A brief sampling:

1789: After the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.

1810: If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain, any title of nobility or honour, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.

1860: In all the territory of the United States now held, or hereafter acquired, situate north of 36 degrees 30 minutes, slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is prohibited while such territory shall remain under territorial government. In all the territory south of said line of latitude, slavery of the African race is hereby recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by Congress, but shall be protected as property by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance. (…) Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under its exclusive jurisdiction, and situate within the limits of States that permit the holding of slaves.

1861: No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

1912: [I]ntermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caucasians or any other character of persons within the United States or any territory under their jurisdiction, is forever prohibited; and the term ‘negro or person of color,’ as here employed, shall be held to mean any and all persons of African descent or having any trace of African or negro blood.

1954: This nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Ruler of nations, through whom are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.

2004: Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.

Q1. How would you define “atheism”?

Technically: Lack of belief in the existence of a god or gods. I acknowledge the colloquial use of the word as meaning an active disbelief in the existence of a god or gods, but maintain that an atheist need not adhere to the colloquial use in order to call him- or herself an atheist.

Q2. Was your upbringing religious? If so, what tradition?

My parents were social Methodists, and I was confirmed in that church. I also spent a brief period of time as a Baptist.

Q3. How would you describe “Intelligent Design”, using only one word?

Nontheory.

Q4. What scientific endeavour really excites you?

Manned space flight. It’s long past time we go back to the Moon, and out to Mars and the Belt.

Q5. If you could change one thing about the “atheist community”, what would it be and why?

I would probably do something about this “New Atheist” movement. For one thing, I hate the designation, as it was invented by Christians and implies that atheism has gone somewhere and returned. For another, I think the complaints these people have about the practical consequences of religion, while perfectly valid, are entirely irrelevant to the existence or nonexistence of God — and that is the only issue that matters in whether or not someone is an atheist. (More on this subject here.)

Q6. If your child came up to you and said “I’m joining the clergy”, what would be your first response?

“Why?”

Q7. What’s your favourite theistic argument, and how do you usually refute it?

My favorite theistic argument is any argument that’s laid out in logical format — premise, premise, conclusion — and its reasoning well-explained. Such arguments are so rare from the theistic community that they are refreshing to read; the major example of such an argument is the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which, of course, has been soundly refuted by many atheists. As for how I refute it, I simply point out the invalidity of the logical deduction and/or the unjustifiability of one or more premises. If I am unable to do this, then I am faced with what may be a sound argument, and may therefore have to reconsider my atheism. But that hasn’t happened yet.

Q8. What’s your most “controversial” (as far as general attitudes amongst other atheists goes) viewpoint?

Unlike most atheists, I believe that we should at least consider outlawing religion. Not today, to be certain, but at some point down the line.

Q9. Of the “Four Horsemen” (Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and Harris) who is your favourite, and why?

Probably Dawkins, due mainly to the whole “Expelled” affair. Also the accent.

Q10. If you could convince just one theistic person to abandon their beliefs, who would it be?

Neal Morse. I miss his secular music.

Now name three other atheist blogs that you’d like to see take up the Atheist Thirteen gauntlet:

Since I’m a relative latecomer to the Atheist Thirteen, and therefore am hard-pressed to find a blog that hasn’t already answered it, I’m just going to say that guy, that other guy, and that guy over there.

This post is for a debate between myself and Ernie Laurence, Jr. regarding the free will defense against the argument from suffering. The debate will proceed as follows:

1. Ernie will go first (decided earlier by “coin flip”), and will post a statement of up to 2000 words arguing that “The concepts of free-will, Jehovah, and the existence of suffering are logically consistent with one another.”

2. I will post a rebuttal to Ernie’s argument, of up to 1000 words.

3. Ernie will respond in 500 words or less.

4. I will then post my own positive argument, in 2000 words or less, that “The existence of the Christian God is logically incompatible with the existence of suffering; moreover, the concept of free will does not negate this incompatibility.”

