in practice. But emotionally, it's quite clear. Christians in Britain are to behave as a persecuted minority, avid for injustice, watching the papers eagerly for signs that some other group is getting special treatment.
This is most certainly and troublingly true already.
What we're seeing here is the growth of Christianity as a player in multicultural politics, competing as a tribal identity for group privileges. It's ironic that the most prominent signatories of the declaration would regard "multiculturalism" as a thoroughly bad thing. I suspect that in the next few years, they will be showing us its bad side in ways that no one has up till now suspected.
An interesting and ironical twist on the issue and possibly support for why I think the claim for “religious liberty” is quite jarring in this Declaration. Still this might be a clever journalistic twist and insight but is it really important in the scheme of things?

Jonathan Chaplin in the self-same Guardian replies to Andrew Brown with
Liberals should not sneer at the Westminster declaration. It is a sign of democratic vitality, not sinister nor right wing
Instead of addressing the issues of the declaration itself he just tries to refute Andrew Brown’s take on it. In response to Brown’s, rather irrelevant in my view, “multicultural” jibe he writes
The "Westminster Declaration of Christian Conscience" is not evidence of Christianity as a "player in multicultural politics" but rather a response to the growing experience among Christians with theologically orthodox and socially conservative leanings of being unacceptably constrained or marginalized in key areas of public life. For the most part such Christians are not demanding special treatment but only a level playing field with other religions and with secular humanists. Yet matters of great importance to them – and, they are convinced, to society at large – are routinely derided as symptoms of a victim mentality.[My Emphasis]
It seems by responding that element of Brown’s critique Chaplin hopes to avoid dealing with the real issues of substance here. Brown has given Chaplin an excuse to avoid such issues. So Chaplin just restates some purported motivations behind the declaration, or of those likely to sign it. As for claims for not demanding special treatment, this is quite contrary to my reading of the declaration. One can look in vain for any argument from Chaplin to support this claim, there is none.

Rather than defend his rhetorical reading of the declaration, Chaplin picks up on other irrelevant issues promoted by Brown, such as his “alarmist stereotyping” of the ethnicity of the groups involved. Indeed Brown has given Chaplin too many reasons for Chaplin to avoid really responding to the underlying issues in the Declaration. This enables him to say “But there's nothing in the declaration to suggest that it is nationalist, authoritarian, or anti-Islamic” – well at least the later is a valid criticism of Brown, the former less so but by bringing up Brown’s “anti-Islamic” point Chaplin is hoping to collectively avoid all those issues. He fails.

The only really substantive point Chaplin engages with is over Brown’s point on homophobia, which Brown due to his focus on other issues made all too briefly. This enables Chaplin to say
Finally, to hold that heterosexual marriage is "the only context for sexual intercourse", as the declaration bluntly puts it, doesn't make you "homophobic".
Well I argue that anyone reading the declaration in a critical and unbiased fashion would have to agree with Brown (and me) and against Chaplin. However Chaplin has been given too much material by Brown to successfully avoiding having to face such issues.

Chaplin finishes with
Whether or not secular or Christian readers agree with the objectives of the declaration, discerning readers should respond by asking what interventions like this disclose about the continuing tendency of the British political system to silence or neutralise dissenting minorities. Over the last century or so it succeeded for long periods in gagging trade unionists, feminists, blacks, and gays and lesbians, and it currently silences the disabled, the elderly and religious conservatives, among others. No representative system can or should equally accommodate the demands of every single minority group, but a confident and strong democracy will seek to make space for as many of them as possible. Andrew Brown sees the declaration as a "dangerous development". On the contrary, it may be a sign of democratic vitality.
Chaplin ends with a false dichotomy. It is both a dangerous development and a sign of democratic vitality.

Now as long as Brown, myself and others are free and feel free to criticise such declarations, without fear of threats or actual violent reprisals, then both their and our democratic freedoms are protected. It is also dangerous because by taking it to its logical conclusion, by acting upon rather than talking through these points, the declaration could a significant step along the road to removing such democratic vitality from this country.

So it is up to everyone to participate in the vital democratic process of freedom of speech, including the freedom to criticise and condemn this declaration and any of those who support and sign it.

Why consider others when you don’t need to?

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 12, 2010
.

Kip has replied to my post Why consider all desires that exist?  which was a response to some emailed questions from him. There are three parts to his reply and I will only address the last part in this post, which is the most important issue.

Kip says:

Group A may have very many prudential reasons for ignoring the desires of Group B -- or perhaps they just don't have any prudential reasons to consider the desires of Group B. In other words, none of their desires will be fulfilled by considering the desires of Group B. Or, perhaps even, more of their desires will be thwarted by considering the desires of Group B.

So, without begging the question, why should Group A consider the desires of Group B, if 1) more of their desires will be fulfilled by not considering them, and 2) Group B has no way of influencing the desires of Group A (though force or social tools).

The impression is that Kip considers this an objection to (at least some aspect of) Desirism but this is no objection at all.

Consider, that for the above situation, anyone and everyone who has any moral theory in the world agrees with the desirist analysis (whether they are aware of it or not).

That is moral realists, desire-based or otherwise, reductive and non-reductive naturalists and non-natural intuitionists all agree. Normatively consequentialists, utilitarian and non-utilitarian, deontologists (duty-based ethics) and aretists (virtue-based ethicists) all agree to the same conclusion too.  Similarly subjectivists, including divine command theorists might agree. And non-cognitivists too, whether of the emotive, expressive or universally prescriptive variety also agree.

The issue of inter-theoretical disagreement, that one group’s reasoning to the right conclusion in this situation is no guarantee that their (claimed) fallacious reasoning might work in others is not relevant. Nor too is any dispute over whether there are objective grounds or not to come to this conclusion. Subjectivists agree regardless.

Now Group A in defence – if they ever hear or allow such criticisms of their position – might answer as moral nihilists – hence any such criticism have no force. Or they they might take the position of normative relativists – this is the way we do things here and no-one else has any grounds to judge them otherwise. Or, more likely they prevent – suppress, censor and hide -such criticism and basically ignore them.

What then? The whole world agrees that Group A’s practices are “wrong”, their values are “bad”, they “should not” continue as they are.

The world can try and use the social forces of condemnation – published and vocal criticism of Group A in the media and the internet - and social punishment such as refusing to buy from them or through more formal trade sanctions... and still Group A can  belligerently carry on and choose to isolate themselves from the rest of the world.

At this point the issue is beyond morality per se and to do with international law (if that can even be said to exist), just war and so on. Now there are ethical issues underlying these but they are different now to the original challenge posed by Kip.

One can all too easily think of international examples that do conform to the above – although people might very well disagree over the examples e.g. The first Iraq War had a large amount of cross-cultural agreement, the latest Afghanistan far less so and that second Iraq War it was virtually non-existent. But feel free to disagree such a characterisation as just presented.

The point is what action is to be taken or actions to refrain from taking are beyond the type of moral considerations here. Yes there are different moral issues over further actions but that is a different issue to the question that Kip asked and I answered.

So this is not an objection to desirism, rather it is an objection that could be raised against any and all ethical analysis of the relation between Group A and Group B. That is the issue is nothing specific to Desirism per se. It is part and parcel of the inherent limitations of any institution of morality.

One of the challenges of the institutions of morality is to create a world where Group A/Group B situations do not occur, where they are inhibited and discouraged from occurring in the first place, where such scenarios are prevented. That is an ongoing effort and one of the reasons why searching for the provisionally best ethical models is worthwhile and important, to help make the world a better place for everyone.

Why consider others when you don’t need to?

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 12, 2010
.

Kip has replied to my post Why consider all desires that exist?  which was a response to some emailed questions from him. There are three parts to his reply and I will only address the last part in this post, which is the most important issue.

Kip says:

Group A may have very many prudential reasons for ignoring the desires of Group B -- or perhaps they just don't have any prudential reasons to consider the desires of Group B. In other words, none of their desires will be fulfilled by considering the desires of Group B. Or, perhaps even, more of their desires will be thwarted by considering the desires of Group B.

So, without begging the question, why should Group A consider the desires of Group B, if 1) more of their desires will be fulfilled by not considering them, and 2) Group B has no way of influencing the desires of Group A (though force or social tools).

The impression is that Kip considers this an objection to (at least some aspect of) Desirism but this is no objection at all.

Consider, that for the above situation, anyone and everyone who has any moral theory in the world agrees with the desirist analysis (whether they are aware of it or not).

That is moral realists, desire-based or otherwise, reductive and non-reductive naturalists and non-natural intuitionists all agree. Normatively consequentialists, utilitarian and non-utilitarian, deontologists (duty-based ethics) and aretists (virtue-based ethicists) all agree to the same conclusion too.  Similarly subjectivists, including divine command theorists might agree. And non-cognitivists too, whether of the emotive, expressive or universally prescriptive variety also agree.

The issue of inter-theoretical disagreement, that one group’s reasoning to the right conclusion in this situation is no guarantee that their (claimed) fallacious reasoning might work in others is not relevant. Nor too is any dispute over whether there are objective grounds or not to come to this conclusion. Subjectivists agree regardless.

Now Group A in defence – if they ever hear or allow such criticisms of their position – might answer as moral nihilists – hence any such criticism have no force. Or they they might take the position of normative relativists – this is the way we do things here and no-one else has any grounds to judge them otherwise. Or, more likely they prevent – suppress, censor and hide -such criticism and basically ignore them.

What then? The whole world agrees that Group A’s practices are “wrong”, their values are “bad”, they “should not” continue as they are.

The world can try and use the social forces of condemnation – published and vocal criticism of Group A in the media and the internet - and social punishment such as refusing to buy from them or through more formal trade sanctions... and still Group A can  belligerently carry on and choose to isolate themselves from the rest of the world.

At this point the issue is beyond morality per se and to do with international law (if that can even be said to exist), just war and so on. Now there are ethical issues underlying these but they are different now to the original challenge posed by Kip.

One can all too easily think of international examples that do conform to the above – although people might very well disagree over the examples e.g. The first Iraq War had a large amount of cross-cultural agreement, the latest Afghanistan far less so and that second Iraq War it was virtually non-existent. But feel free to disagree such a characterisation as just presented.

The point is what action is to be taken or actions to refrain from taking are beyond the type of moral considerations here. Yes there are different moral issues over further actions but that is a different issue to the question that Kip asked and I answered.

So this is not an objection to desirism, rather it is an objection that could be raised against any and all ethical analysis of the relation between Group A and Group B. That is the issue is nothing specific to Desirism per se. It is part and parcel of the inherent limitations of any institution of morality.

One of the challenges of the institutions of morality is to create a world where Group A/Group B situations do not occur, where they are inhibited and discouraged from occurring in the first place, where such scenarios are prevented. That is an ongoing effort and one of the reasons why searching for the provisionally best ethical models is worthwhile and important, to help make the world a better place for everyone.

Fisking the Westminster Declaration

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 8, 2010
.
The Westminster Declaration is written by 20 UK based Christians of various influence and renown. This includes Lord Carey, the Former Archbishop of Canterbury; Cardinal O'Brien of the Catholic Church in Scotland; and  Michael Nazir-Ali,  the former Bishop of Rochester. Since its launch at Easter weekend it has gained over 12,000 signatures and counting.The declaration comprises an overview, then a statement of beliefs and values followed by the three areas they aim to speak out and act in defence of: human life, marriage and freedom of conscience. I will start with the statement of beliefs and values. 

Their Beliefs and Values

As Christians we reaffirm historic belief in God the Father (who created us and gave us the blueprint for our lives together); in God the Son Jesus Christ our Saviour (accepting his incarnation, teaching, claims, miracles, death, resurrection and return in judgment); and in God the Holy Spirit (who lives within us, guides us and gives us strength)….

In a modern liberal democracy anyone and everyone should be free to believe whatever gobbledegook they want to. Presumably the above nonsense makes sense to Christians, so no issue there. However the first problem is in the final sentence of this first paragraph:

….We commit ourselves to worship, honour and obey God.[My emphasis here and in all quotes below]

When I first read this, my first thought was that anyone is free to worship or honour whatever they want, however, when it comes to obeying - there are limits. This fear was immediately confirmed in the second paragraph of this section:

As UK citizens we affirm our Christian commitment both to exercise social responsibility in working for the common good and also to be subject to all governing authorities and obey them except when they require us to act unjustly.

One would like to think, that as a UK citizen, if such a Christian were to lose their faith, their “commitment to exercise social responsibility in working for the common good” would remain unaltered. Certainly Christianity  is not necessary for such a commitment, however is it even sufficient when they wish to exclude acting unjustly?

This depends on how injustice is determined. Given the previous emphasis over obeying God, the implication is that injustice is determined by such Christians, that sign or support this declaration, as being relative to God’s commands and if governing authorities conflict with their subjective opinion, they do not have to act as required.

Unfortunately history is littered with “obeying God” being used as a justification for many past injustices and worse - slavery, misogyny, homophobia, apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide. It is true that Christians have sometimes been on both sides, using the argument of “obeying God” to fight those injustices rather than support and promote them. However, given this, it is surely impossible not to conclude that “obeying God” is a wholly indeterminate and hence arbitrary basis for determining injustices. It is a standard of injustice that is woefully and dangerously inadequate in the 21st Century anywhere.

Whilst I agree we should all act to make our government more rather than less just, we need a far better basis than what has been so far implied. Their underlying value here allows promoting injustice in the name of “justice” - it can and has all too easily inverted the meaning of justice in the past – especially when invoking God in support. Let us hope that this analysis will not show that this is the case and that other terms are also not inverted.

George Santayana famously said “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Lets us remember and learn from the past and move forward, rather than forget and move backwards. We need better not worse standards for identifying and fighting injustice. Lowering standards is not an improvement in defence of justice.

Maybe I am jumping the gun, let us see how these values are explicated in their three areas of concern?

Human Life

We believe that being made in the image of God, all human life has intrinsic and equal dignity and worth and that it is the duty of the state to protect the vulnerable.

Sometimes, in such a declaration, what is not said is as relevant as what is said, and one implication of the first line is that they have zero regard for any non human life. So they do not care about obscene and unnecessary maltreatments of animal nor extinction of any species – except where environmental change discomforts humans?

Again they can believe whatever they want to believe with respect to “image of God”, one does not need such a belief to consider any individual of equal worth or dignity.  Again, I hope that if any of these signees or supporters of the declaration lose their faith, they still recognise that all individuals are worthy of equal consideration. Of course, such an “image of God” argument has failed to prevent injustices in the past and often actively encouraged them, the signees have provided, as yet, zero indication that things would be different now.

This makes me wonder do they mean what everyone else means by “vulnerable”? Can I or anyone assume any of the terms they use mean what everyone else in polite society thinks they mean? Lets see what they mean by vulnerable then:

We will support, protect, and be advocates for such people – including children born and unborn, and all those who are sick, disabled, addicted, elderly, in single parent families, poor, exploited, trafficked, appropriately seeking asylum, threatened by environmental change, or exploited by unjust trade, aid or debt policies.

Interesting that those subject to religious discrimination and persecution are not listed among the vulnerable.

Now note my emphasis and how the three lines (above, here and the one below) of this paragraph switches from “human life” through “people” to “human being”. These are three distinct although related concepts, they are most certainly not synonyms, at least here.