5. Ernie’s 1000 word rebuttal.

6. My 500 word response.

Once the debate is concluded I will move the material onto a separate web page on this site and, if both parties are so interested, we can start another debate on a different topic.

For the sake of keeping things organized, I’m going to ask everyone except Ernie to refrain from posting in this thread. After Ernie posts his opening statement, I’ll start a new thread for discussion on the debate — which I’m going to ask Ernie to stay out of until the debate is completed. I’ll do the same.

Ernie, the floor is yours . . .

THE VERY STRONG ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE

(With apologies to Terry Pratchett . . .)

Hypothesis: The purpose of the universe is to bring about a particular being, Dave Holloway, aka Silent Dave, a bipedal, carbon-based sentient being who lives in Minnesota in the 20th and 21st century (local referents), has a girlfriend named Cassie, and blogs about atheism.

Predictions made by the theory: That this being should exist, should live in the time and place indicated, should have the aforementioned girlfriend, and should blog about atheism; moreover, that the universe should be such as to make it physically possible for all this to happen.

Potential falsifications of the theory: That this being should not exist as described, or that any condition should obtain which would preclude this being from existing as described.

Falsifications observed: None.

At this point, I shall transition to a Q&A format, questioning VSAP from the perspective of a proponent of the Theistic Anthropic Principle (TAP), which states that the purpose of the universe is to bring about a race of bipedal, carbon-based beings many of whom love and worship God.

Q: What gave you the idea that the VSAP might be true?

A: A magical being told me.

Q: Millions upon millions of people believe in the TAP. How many people, beside yourself, believe in the VSAP?

A: None so far as I know, but of course, maintaining that the unpopularity of a premise entails its falsehood is a logical fallacy.

Q: How does the VSAP explain Christianity?

A: A by-product of conditions for carbon-based bipedal beings obtaining, similar to how evil is a by-product of free will obtaining, according to the Christian hypothesis.

Q: How does the VSAP explain the wonder and grandeur of the universe?

A: With the same arbitrariness as the TAP.

Q: What do you stand to lose if the TAP is true and you fail to act accordingly?

A: What do YOU stand to lose if the VSAP is true and you fail to act accordingly? That would mean deferring to the entity for whose benefit the universe itself was created.

Q: You mean yourself?

A: Yep.

Q: Aren’t you a bit egotistical?

A: Only in one respect: instead of applying the principle to members of a particular religion, for whose benefit the universe was supposedly created, I am applying it much more narrowly. This gives it more predictive power.

Q: The TAP predicts the existence of many more entities than does the VSAP. Doesn’t that mean the TAP has more predictive power, and is therefore more logical?

A: If that’s the way it works, then both TAP and VSAP should defer to a third principle, the Smolin Not-so-Anthropic Principle (SNAP). Conceptualized by physicist Lee Smolin, the SNAP theorizes that the purpose of the universe is to bring about as many black holes as possible.

Q: Black holes? What’s so great about black holes?

A: What’s so great about humans?

Q: Humans have mind. Black holes do not.

A: What’s so great about mind?

Q: I thought I was asking the questions!

A: Sorry.

Q: What about the Other Very Strong Anthropic Principle (O-VSAP), according to which the purpose of the universe is to bring about (let us say) a Christian apologist named William Lane Craig? Doesn’t it have the same predictive power as the VSAP?

A: I suppose it does, but I have reason for believing that the VSAP, rather than the OVSAP, is true.

Q: What reason is that?

A: A magical being told me.

Q: What’s the purpose of arguing for VSAP, anyway? It doesn’t prove that Christianity is false.

A: The purpose here is to make a point regarding the TAP, which all variants of the theistic design or “fine-tuning” arguments presume. The TAP is no more logical than something like the VSAP. If theists didn’t exist, then the TAP wouldn’t occur to anyone, any more than the VSAP has occurred to anyone other than myself. For all their professing (and in my experience, it really is no more than that) of the selflessness of their religion, Christian are egotistical as all hell to believe that the universe revolves around them. The VSAP simply carries that sort of reasoning to its natural conclusion.