In particular, an unborn foetus (most certainly first trimester) is not yet a person nor a human being.  When conceived it is most certainly not a person or a human being, what is there to protect? Clearly “vulnerable” here does not include the future pregnant mother, however vulnerable they actually are…

What on earth does the “appropriately” mean  in “appropriately seeking asylum”? To charitably interpret it as if said by a non-Christian is as likely to mislead as anything. Given the intent of the rest of the declaration, who decides what is appropriate? God? Christians? These are not the grounds that any citizen who wishes to keep living in a modern liberal democracy would endorse.

We pledge to work to protect the life of every human being from conception to its natural end and we refuse to comply with any directive that compels us to participate in or facilitate abortion, embryo-destructive research, assisted suicide, euthanasia, or any other act that involves intentionally taking innocent human life.

Why the selection of “natural” in “natural end”? When someone who has led a good and fulfilling life, is now naturally suffering in unending pain with no hope of reprieve, they are to be denied their own dignity and worth in choosing to end their own life because it is unnatural? When a terminally ill child is born, with no hope of surviving a few days or weeks, they would rather the child naturally dies in suffering and agony by withholding medical care rather than provide a painless means to end their avoidable suffering?

It appears the signees seem happy to impose additional suffering on the child’s parents and on the members of a terminally ill patient’s family as these all watch as their loved ones suffer unnecessarily and viciously, all due to Christian conscience, which only goes to show that the signees have a warped concept of worth and dignity - then again they did not use “suffering” here, did they?

The pledge here insists that they do not facilitate or participate in “embryo-destructive research” (so embryo-constructive research is ok?).

An interesting story, that just happened in Israel, can cast light on one issue here. It has just introduced a novel solution to the problem of free-riders in organ transplants. The religious do not donate organs but all too willingly accept them, creating a short fall in available organs. The solution is to prioritise those who sign consent to be organ donors. The ones who do not consent go to the bottom of the organ recipient list.

Maybe the same principle should apply here? Anyone who signs this declaration goes to the bottom of the list for gaining any of the benefits of embryo research? I am sure none of the signees would want to be a free rider nor benefit from such research as that, by implication, means participating in it.

The signees are also asking us to sacrifice human beings and cause suffering to many others in the name of their God! All those who lives could be saved and relieved of suffering due to the benefits of embryological research are to be sacrificed because of what they think their God commands! The signees demand human sacrifice of innocents all in the name of preserving the dignity and worth of innocents!

This leads to the final issue in this sentence - who gets to decide who is innocent or not? Is it these Christian’s subjective interpretation of God? Or are they just saying that the guilty can be killed by the state? Do we want to regress to having state sanctioned official killings in the UK?

We will support those who take the same stand.

In the USA there have been the murders of gynaecologists who carry out abortions. According to this declaration those doctors are not innocent – they are the “murderers” of “unborn” children taking “human life” of “persons” “unnaturally” – these doctors are “guilty”.  The signees do not say that that there is a prohibition of taking the lives of the “guilty”. Maybe they would not act to take the lives of those “guilty” doctors, and as far as I know it has not happened in the UK yet but the above makes clear they would support those who do – after all they take the same stand as the signees.

It should be quite clear that the fuzziness of human life, person, human being, dignity and worth is indicative they do not really mean what they are claiming and often mean the opposite!

Marriage

We pledge to support marriage – the lifelong covenantal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.

So they do not recognise divorcees? They will not allow divorcees to re-marry?

We believe it is divinely ordained, the only context for sexual intercourse, and the most important unit for sustaining the health, education, and welfare of all.

You can have as many beliefs as you want but how does this match up to reality? If it does not so much the worse for your beliefs. Why is it that Christians get divorced as often as non-Christians? Divine ordination of Christian marriages has not helped reduced their divorce rate.

Certainly I would agree that caring environment is better for the welfare of our children than not. Sadly many marriages are not the basis of such a caring environment, as the data on incest and domestic violence shows. Rather than divorce as one means to secure a better and more sustaining environment, the signees would want these disastrous marriages to carry on, creating the opposite. To blithely ignore these facts is not to give equal consideration to the worth and dignity to everyone. Not if you are focused on sustaining the health, education and welfare of all.

As for “the only context for sexual intercourse”, Christians need to account for the higher prevalence of teenage pregnancies, venereal disease and the consumption of pornography (oh they did not mention that, may be that is ok?) in areas with higher levels of Christian adherence, in many countries around the world.

Now this is highly correlated with, in many of these areas, the promotion of abstinence over condoms, the lack of sexual education, the deliberate and immoral mis-education about sex such as that condoms cause AIDS, the unavailability of safe alternatives for sex inside and outside of marriage and so on.

Interestingly many of these policies are due to explicit Christian interference in state policies, interference of the type that the signees are implying here in general. One way to protect the vulnerable is not promote situations which makes people vulnerable but that is what all these polices do.

The more you look at this declaration the more incoherent it becomes. Part of this incoherence might be to cover up the elephant in the room – only man and woman can be married and only married couples can have sex. In other words homosexual intercourse would be impossible under such views – does this make these innocents “guilty”? Would not such a Christian society makes such people vulnerable? However they are not “innocent” and so not worthy of protection?

We call on government to honour, promote and protect marriage and we refuse to submit to any edict forcing us to equate any other form of sexual partnership with marriage.

We can all see the elephant now. So they want to preserve their prejudice and bigotry against homosexuals and this declaration says they will regardless of any government edict otherwise. Coupled with the above list of the vulnerable omitting those subject to religious prejudice, what else can any unbiased observer conclude that any signee is endorsing bigotry, specifically homophobia? I doubt they would sign this unwittingly, but you never know, certainly many signees must be well aware of what they are pledging to promote.

We commit ourselves to continue affirming what we believe as Christians about sexual morality, marriage, and the family.

You can commit all you want in the privacy of your own home with consenting adults but outside that, when these commitments conflicts with a modern civilised democracy, hiding behind the claim that “I am only following orders” - by obeying God - should carry no weight in the public sphere. It is becoming clear that anyone who signs this declaration is against the modern civilised democracy that many have suffered and died to bequeath to us.

Maybe the conscience section will alleviate all my concerns so far, or maybe not. Lets see.

Conscience

We count it a special privilege to live in a democratic society where all citizens have the right to participate in the political process.

It should be the norm and it should be an equal right.

We know that in many places today and thought history this “special privilege” of equal citizenship has been denied. Whilst there are many reasons for this, any signee of this declaration needs to be aware that such specifically Christian ideals as expressed, here has been one of those reasons why we do consider it a “special privilege” and not just a norm today, those ideals making it special because in times past when such ideals dominated societies, this “special privilege” did not exist!

We were subjects of divinely appointed monarchs working hand in hand with Christian institutions, we were slaves, serfs and servants of God and not allowed equal dignity and worth. We were not citizens.

Those days are past in the UK, lets not bring them back. If you want to preserve this “special privilege” that is a good reason not to sign this declaration and to condemn those who do. That would be the act of a good Samaritan.

We pledge to do what we can to ensure our laws are just and fair, particularly in protecting vulnerable people.

Given everything else in this declaration this is just empty rhetoric to distract the unwary. This might make you feel warm inside but you need to do a reality check.

We will seek to ensure that religious liberty and freedom of conscience are unequivocally protected against interference by the state and other threats, not only to individuals but also to institutions including families, charities, schools and religious communities.

So the signees wish to preserve their right to take state funds and provide services…not to all, certainly not to homosexual couples willing to adopt children who could benefit from a caring environment, to discriminate against non Christians in employing people in supplying these services, to gain tax exemptions for “charities” that only support their own institutions and buildings and do no real charitable work, to teach this discrimination and proving misleading and failed sex education at schools, this list could go one but this post is already long lets stop there.

Methinks they have a different notion of “special privileges” to what they were implying above. The signees wish to have and preserve special privileges not available to the non-Christian. Maybe it was not a mistake that they omitted “equal” in the first line of this section?

As for “other threats” what does this mean? The signees have not spoken about freedom of speech and expression which would protect anyone from discrimination in pursing their beliefs and conscience whatever they were, provided it did not harm others. Is freedom of speech one of these “other threats”? Is showing the inconsistencies, incoherencies and immorality in this declaration such a threat? We need to be told.

However this line does not only apply to Christians, does it? Here is another problem, we already have an elephant, so I suppose now we are letting the cat out the bag. Everything so far has focused on Christian liberty but they could not say that here without being overtly prejudiced. So “religious liberty” was used instead.

If this is what is now being argued for, on the pain of consistency, whatever basis the Christian signee can use to claim dispensation for requirements to act unjustly, is also available to a member of any other religion.

One could say, as has happened, that extremist Muslims have exercised their religious liberty in blowing up London buses and trains and attempted to blow up Glasgow Airport. They were within their rights and expressing their conscience in doing so. This is the type of society which signees wish to live in.  Anyone can claim dispensation to act against the laws of this country because their religion regards them as unjust. And we must protect their right to religious liberty even as we are being killed. An excellent means to preserve a “just and fair” society.

The arguments just here for religious liberty are no such thing. Let us call a spade a spade, signees of this declaration are arguing for religious tyranny! And anyone, not of any religion, does not have the same “special privilege” to so act, we have to turn back the clock, return to the dark ages, be subjugated to the discrimination and prejudices of the Christians, purely in virtue of them being Christians. And this is meant by “what we can to [do] ensure our laws are just and fair”. Hmmm.

We will not be intimidated by any cultural or political power into silence or acquiescence and we will reject measures that seek to over-rule our Christian consciences or to restrict our freedoms to express Christian beliefs, or to worship and obey God.

Now the declaration is quite blatantly belligerent and showing everyone what it really stands for. Far from supporting the worth and dignity of everyone and protecting the vulnerable, this declaration is an argument to promote discrimination, bigotry and tyranny.

Commitment

We call upon all those in UK positions of leadership, responsibility and influence to pledge to respect, uphold and protect the right of Christians to hold these beliefs and to act according to Christian conscience.

No, anyone in such positions of leadership, responsibility and influence needs to condemn such threats to equality, fairness, liberty and civilisation. Christian and non-Christian alike, if you want to promote and improve the values of our country, we should all be united in exercising our freedom of speech to criticise and condemn anyone who signs this declaration.

Updates

See also The Press On The Westminster Declaration and The Manhattan Versus The Westminste Declaration.

Fisking the Westminster Declaration

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 8, 2010
.
The Westminster Declaration is written by 20 UK based Christians of various influence and renown. This includes Lord Carey, the Former Archbishop of Canterbury; Cardinal O'Brien of the Catholic Church in Scotland; and  Michael Nazir-Ali,  the former Bishop of Rochester. Since its launch at Easter weekend it has gained over 12,000 signatures and counting.The declaration comprises an overview, then a statement of beliefs and values followed by the three areas they aim to speak out and act in defence of: human life, marriage and freedom of conscience. I will start with the statement of beliefs and values. 

Their Beliefs and Values

As Christians we reaffirm historic belief in God the Father (who created us and gave us the blueprint for our lives together); in God the Son Jesus Christ our Saviour (accepting his incarnation, teaching, claims, miracles, death, resurrection and return in judgment); and in God the Holy Spirit (who lives within us, guides us and gives us strength)….

In a modern liberal democracy anyone and everyone should be free to believe whatever gobbledegook they want to. Presumably the above nonsense makes sense to Christians, so no issue there. However the first problem is in the final sentence of this first paragraph:

….We commit ourselves to worship, honour and obey God.[My emphasis here and in all quotes below]

When I first read this, my first thought was that anyone is free to worship or honour whatever they want, however, when it comes to obeying - there are limits. This fear was immediately confirmed in the second paragraph of this section:

As UK citizens we affirm our Christian commitment both to exercise social responsibility in working for the common good and also to be subject to all governing authorities and obey them except when they require us to act unjustly.

One would like to think, that as a UK citizen, if such a Christian were to lose their faith, their “commitment to exercise social responsibility in working for the common good” would remain unaltered. Certainly Christianity  is not necessary for such a commitment, however is it even sufficient when they wish to exclude acting unjustly?

This depends on how injustice is determined. Given the previous emphasis over obeying God, the implication is that injustice is determined by such Christians, that sign or support this declaration, as being relative to God’s commands and if governing authorities conflict with their subjective opinion, they do not have to act as required.

Unfortunately history is littered with “obeying God” being used as a justification for many past injustices and worse - slavery, misogyny, homophobia, apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide. It is true that Christians have sometimes been on both sides, using the argument of “obeying God” to fight those injustices rather than support and promote them. However, given this, it is surely impossible not to conclude that “obeying God” is a wholly indeterminate and hence arbitrary basis for determining injustices. It is a standard of injustice that is woefully and dangerously inadequate in the 21st Century anywhere.

Whilst I agree we should all act to make our government more rather than less just, we need a far better basis than what has been so far implied. Their underlying value here allows promoting injustice in the name of “justice” - it can and has all too easily inverted the meaning of justice in the past – especially when invoking God in support. Let us hope that this analysis will not show that this is the case and that other terms are also not inverted.

George Santayana famously said “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Lets us remember and learn from the past and move forward, rather than forget and move backwards. We need better not worse standards for identifying and fighting injustice. Lowering standards is not an improvement in defence of justice.

Maybe I am jumping the gun, let us see how these values are explicated in their three areas of concern?

Human Life

We believe that being made in the image of God, all human life has intrinsic and equal dignity and worth and that it is the duty of the state to protect the vulnerable.

Sometimes, in such a declaration, what is not said is as relevant as what is said, and one implication of the first line is that they have zero regard for any non human life. So they do not care about obscene and unnecessary maltreatments of animal nor extinction of any species – except where environmental change discomforts humans?

Again they can believe whatever they want to believe with respect to “image of God”, one does not need such a belief to consider any individual of equal worth or dignity.  Again, I hope that if any of these signees or supporters of the declaration lose their faith, they still recognise that all individuals are worthy of equal consideration. Of course, such an “image of God” argument has failed to prevent injustices in the past and often actively encouraged them, the signees have provided, as yet, zero indication that things would be different now.

This makes me wonder do they mean what everyone else means by “vulnerable”? Can I or anyone assume any of the terms they use mean what everyone else in polite society thinks they mean? Lets see what they mean by vulnerable then:

We will support, protect, and be advocates for such people – including children born and unborn, and all those who are sick, disabled, addicted, elderly, in single parent families, poor, exploited, trafficked, appropriately seeking asylum, threatened by environmental change, or exploited by unjust trade, aid or debt policies.

Interesting that those subject to religious discrimination and persecution are not listed among the vulnerable.

Now note my emphasis and how the three lines (above, here and the one below) of this paragraph switches from “human life” through “people” to “human being”. These are three distinct although related concepts, they are most certainly not synonyms, at least here.

In particular, an unborn foetus (most certainly first trimester) is not yet a person nor a human being.  When conceived it is most certainly not a person or a human being, what is there to protect? Clearly “vulnerable” here does not include the future pregnant mother, however vulnerable they actually are…

What on earth does the “appropriately” mean  in “appropriately seeking asylum”? To charitably interpret it as if said by a non-Christian is as likely to mislead as anything. Given the intent of the rest of the declaration, who decides what is appropriate? God? Christians? These are not the grounds that any citizen who wishes to keep living in a modern liberal democracy would endorse.