Q: Turn or burn!

A: I accept your surrender.

Tomorrow, we’ll take a look at the theory that the universe and its life forms were intelligently designed and that all indications to the contrary are the result of a conspiracy within the scientific community to suppress the truth — commonly called the Supernatural Theory (Explaining Intelligently Nature) Investigators’ Scientific Community Reputation Annihilation Principle (STEIN-IS-CRAP).

In my essay Why I Am Not A Christian, I outlined six types of arguments for God’s existence, cosmological, teleological, ontological, moral, historical and transcendental. In the “Does God Exist?” category on his website, Mr. Frank Turek uses two of them: the first and the last. At this point it would not, I am sorry to say, be beneath my dignity to make a little joke about Frank seeing himself as the Alpha and the Omega — but my ordering of the argument types is pretty much arbitrary, so it wouldn’t be a very good joke. Oh well, there are many others.[1]

In the cosmological category, Frank cited the “Law of Causality,” which is an authoritative-sounding title for the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: whatever begins to exist has a cause. But what sort of “law” is the “Law of Causality?” It cannot be a law of logic, for there is no logical contradiction entailed in something beginning to exist uncaused, so it must be a law of physics.

However, during the first ten to the minus forty three seconds of the universe — what cosmologists called the Planck Era — the universe was in a state of supersymmetry, wherein no physical laws obtained. They all “evolved” later in the universe’s development, when the symmetry broke. Therefore, even if the “Law of Causality” really did exist, it could not apply in the one place that Frank needs it to apply in order for the argument to work: the Big Bang!

As for the universe beginning to exist, Frank is a decade or two behind the times. Cosmologists now have evidence that the universe began existence as a “bubble” that formed out of a pre-existing substrate, one of an infinite number, most likely.[2] Frank’s cute little SURGE acronym refers to evidence that only applies to the VISIBLE universe — the universe we can observe, the one that came out of the Big Bang. We have no, or almost no, information about the Big Bang itself or what conditions were like beforehand, but we do know that there was SOMETHING beforehand. Frank may think otherwise, but his “doctorate” is not in any physical science, nor has he published any peer-reviewed work in the scientific literature, so his opinion on the matter cannot supercede those of actual scientists.

(Frank also cites the Kalam argument itself as evidence that the universe began to exist; I can only assume he’s referring to Craig’s attempts at proving that actual infinities cannot exist. These proofs all fail for the same reason: infinities do not obey the rules of finite mathematics.)

In the transcendental category, Frank shoots himself in the foot in a most amusing way: he states that any good worldview must be able to explain, among other things, the origin of the laws of logic themselves (and abstract objects which are derived from them, such as mathematics and objective morals). But what is Frank’s answer to this question? As he does NOT state in that post, but rather states in a discussion long after that post was written, his position is that the laws of logic are a part of God himself, and a necessary one — they did not come about as an act of God’s volition, but rather are part of his “unchanging nature.”

And what is the origin of God? He doesn’t have one, he doesn’t need one. Frank’s position, then, is tatamount to saying that logic itself neither has nor needs an origin — the same thing he accuses atheists of saying!

But for Frank, it gets even worse: his position does not allow for change. Unlike scientists, Frank cannot alter his theory based on new evidence; he is comitted, both dogmatically and metaphysically, to the position that logic comes from God — i.e. has no explanation. Even if that were true of atheism, we at least have the hope of altering our position in the future as new evidence becomes available; Frank, not being able to see the future, cannot say that no such evidence would ever appear. So the explanatory power of an atheistic worldview averages around good, and tends toward improvement. The explanatory power of Frank’s worldview, however, is zero and will always remain so.

It is obvious, then, that Frank has no evidence that is even marginally good, still less compelling, for the existence of God. However, it is possible that I have misconstrued his position, or missed a line of evidence he offered elsewhere on his site. If that is the case, I invite Frank to post on this site to set the record straight. (Unlike on his own site, Frank can be sure that the administrator of this site will not delete posts that happen to make good points.)