We pledge to work to protect the life of every human being from conception to its natural end and we refuse to comply with any directive that compels us to participate in or facilitate abortion, embryo-destructive research, assisted suicide, euthanasia, or any other act that involves intentionally taking innocent human life.

Why the selection of “natural” in “natural end”? When someone who has led a good and fulfilling life, is now naturally suffering in unending pain with no hope of reprieve, they are to be denied their own dignity and worth in choosing to end their own life because it is unnatural? When a terminally ill child is born, with no hope of surviving a few days or weeks, they would rather the child naturally dies in suffering and agony by withholding medical care rather than provide a painless means to end their avoidable suffering?

It appears the signees seem happy to impose additional suffering on the child’s parents and on the members of a terminally ill patient’s family as these all watch as their loved ones suffer unnecessarily and viciously, all due to Christian conscience, which only goes to show that the signees have a warped concept of worth and dignity - then again they did not use “suffering” here, did they?

The pledge here insists that they do not facilitate or participate in “embryo-destructive research” (so embryo-constructive research is ok?).

An interesting story, that just happened in Israel, can cast light on one issue here. It has just introduced a novel solution to the problem of free-riders in organ transplants. The religious do not donate organs but all too willingly accept them, creating a short fall in available organs. The solution is to prioritise those who sign consent to be organ donors. The ones who do not consent go to the bottom of the organ recipient list.

Maybe the same principle should apply here? Anyone who signs this declaration goes to the bottom of the list for gaining any of the benefits of embryo research? I am sure none of the signees would want to be a free rider nor benefit from such research as that, by implication, means participating in it.

The signees are also asking us to sacrifice human beings and cause suffering to many others in the name of their God! All those who lives could be saved and relieved of suffering due to the benefits of embryological research are to be sacrificed because of what they think their God commands! The signees demand human sacrifice of innocents all in the name of preserving the dignity and worth of innocents!

This leads to the final issue in this sentence - who gets to decide who is innocent or not? Is it these Christian’s subjective interpretation of God? Or are they just saying that the guilty can be killed by the state? Do we want to regress to having state sanctioned official killings in the UK?

We will support those who take the same stand.

In the USA there have been the murders of gynaecologists who carry out abortions. According to this declaration those doctors are not innocent – they are the “murderers” of “unborn” children taking “human life” of “persons” “unnaturally” – these doctors are “guilty”.  The signees do not say that that there is a prohibition of taking the lives of the “guilty”. Maybe they would not act to take the lives of those “guilty” doctors, and as far as I know it has not happened in the UK yet but the above makes clear they would support those who do – after all they take the same stand as the signees.

It should be quite clear that the fuzziness of human life, person, human being, dignity and worth is indicative they do not really mean what they are claiming and often mean the opposite!

Marriage

We pledge to support marriage – the lifelong covenantal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.

So they do not recognise divorcees? They will not allow divorcees to re-marry?

We believe it is divinely ordained, the only context for sexual intercourse, and the most important unit for sustaining the health, education, and welfare of all.

You can have as many beliefs as you want but how does this match up to reality? If it does not so much the worse for your beliefs. Why is it that Christians get divorced as often as non-Christians? Divine ordination of Christian marriages has not helped reduced their divorce rate.

Certainly I would agree that caring environment is better for the welfare of our children than not. Sadly many marriages are not the basis of such a caring environment, as the data on incest and domestic violence shows. Rather than divorce as one means to secure a better and more sustaining environment, the signees would want these disastrous marriages to carry on, creating the opposite. To blithely ignore these facts is not to give equal consideration to the worth and dignity to everyone. Not if you are focused on sustaining the health, education and welfare of all.

As for “the only context for sexual intercourse”, Christians need to account for the higher prevalence of teenage pregnancies, venereal disease and the consumption of pornography (oh they did not mention that, may be that is ok?) in areas with higher levels of Christian adherence, in many countries around the world.

Now this is highly correlated with, in many of these areas, the promotion of abstinence over condoms, the lack of sexual education, the deliberate and immoral mis-education about sex such as that condoms cause AIDS, the unavailability of safe alternatives for sex inside and outside of marriage and so on.

Interestingly many of these policies are due to explicit Christian interference in state policies, interference of the type that the signees are implying here in general. One way to protect the vulnerable is not promote situations which makes people vulnerable but that is what all these polices do.

The more you look at this declaration the more incoherent it becomes. Part of this incoherence might be to cover up the elephant in the room – only man and woman can be married and only married couples can have sex. In other words homosexual intercourse would be impossible under such views – does this make these innocents “guilty”? Would not such a Christian society makes such people vulnerable? However they are not “innocent” and so not worthy of protection?

We call on government to honour, promote and protect marriage and we refuse to submit to any edict forcing us to equate any other form of sexual partnership with marriage.

We can all see the elephant now. So they want to preserve their prejudice and bigotry against homosexuals and this declaration says they will regardless of any government edict otherwise. Coupled with the above list of the vulnerable omitting those subject to religious prejudice, what else can any unbiased observer conclude that any signee is endorsing bigotry, specifically homophobia? I doubt they would sign this unwittingly, but you never know, certainly many signees must be well aware of what they are pledging to promote.

We commit ourselves to continue affirming what we believe as Christians about sexual morality, marriage, and the family.

You can commit all you want in the privacy of your own home with consenting adults but outside that, when these commitments conflicts with a modern civilised democracy, hiding behind the claim that “I am only following orders” - by obeying God - should carry no weight in the public sphere. It is becoming clear that anyone who signs this declaration is against the modern civilised democracy that many have suffered and died to bequeath to us.

Maybe the conscience section will alleviate all my concerns so far, or maybe not. Lets see.

Conscience

We count it a special privilege to live in a democratic society where all citizens have the right to participate in the political process.

It should be the norm and it should be an equal right.

We know that in many places today and thought history this “special privilege” of equal citizenship has been denied. Whilst there are many reasons for this, any signee of this declaration needs to be aware that such specifically Christian ideals as expressed, here has been one of those reasons why we do consider it a “special privilege” and not just a norm today, those ideals making it special because in times past when such ideals dominated societies, this “special privilege” did not exist!

We were subjects of divinely appointed monarchs working hand in hand with Christian institutions, we were slaves, serfs and servants of God and not allowed equal dignity and worth. We were not citizens.

Those days are past in the UK, lets not bring them back. If you want to preserve this “special privilege” that is a good reason not to sign this declaration and to condemn those who do. That would be the act of a good Samaritan.

We pledge to do what we can to ensure our laws are just and fair, particularly in protecting vulnerable people.

Given everything else in this declaration this is just empty rhetoric to distract the unwary. This might make you feel warm inside but you need to do a reality check.

We will seek to ensure that religious liberty and freedom of conscience are unequivocally protected against interference by the state and other threats, not only to individuals but also to institutions including families, charities, schools and religious communities.

So the signees wish to preserve their right to take state funds and provide services…not to all, certainly not to homosexual couples willing to adopt children who could benefit from a caring environment, to discriminate against non Christians in employing people in supplying these services, to gain tax exemptions for “charities” that only support their own institutions and buildings and do no real charitable work, to teach this discrimination and proving misleading and failed sex education at schools, this list could go one but this post is already long lets stop there.

Methinks they have a different notion of “special privileges” to what they were implying above. The signees wish to have and preserve special privileges not available to the non-Christian. Maybe it was not a mistake that they omitted “equal” in the first line of this section?

As for “other threats” what does this mean? The signees have not spoken about freedom of speech and expression which would protect anyone from discrimination in pursing their beliefs and conscience whatever they were, provided it did not harm others. Is freedom of speech one of these “other threats”? Is showing the inconsistencies, incoherencies and immorality in this declaration such a threat? We need to be told.

However this line does not only apply to Christians, does it? Here is another problem, we already have an elephant, so I suppose now we are letting the cat out the bag. Everything so far has focused on Christian liberty but they could not say that here without being overtly prejudiced. So “religious liberty” was used instead.

If this is what is now being argued for, on the pain of consistency, whatever basis the Christian signee can use to claim dispensation for requirements to act unjustly, is also available to a member of any other religion.

One could say, as has happened, that extremist Muslims have exercised their religious liberty in blowing up London buses and trains and attempted to blow up Glasgow Airport. They were within their rights and expressing their conscience in doing so. This is the type of society which signees wish to live in.  Anyone can claim dispensation to act against the laws of this country because their religion regards them as unjust. And we must protect their right to religious liberty even as we are being killed. An excellent means to preserve a “just and fair” society.

The arguments just here for religious liberty are no such thing. Let us call a spade a spade, signees of this declaration are arguing for religious tyranny! And anyone, not of any religion, does not have the same “special privilege” to so act, we have to turn back the clock, return to the dark ages, be subjugated to the discrimination and prejudices of the Christians, purely in virtue of them being Christians. And this is meant by “what we can to [do] ensure our laws are just and fair”. Hmmm.

We will not be intimidated by any cultural or political power into silence or acquiescence and we will reject measures that seek to over-rule our Christian consciences or to restrict our freedoms to express Christian beliefs, or to worship and obey God.

Now the declaration is quite blatantly belligerent and showing everyone what it really stands for. Far from supporting the worth and dignity of everyone and protecting the vulnerable, this declaration is an argument to promote discrimination, bigotry and tyranny.

Commitment

We call upon all those in UK positions of leadership, responsibility and influence to pledge to respect, uphold and protect the right of Christians to hold these beliefs and to act according to Christian conscience.

No, anyone in such positions of leadership, responsibility and influence needs to condemn such threats to equality, fairness, liberty and civilisation. Christian and non-Christian alike, if you want to promote and improve the values of our country, we should all be united in exercising our freedom of speech to criticise and condemn anyone who signs this declaration.

Updates

See also The Press On The Westminster Declaration and The Manhattan Versus The Westminste Declaration.

The Westminster Manifesto

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 8, 2010
.

 

WestminsterManifestoImage

A UK equivalent to the Manhattan Declaration has recently been created. This is the Westminster Declaration.  I will analyse this declaration and its political and social implications in future posts.

I must note I am not impressed - although not surprised - by the signatories to date :-)

The Westminster Manifesto

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 8, 2010
.

 

WestminsterManifestoImage

A UK equivalent to the Manhattan Declaration has recently been created. This is the Westminster Declaration.  I will analyse this declaration and its political and social implications in future posts.

I must note I am not impressed - although not surprised - by the signatories to date :-)

Why consider all desires that exist?

Published
by
faithlessgod
on April 7, 2010
.

In the ethical framework I support called desirism is the requirement that one considers “all desires that exist”. Now Kip, who has commented on this blog and other blogs that advocate desirism and is largely also an advocate of desirism, and is well able to identify and argue against the all too common poor, unsound and invalid objections against desirism, still has an issue over this requirement. In his own words:

You know I am very fond of Desirism... but can't help thinking that the idea that we should consider "all desires that exist" into the moral calculus is just plain wrong.  I mean, you can do that, but then you aren't talking about the same system of morality that I think the theory was trying to capture -- the system that is being used by people.

…

Desirism states:  a practical-ought is relative to "the desires in question"; a moral-ought is relative to "all the desires that exist".  Why "all the desires that exist", and not just a subset of them?

My objection is that this claim is just an assertion -- that there is no reason or evidence to support it.

…

There are no moral laws of the universe that tell us to consider all desires that exist. That is just Alonzo's assertion.

Well is it just Alonzo’s assertion and if not, why not?

Kip provides a number of related objections in making his argument.  I have labelled these:

  • The Multiverse Objection
  • The Omniscience Objection
  • The Universal Objection
  • The Influencing Objection

The Multiverse Objection

[in] saying that when people say "you should not rape", that the desires in question for this statement include every desire that exists in the entire multi/universe.

In the two recent Doctor Who Series finales, the enemies of the Doctor were trying to destroy not just this universe but all universes – the multiverse – with the means to survive such destruction! How they how they could have destroyed the multiverse, let alone survived such destruction, is a question for science fiction. Here such desires can surely be seen as the ultimate desire-thwarting desires, can anyone imagine any desire more desire-thwarting than the destruction of the multiverse?

Now in such a science fiction scenario, the desire-desire cause-effect relations are such that the desire to destroy the multiverse is a causal desire and all desires that exist in the multiverse are necessarily affected. However, luckily, we do not as far as we know live in such a multiverse. As far as we know  the maximum causal scope of a desire is the world we live on now and no farther.  Whilst that might change in the far future the underlying principles would not, namely what are the cause-effect relations.

I do not know if Kip intended this as a reductio ad absurdum over  what “all desires that exist” means but, regardless, once one recognises that out of “all desires that exist” it is only the ones that are affected that are an issue, then surely this multiverse objection fails.   

I could dwell on global desire-thwarting issues such as Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) but that would be diversionary to the theme of this post. Still it is relevant to note two points on this.

The first is that AGW and other global issues illustrate, whether one agrees with their arguments or not, that there can be a global scope to the effect of certain desires. At this stage in our evolution the scope is only global, not stellar, let alone galactic, universal (in the cosmological sense) or multiversal.

The second is that many of the disputes over  AGW and so on, revolve over what is knowable now, certainly compared to the past and this leads to Kip’s next objection:

The Omniscience Objection

And, couldn't be the case as people are not omniscient.  At the most, people would mean "considering all the desires that we are aware of". 

With regard to Kip’s issue over omniscience not only does desirism not demand it but it already incorporates this cognitive limitation.

It provides substance to the reasonable person test in the establishment of Mens Rea “Guilty Mind” in criminal and civil judgements. If an actor caused a prima facie legal wrong they can be excused if it can be shown that no reasonable person could have done better in that situation, that is they were not acting in a negligent, reckless or knowing manner.  

Consider Asbestos. When it was developed it was regarded as having positive economic-value and use-value due to providing energy saving insulation. It was also regarded as having zero or neutral health-value. 

At some stage it was discovered – by one of the few great successes of epidemiology as it happens – that it has negative health-value (other means could have established this but it happened this way).

From that stage forward to promote the economic usefulness of asbestos by disregarding, ignoring, denying  or otherwise avoiding the negative health-value of asbestos made one morally and (eventually) legally culpable. One could only proceed to do so by being negligent, reckless or ignoring what was foreseeable.

Still prior to this, no-one could be held responsible, one could not demand an impossible omniscience. 

Partly as a result of story of Asbestos (and Thalidomide and so on) there is much issue made over trying to determine the currently unknown and maybe non-existent dangers of new technologies such as genetically modified foods and so on. Whatever the specifics over such controversies (and if they really are controversies) it is still the case that if one has made best efforts to ensure the safety and health issues, one could not be held responsible for not being omniscient.

Many new facts and discoveries emerge that can require revision of the health and other values of existing technologies (revised both positively as well as negatively) but desirism employs these same provisional principles, the ones that are shared by the best means to knowledge such as science. All ethical knowledge can ever be is provisional, the only challenge to seek the best provisional conclusion available, rather than lower such standards to permit less than best conclusions to be allowed.

The Influencing Objection

I actually think people mean "considering all the desires that we include in our "moral sphere", those that are capable of influencing us"

How does this connect to the cause-effect relations that desires have upon other desires?