[1] You’ve probably noticed that in the very first paragraph of this scholarly-appearing essay, I insulted Frank twice: first when I called him Mister when he in fact possesses a doctorate in Christian Apologetics, second when I insinuated that many jokes could be made at his expense. The first is not intended as disrespect to Frank, but rather is intended to avoid disrespecting those who have earned doctorates in legitimate fields of study. The existence of “diploma mills” where anyone can get a piece of paper proclaiming them a doctor with minimal effort, or even a mere financial contribution, is a source of great chagrin to such people, and I have no intention of adding to their woes. For the second, however, I have no excuse. Neither does Frank, however, whose very first post in this category called atheism a fundamentalist religion — a linguistic impossibility, offered for the sole purpose of attempting to drag atheism down to Christianity’s level. Frank himself admits as much in this post.

[2] Cf. Michio Kaku, “Parallel Worlds” (2005). This also answers the teleological, or “design,” argument — given an infinity of universes arising from the quantum foam, we would need a very good explanation indeed if we DIDN’T find life in some of them!

A response to Neil Mammen:

Imagine that a God existed, what characteristics would you require of him before you accepted him as your God and what behavioral change if any would that cause in you? E.g.

1. He would be more obvious about revealing himself (this I think is a given).
2. He would not send anyone to hell just for not believing he didn’t exist.
3. He would not allow suffering or evil.
4. He would punish bad folks like Hitler or hypocritical Christians with a bolt of lightning on the spot.
5. He would not require anyone to glorify or worship him.
6. He would not have any rules or regulations that we would have to follow. etc.

So what characteristics would you require before you accepted him as your God. If the answer is None, that’s a valid answer too, especially if you say why.

Neil Peart, an agnostic who is best known as the drummer and lyricist of the Canadian rock band Rush, probably said it best: He said that he would accept a God if and only if you demonstrated to him that (1) he exists, (2) he is as described by your religion, and (3) he is worthy of worship.

It really is that simple, and reflecting on that in conjunction with your writings has allowed me to put my finger on what the basic problem is: you’re essentially trying to accomplish step three, when you haven’t even gotten past step one.

As I’ve stated in the post below, I have left the “Cross Examined” site but will be continuing my part in the discussions here, so as not to be 1984ed. Frank and the others may participate here, or at CE, or not at all, as they choose.

FRANK:
Saying that God’s nature and logic are unchangable, congruent and simultaneous does not mean that God is ontologically dependent on logic. I suppose you could say that if God did not exist than neither would logic because his nature is the grounding of logic. You could say the same about justice. But that is exactly the point I’m making. Logic or Justice (morality) does not exist unless God exists.

DAVE:
By saying ~G -> ~L (if no god, then no logic), you are making logic contingent upon God. And once again we’re back to where we started: human discourse presupposes the nonexistence of any entity which is defined as being an entity upon which logic is contingent.

Let me put it YET ANOTHER way: the only way that logic could be both necessarily existing and by definition a part of God would be if God himself were necessarily existing. The only way to show that God is necessarily existing would be to produce a sound ontological argument for God’s existence. Having studied analytical philosophy of religion my entire adult life, I can state with much confidence that no such argument exists. So there’s no rational way for you to maintain that logic presupposes, or is evidence for, God’s existence.

This post is the result of my recent experiences at the blog at the Christian apologetics website crossexamined.org, about which I’ll be posting more later. This arguement is hardly a new one, but it hasn’t received much attention in the blogosphere, probably because it’s fairly technical — the folks at CE are still scratching their heads about it.

In order to explain why the free will defense fails, we have to distinguish between two types of free will, call them A-type and B-type.

Let’s say that person P must, at time t, choose between either decision D or decision ~D (not-D). Under A-type free will, P has free will if and only if it is logically possible for P to either choose D or choose ~D at time t — that is, if his choice was not logically determined. (Note that logical determination is not the same thing as physical determination.)

Under B-type free will, that is not the case; P can have free will to choose either D or ~D at time t even if logical determinism applies.