If Group A discriminates (or worse) against Group B and Group B has no power to influence group A, it is still the case that Group B is affected by Group A. Further Group B has no ability to affect Group A – whether due to natural or social constraints and limitations - that it is why it has no influence over Group A. 

It seems that much of the history of moral progress is over this distinction between influence and affect and the institutionalised imbalance of the ability to affect one other. Whether this was and is apartheid both past (South Africa) and present (Sharia Law states) or slavery or misogynistic societies (ahem…Sharia law states again and so on) and so on, these can all be characterised this way.  This leads to the final version of Kip’s argument:

The Universal Objection

I guess it's that "universal" word that I'm now disagreeing with.  That doesn't reflect the actual usage of our moral institutions and practices, and it doesn't even make prudential sense to try to make it that way -- it's impossible.

…

I think a group of moral agents should (prudential reason for action) only consider the desires that are able to influence their desires (either through moral tools or force).  The agents using the social tools should (prudentially) consider any and all desires that need to be harmonized.  They should not (prudentially) consider desires that do not need to be harmonized, and they could not consider all desires that existed even if they wanted to (since they are not omniscient).

…

Further, if ought implies can, then it would be wrong to say that they moral-should consider all desires that exist, since they cannot do that.

If there is no multiversal scope or omniscient requirement it is not impossible.

Still the question to ask is why should Group A care about Group B? However just asking the questions presupposes the consideration of all desire that exist – the ones that can be reasonably be determined to be affected. Whatever answer a representative of Group A gives such as:-

  • we do not consider their desires
  • we do not need to consider their desires
  • their desires cannot influence us, so we do not need to concern ourselves of those desires
  • that is the way we always do (did) it
  • we are stronger and can get a way with it
  • we are more and can get away with it
  • we have the law on our side
  • we have God on our side
  • their desires are not worthy of moral consideration

and many other possible defences all presuppose that, in this case, the question over “all desires that exist” means the desires of Group B. This presupposition is both intelligible and feasible and neither impossible nor beyond cognitive capacities.

In asking the question to Group A “why do you ignore the desire of Group B?” one is seeking a rational and empirical justification, the above does not assume that none is possible. Indeed the above does shows that there can be one such justification, based on the fact that we are not omniscient but this only applies where there is new knowledge that a reasonable (or good) person could not now ignore. The many answers bulleted above all fail as rational and empirical justifications for Group A’s practises.

Desire that exist

There is another meaning over the term “all desires that exist” - the whole basis of asking such questions of Group A (and Group B as well for that matter) is that it is not over the desires they (internally) do have but over the desires that they could have – desire that exist. This is externalism, the institution of morality being the way to internalise such external desires.

Evaluating Moral Institutions

The last bulleted pseudo-justification is particularly telling as many claim morality on their side to “justify” their desires and actions. This too, is to be expected within a desirist analysis. It makes no difference whether they defend their position using “morality” and moral-speak or not, it is still a fact that their practices are desire-thwarting.

Like science that can recursively apply its own standards to the the methods by which it achieves provisional scientific knowledge, any such institution (of morality) can themselves be evaluated for how effective they are, in the Group A/Group B scenarios they are not.

Conclusion

I hope this addresses Kip’s concerns who I have otherwise found to be an able exponent of desirism. I regard the fact that Kip still asks such questions is a positive sign as I would never want anyone to accept such arguments without robust challenges. This and any other successful ethical theory should be well able to handle such objections and at least Kip presents decent challenges to desirism, still ones that desirism can refute.

In short that is no demand for omniscience and such cognitive limitations are incorporated into any desirist analysis of any situation.  To ask the question about what desires to consider is to presuppose all desires that could exist in order to find the desires that are actually affected and that anyone reasonably asking that question could know about. There is no reason to suppose today that there are any such affected desires that reach beyond this planet. Any defence is open to a critical evaluation which again presupposes in an intelligible and reasonable fashion what are the relevant desires. A “moral defence” and other defences that excludes - prior to argument - certain desires from consideration, is an illegitimate defence since if one wishes to argue for the exclusion of some desire that has be done in the argument and not before.

Neither Alonzo, myself nor anyone else is making an arbitrary or subjective assertion to consider all desires that exist, it is inherent in the objective approach of this framework that these are all to be considered unless and until some reasonable rational and empirical argument can show otherwise.

Update

I have provided three replies to Kip’s questions in the comments here. These are:

  1. Why Consider Others When You Don’t Need To
  • All Desires Versus Affected Desires
  • Rational And Irrational Justifications

    • In addition, Alonzo Fyfe has replied again to Kip’s issues on CommonsenseAtheism blog in the post All Desires that Exist.

    This also addresses some points raised in posts 1 and 2 above. Both Alonzo’s reply and mine are quite consistent, although I realize now that it is still possible to misread some of my analysis in the way that Alonzo argues against. So it is useful to read my posts in conjunction with Alonzo’s, to avoid any such misreading.

    In short, the reason one analyses all desires that exist, and so finding and not omitting all the affected desires, is so that one can identify and predict those who have reasons to promote or inhibit the desire under evaluation. It would be misreading this analysis to think that there is any overall ethical principal or commandment such as “Thou Shalt consider all desires” in addition to such requirements.

    Why consider all desires that exist?

    Published
    by
    faithlessgod
    on April 7, 2010
    .

    In the ethical framework I support called desirism is the requirement that one considers “all desires that exist”. Now Kip, who has commented on this blog and other blogs that advocate desirism and is largely also an advocate of desirism, and is well able to identify and argue against the all too common poor, unsound and invalid objections against desirism, still has an issue over this requirement. In his own words:

    You know I am very fond of Desirism... but can't help thinking that the idea that we should consider "all desires that exist" into the moral calculus is just plain wrong.  I mean, you can do that, but then you aren't talking about the same system of morality that I think the theory was trying to capture -- the system that is being used by people.

    …

    Desirism states:  a practical-ought is relative to "the desires in question"; a moral-ought is relative to "all the desires that exist".  Why "all the desires that exist", and not just a subset of them?

    My objection is that this claim is just an assertion -- that there is no reason or evidence to support it.

    …

    There are no moral laws of the universe that tell us to consider all desires that exist. That is just Alonzo's assertion.

    Well is it just Alonzo’s assertion and if not, why not?

    Kip provides a number of related objections in making his argument.  I have labelled these:

    • The Multiverse Objection
    • The Omniscience Objection
    • The Universal Objection
    • The Influencing Objection

    The Multiverse Objection

    [in] saying that when people say "you should not rape", that the desires in question for this statement include every desire that exists in the entire multi/universe.

    In the two recent Doctor Who Series finales, the enemies of the Doctor were trying to destroy not just this universe but all universes – the multiverse – with the means to survive such destruction! How they how they could have destroyed the multiverse, let alone survived such destruction, is a question for science fiction. Here such desires can surely be seen as the ultimate desire-thwarting desires, can anyone imagine any desire more desire-thwarting than the destruction of the multiverse?

    Now in such a science fiction scenario, the desire-desire cause-effect relations are such that the desire to destroy the multiverse is a causal desire and all desires that exist in the multiverse are necessarily affected. However, luckily, we do not as far as we know live in such a multiverse. As far as we know  the maximum causal scope of a desire is the world we live on now and no farther.  Whilst that might change in the far future the underlying principles would not, namely what are the cause-effect relations.

    I do not know if Kip intended this as a reductio ad absurdum over  what “all desires that exist” means but, regardless, once one recognises that out of “all desires that exist” it is only the ones that are affected that are an issue, then surely this multiverse objection fails.   

    I could dwell on global desire-thwarting issues such as Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) but that would be diversionary to the theme of this post. Still it is relevant to note two points on this.