If God exists, then God, being all-knowing, knows that P will choose (let us say) D at time t, and this knowledge is infallible. Thus, it is necessarily true that P chooses D, and necessarily false that P chooses ~D. Now, under B-type free will, this doesn’t matter at all — P was still free in choosing D. But under A-type free will, P was not free in choosing D, by virtue of the fact that it was logically impossible for him to choose ~D.

The free will defender states that God cannot actualize a state of affairs wherein P would freely choose D at time t, because if God actualizes a state of affairs wherein P chooses D at time t, then P’s choice was not a free will decision.

The question is, which type of free will is the defender referring to, A-type or B-type?

If the defender is referring to A-type free will, then the defender is correct, God cannot make P freely choose D. In fact, God cannot make, or even allow, anyone to freely choose at all. A-type free will is impossible if God exists, because it is logically impossible for anyone to do anything other than what God already knows he will do. And, by modus tolens, if A-type free will exists, then God does not.

“Ah,” I hear you say, “but God didn’t cause that person to do what he did; even though he knew it would happen, that person was still free to make that choice or not.”

In that case, you’re referring to B-type free will, wherein P is free to choose D in spite of God already knowing that he would do so.

But that means that P is also free to choose ~D in spite of God already knowing that he would do so; God would simply have that knowledge instead. So, antecedent to God having knowledge that P would choose D or that P would choose ~D, there is a possible world in which P freely chooses D (call it W1) and a possible world in which P freely chooses ~D (call it W2). God, being all-powerful, can actualize either of those worlds, and he would know which is which.

“Wait a minute,” you might retort. “that means that P is not free, because God, in choosing either W1 or W2, determined whether he would choose D or ~D.”

Granted, God made it logically impossible for P to choose other than what God knew P would choose in the world that God actualized. But other than having been logically determined, P’s decision was uncoerced. So if it is your position that P nonetheless does not have free will, then you’ve gone back to A-type free will. See above.

So therein lies the dilemma. It doesn’t really matter whether you choose A-type or B-type free will, but you must choose one or the other, and whatever choice you make, you’re stuck with it. You can’t switch back and forth.

If you choose A-type, then the free will defense fails because free will and God are logically incompatible; if one exists, the other does not. If you choose B-type, then the free will defense fails because there is a set of possible worlds in which all choices are freely made and suffering nonetheless does not exist, and God, if he existed and desired free will, would actualize one of those worlds.

Whatever your choice, the free will defense fails.

(Note: although I’ve tagged this post with “evil,” it really should be tagged with “suffering,” as this particular atheological argument concerns suffering and not moral evil per se. But I didn’t feel like adding “suffering” to my already-overcrowded tag cloud. So sue me.)

The sexiest atheist on the planet takes on Jack Chick’s latest piece of Christbot manure here. Ignore at your peril.

Expelled

(Well, it’s the least I can do. Besides, I’m rather irritated that they’ve been running ads on Comedy Central during Stewart and Colbert.)

In response to the classical logical problem of evil, Alvin Plantinga created the Free Will Defense, which turns, to a large extent, upon the concept of “transworld depravity.” This is the condition of a person making at least one morally wrong choice in every possible world, and was posited in response to the notion that God could actualize a world in which all humans freely choose good. Although philosophically arbitrary (although it has obvious roots in fundamentalist Christian doctrine), the possibility of transworld depravity allows Plantinga to demonstrate a possible (and therefore, according to Plantinga’s beloved S5 modal system, necessary) contradiction between free will and the absence of evil.

Let TD be the condition of all possible persons suffering from transworld depravity. By definition,

(1) If TD obtains, then for every possible world it is true that every person in that world suffers from localized depravity.

“Localized depravity” is a term original to myself, as far as I know; it is the condition of a person making at least one morally wrong decision in the world in which he exists.

Now, let P be a possible person, and let “blip” be a unit of time such that (blip * 2) is sufficient time to make one, but only one, moral decision.

(2) It is logically possible that, at time T minus one blip, P becomes capable of making a moral freewill decision for the first time.