    The first is that AGW and other global issues illustrate, whether one agrees with their arguments or not, that there can be a global scope to the effect of certain desires. At this stage in our evolution the scope is only global, not stellar, let alone galactic, universal (in the cosmological sense) or multiversal.

    The second is that many of the disputes over  AGW and so on, revolve over what is knowable now, certainly compared to the past and this leads to Kip’s next objection:

    The Omniscience Objection

    And, couldn't be the case as people are not omniscient.  At the most, people would mean "considering all the desires that we are aware of". 

    With regard to Kip’s issue over omniscience not only does desirism not demand it but it already incorporates this cognitive limitation.

    It provides substance to the reasonable person test in the establishment of Mens Rea “Guilty Mind” in criminal and civil judgements. If an actor caused a prima facie legal wrong they can be excused if it can be shown that no reasonable person could have done better in that situation, that is they were not acting in a negligent, reckless or knowing manner.  

    Consider Asbestos. When it was developed it was regarded as having positive economic-value and use-value due to providing energy saving insulation. It was also regarded as having zero or neutral health-value. 

    At some stage it was discovered – by one of the few great successes of epidemiology as it happens – that it has negative health-value (other means could have established this but it happened this way).

    From that stage forward to promote the economic usefulness of asbestos by disregarding, ignoring, denying  or otherwise avoiding the negative health-value of asbestos made one morally and (eventually) legally culpable. One could only proceed to do so by being negligent, reckless or ignoring what was foreseeable.

    Still prior to this, no-one could be held responsible, one could not demand an impossible omniscience. 

    Partly as a result of story of Asbestos (and Thalidomide and so on) there is much issue made over trying to determine the currently unknown and maybe non-existent dangers of new technologies such as genetically modified foods and so on. Whatever the specifics over such controversies (and if they really are controversies) it is still the case that if one has made best efforts to ensure the safety and health issues, one could not be held responsible for not being omniscient.

    Many new facts and discoveries emerge that can require revision of the health and other values of existing technologies (revised both positively as well as negatively) but desirism employs these same provisional principles, the ones that are shared by the best means to knowledge such as science. All ethical knowledge can ever be is provisional, the only challenge to seek the best provisional conclusion available, rather than lower such standards to permit less than best conclusions to be allowed.

    The Influencing Objection

    I actually think people mean "considering all the desires that we include in our "moral sphere", those that are capable of influencing us"

    How does this connect to the cause-effect relations that desires have upon other desires?

    If Group A discriminates (or worse) against Group B and Group B has no power to influence group A, it is still the case that Group B is affected by Group A. Further Group B has no ability to affect Group A – whether due to natural or social constraints and limitations - that it is why it has no influence over Group A. 

    It seems that much of the history of moral progress is over this distinction between influence and affect and the institutionalised imbalance of the ability to affect one other. Whether this was and is apartheid both past (South Africa) and present (Sharia Law states) or slavery or misogynistic societies (ahem…Sharia law states again and so on) and so on, these can all be characterised this way.  This leads to the final version of Kip’s argument:

    The Universal Objection

    I guess it's that "universal" word that I'm now disagreeing with.  That doesn't reflect the actual usage of our moral institutions and practices, and it doesn't even make prudential sense to try to make it that way -- it's impossible.

    …

    I think a group of moral agents should (prudential reason for action) only consider the desires that are able to influence their desires (either through moral tools or force).  The agents using the social tools should (prudentially) consider any and all desires that need to be harmonized.  They should not (prudentially) consider desires that do not need to be harmonized, and they could not consider all desires that existed even if they wanted to (since they are not omniscient).

    …

    Further, if ought implies can, then it would be wrong to say that they moral-should consider all desires that exist, since they cannot do that.

    If there is no multiversal scope or omniscient requirement it is not impossible.

    Still the question to ask is why should Group A care about Group B? However just asking the questions presupposes the consideration of all desire that exist – the ones that can be reasonably be determined to be affected. Whatever answer a representative of Group A gives such as:-

    • we do not consider their desires
    • we do not need to consider their desires
    • their desires cannot influence us, so we do not need to concern ourselves of those desires
    • that is the way we always do (did) it
    • we are stronger and can get a way with it
    • we are more and can get away with it
    • we have the law on our side
    • we have God on our side
    • their desires are not worthy of moral consideration

    and many other possible defences all presuppose that, in this case, the question over “all desires that exist” means the desires of Group B. This presupposition is both intelligible and feasible and neither impossible nor beyond cognitive capacities.

    In asking the question to Group A “why do you ignore the desire of Group B?” one is seeking a rational and empirical justification, the above does not assume that none is possible. Indeed the above does shows that there can be one such justification, based on the fact that we are not omniscient but this only applies where there is new knowledge that a reasonable (or good) person could not now ignore. The many answers bulleted above all fail as rational and empirical justifications for Group A’s practises.

    Desire that exist

    There is another meaning over the term “all desires that exist” - the whole basis of asking such questions of Group A (and Group B as well for that matter) is that it is not over the desires they (internally) do have but over the desires that they could have – desire that exist. This is externalism, the institution of morality being the way to internalise such external desires.

    Evaluating Moral Institutions

    The last bulleted pseudo-justification is particularly telling as many claim morality on their side to “justify” their desires and actions. This too, is to be expected within a desirist analysis. It makes no difference whether they defend their position using “morality” and moral-speak or not, it is still a fact that their practices are desire-thwarting.

    Like science that can recursively apply its own standards to the the methods by which it achieves provisional scientific knowledge, any such institution (of morality) can themselves be evaluated for how effective they are, in the Group A/Group B scenarios they are not.

    Conclusion

    I hope this addresses Kip’s concerns who I have otherwise found to be an able exponent of desirism. I regard the fact that Kip still asks such questions is a positive sign as I would never want anyone to accept such arguments without robust challenges. This and any other successful ethical theory should be well able to handle such objections and at least Kip presents decent challenges to desirism, still ones that desirism can refute.

    In short that is no demand for omniscience and such cognitive limitations are incorporated into any desirist analysis of any situation.  To ask the question about what desires to consider is to presuppose all desires that could exist in order to find the desires that are actually affected and that anyone reasonably asking that question could know about. There is no reason to suppose today that there are any such affected desires that reach beyond this planet. Any defence is open to a critical evaluation which again presupposes in an intelligible and reasonable fashion what are the relevant desires. A “moral defence” and other defences that excludes - prior to argument - certain desires from consideration, is an illegitimate defence since if one wishes to argue for the exclusion of some desire that has be done in the argument and not before.

    Neither Alonzo, myself nor anyone else is making an arbitrary or subjective assertion to consider all desires that exist, it is inherent in the objective approach of this framework that these are all to be considered unless and until some reasonable rational and empirical argument can show otherwise.

    Update

    I have provided three replies to Kip’s questions in the comments here. These are:

    1. Why Consider Others When You Don’t Need To
  • All Desires Versus Affected Desires
  • Rational And Irrational Justifications

    • In addition, Alonzo Fyfe has replied again to Kip’s issues on CommonsenseAtheism blog in the post All Desires that Exist.

    This also addresses some points raised in posts 1 and 2 above. Both Alonzo’s reply and mine are quite consistent, although I realize now that it is still possible to misread some of my analysis in the way that Alonzo argues against. So it is useful to read my posts in conjunction with Alonzo’s, to avoid any such misreading.

    In short, the reason one analyses all desires that exist, and so finding and not omitting all the affected desires, is so that one can identify and predict those who have reasons to promote or inhibit the desire under evaluation. It would be misreading this analysis to think that there is any overall ethical principal or commandment such as “Thou Shalt consider all desires” in addition to such requirements.