This would lead one to suppose that P is very young, but of course, that is not necessarily the case. Further,

(3) It is logically possible that, at or around time T, P makes a morally good decision.

To say otherwise, to say that it is logically impossible or that it is logically necessary that P make that decision, is to say that P does not have free will with respect to this instance. Finally,

(4) It is logically possible that, at time T plus one blip, P is struck and killed by a falling meteorite.

Now, it should strike the reader as obvious that

(5) Propositions (2), (3) and (4) are logically compossible.

(6) Therefore, the conjunction of (2), (3) and (4) is logically possible, and said conjunction does describe a possible person.

Let W be the world which this possible world inhabits.

(7) Therefore, not every person in W suffers from localized depravity.

(8) Therefore, it is not the case that, for every possible world it is true that every person in that world suffers from localized depravity; TD does not obtain.

(9) Therefore, it is not the case that all possible persons suffer from transworld depravity.

And, since applying Plantinga’s beloved S5 modal logic makes (9) a necessary proposition,

(10) It is not possible that all possible persons suffer from transworld depravity.

It seems that evil > Plantinga after all.

I have just learned of the death of my literary hero, from natural causes. If you haven’t read anything of his, then do yourself a favor, drop whatever you’re doing, run out to your nearest bookstore and buy something of his. Preferably one of the “classics,” such as 2001, Childhood’s End, Rendezvous With Rama or The Fountains of Paradise. But really, anything in that section will do. Buy it, take it home, read it, savor it, thank me later.

Farewell, Sir Arthur. Thank you beyond words for years of entertainment and thoughtfulness — not to mention the geosynchronous communications satellite.

A website recently encouraged me, in the person of “atheists everywhere” or something like that, to check out a book called “The Irrational Atheist” by a chunk of meat called Vox Day, owner of a libertarian blog called Vox Populi. Two thoughts immediately came to my mind:

1. He calls his blog Vox Populi. That means “the voice of the people.” A libertarian blog, claiming to represent the voice of the people? How many of the people can name the Libertarian Party candidate for President in ‘04 without Googling?

2. He calls himself Vox Day. That’s an obvious homonym for Vox Dei. Is this guy serious? I mean, I have no problem with odd pseudonyms in the blogosphere, but really, “the voice of God?” In print? On a book about atheists?

Even if one assumes that both of these stylings are tongue-in-cheek, I think that, taken in conjunction, they constitute a prima facie case against taking anything this guy has said, is saying, or will ever say seriously. His proclamation that the Sun is shining would cause me to instinctively reach for my umbrella. The fact that he wrote a book called “The Irrational Atheist” causes me, a self-considered rational atheist, to experience complete cognitive resonance.*

I’ve been wrong before, of course, so if the reader of these words happens across something in the pages of voice-of-a-dog’s words that could and should be given something approaching serious consideration, please let me know. Until then, I’ll stick with my re-read of the Mars Trilogy, a magnificent work by a magnificent writer with a name that’s only slightly silly.

* Or whatever the opposite of cognitive dissonance is; I’m too lazy to look it up right now.

As a sort of warm-up for my return to the world of analytical atheology, I have been looking for something, relevant to the atheism-Christianity dialogue/debate, something that I could rip into shreds. I typed “atheism” into Google, and the first thing that came to me was the description blurb for CARM’s page on atheism: “Proves that atheism is invalid. Also provides tips on how atheists and Christians can communicate.” Note to Matt Slick: if you’re going to lead off with the former, then I wouldn’t exactly qualify you as an expert on the latter. Especially if you suck at the former as much as the writings on your page suggest — but that’s a topic for another article, as your page is too much to take on in one go.

In this article I shall focus on Robin Collins’ recent defense of that old apologetic canard, the fine-tuning argument. Collins derives his conclusion, that theism is more probable than atheism (the single-world version of it — he addresses the many-worlds hypothesis elsewhere but I won’t go there right now) from the following two premises:

1. The fine-tuning’s existence is not improbable under theism.

2. The fine-tuning’s existence is improbable under atheism.

The first thing that occurred to me is that Collins forgot a premise, one more basic than, and certainly essential to, the above two:

0. The fine-tuning exists.

If by “fine-tuning” Collins means the state of the universe having been fine-tuned like a series of radio dials to achieve exactly the right settings, then this premise begs the question in a number of ways, not the least of which it assumes the existence of a fine tuner. However, if by “fine-tuning” Collins simply means the variables that allow us to live our lives without blowing up like a balloon, or whatever, then this premise is defensible, and even obvious enough to go unstated. But in that case, to avoid misleading the reader, it should be phrased in such a way that does not imply the question-begging meaning. For example,

0′. The universal variables are life-friendly.

Which means that the other premises would read,

1′. The universal variables being life-friendly is not improbable under theism.

2′. The universal variables being life-friendly is improbable under atheism.

This seems to me to be a clearer wording, and does not significantly alter the analytic force of the argument, although it does rob it of some of its rhetorical force. Since Collins has anticipated most of the standard objections to the fine-tuning argument, including the ones that immediately came to my mind, I shall here focus on his responses to three of those objections, the ones I personally use most often:

The variables could be the result of a more fundamental law, or a logical necessity. Collins responds that such a fundamental law is entirely speculative, and only pushes back the problem since the more fundamental law would itself be improbable, even if it were regarded as logically necessary.

With respect to the first response, Collins appears to have not done his homework. He seems unaware of the scientific work on the fundamental law theory — particularly Quentin Smith’s commentaries on the Hartle-Hawking theory, which shows that this theory, though unproven, is certainly much better grounded, scientifically, than the phrase “entirely speculative” would imply.

With respect to the second, I submit that Collins, like myself, is not in a position to make any determination regarding the logical necessity of the fundamental constant(s) of the universe. I cannot stay with any authority or knowledge that it is probable, Collins cannot say that it is improbable. Any assignation we make to the probability would be as good as any other. Although this places us in the same epistemological boat, I am not the one making an argument whose premises depend on the probability tipping toward one end of the spectrum rather than the other. Collins is. Unless he can resolve this problem — and there is no reason to think that the problem is resolvable, even in principle — premise 2 will have a universe-sized hole in it.

Other forms of life than human are possible. Collins responds that the fine-tuning proponent doesn’t necessarily assume otherwise, and that this objection misses the point; the point is that “the life-permitting range for the values of the constants of physics (such as gravity) is small compared to the surrounding range of non-life-permitting values.”

Let’s assume for a moment that Collins has managed to figure out exactly what the life-permitting range for the physical constant values is. The question is, how does he know what the surrounding range is? For example, let’s say the life-permitting range for gravity is 0.8g to 1.2g, where g is the present value. What is the surrounding range? Collins would no doubt like for it to be zero to (infinity)g, but why should we assume that? Just because that’s the range of real numbers?

Perhaps (and here I am getting into a different objection framed by Collins, but they are similar enough to consider together) it has more in common with a randomized throw of a pair of dice, the range of the results of which is between two and twelve pips, not one and infinity, and in which one particular result, seven, is more likely than all the others. I have no reason to think that that is the case, but Collins has given no reason to think otherwise other than the probabilistic “principle of indifference,” under which when we have no reason to prefer one parameter over another we should assign them equal probabilities. But again, Collins hasn’t done his homework; as pointed out above, we do have reason to favor this set of parameters over another.

One more point: if Collins assumes that the surrounding range of possible physical constants is infinite — which, given his defense of the probabilistic principle of indifference, I believe he must — then he faces this dilemma: the life-permitting range is either infinite or finite. If infinite, then there is no possible set of physical values that prohibits life, and premise 2 is false. If finite, then the point that the life-permitting range is smaller than the surrounding range is tautologically true, since any finite range is necessarily smaller than infinity. Non-tautologies cannot be derived from tautologies. Therefore, the point that Collins makes cannot support premise 2, and that premise is unsupported.

God is more complex than the universe, so who designed God? Collins responds that the fine-tuning argument still disproves atheism even if this objection is granted: his argument, he states, “only required that the fine-tuning be more probable under theism than under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis. But this requirement is still met even if God exhibits tremendous internal complexity, far exceeding that of the universe. Thus, even if we were to grant the atheist assumption that the designer of an artifact must be as complex as the artifact, the fine-tuning would still give us strong reasons to prefer theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.”

First of all, it bears noting that the force of this objection is not necessarily related to complexity. Rather, it is related to the fact that, whatever quality is possessed by intelligent life in the universe that calls for an explanation for intelligent life in the universe — whether it’s complexity, or self-awareness, or whatever; call it the E factor — God has it too. Since God has the E factor, God calls for an explanation to the same extent as intelligent life in the universe.

Collins may be correct that the requirement of the fine-tuning argument, that the fine-tuning is more likely under theism than atheism, is still met if God possesses the E factor, but as it turns out, it doesn’t matter, because conceding that God has the E factor — and I can think of no definition of the E factor such that intelligent life would have it but God would not — defeats the purpose of the argument.

This is true for two reasons. First if theism is true, then the theistic God exists. If the theistic God exists, then God cannot have an explanation outside of himself. If God cannot have an explanation outside of himself, then God cannot possess the E factor. Therefore, to concede that God has the E factor is to set of a string of modus tolens conclusions, like lighting a string of firecrackers, at the end of which the fine tuning argument explodes. Theism cannot be more probable than atheism if the probability of theism is zero.

Second, if God is the best explanation for intelligent life in the universe, and God calls for an explanation, then whatever entity explains God would most likely have the E factor itself, and would therefore itself call for an explanation, and so on. Thus we have an infinite regress, and the prior probability of theism is again much lower.

As if realizing these problems, Collins quickly brings up another response: that God isn’t actually complex, and that Medieval theologians were actually correct when they said that God was absolutely simple. Even if complexity is indeed the E factor, this response is just plain silly; an entity having set S of characteristics plus the added characteristic of being concerned about every human’s sex life is obviously more complex than an entity having set S alone.

In addition to the three objections above, there is one objection I make which Collins failed to address: although the universal constants do allow intelligent life, an objective observer looking at the entire universe could hardly conclude that humans are the intended product of any fine-tuning. Given the many orders of magnitude by which humans are outnumbered by stars, or asteroids, or even bacteria, one could easily assume that the universe was fine-tuned for them to flourish, in which case humans would be an unintended by-product. Therefore, one cannot infer that the fine tuner has the concern for humans that the theistic God must have, and premise 1, that the fine-tuning is not improbable under theism, loses any support it might have had.

As I stated in the outset, this paper is a sort of warm-up for my return to the realm of analytic philosophy of religion; a shaking off of the dust and clearing of the cobwebs. Accordingly, this work might be sub-standard. Any constructive criticism or comments would be most welcome.

Whenever I encounter someone who identifies him- or herself as a Christian and a former atheist, I ask myself three questions regarding that person, all three of which must be answered “yes” in order for me to take that person seriously. First, was he really an atheist? Second, did he have good, rational reasons for being an atheist? Third, is he in possession of knowledge which undermines those reasons and rationally compels one to be a Christian?

I have met few Christians for whom the first answer was yes, perhaps one or two for whom the second answer was yes, and none at all for whom the third was yes. As a result, I have never met a genuine (in the evangelistic and apologetic sense) atheist-turned-Christian, and I have excellent reason to believe that no such person exists.

To understand why the first question, whether the person really was an atheist, is much more complex than it might seem, I must clear up a common misconception about atheism — namely, the difference between atheism and another philosophical stance altogether, one for which no name exists, so far as I am aware, possibly because it is so often confused with atheism.

Atheism is the absence of an acknowledgement of the existence of a god. The other condition, which I’ll call “dystheism,” is the acknowledgement of the existence of a god with whom the acknowledging one has a dysfunctional relationship.

Many are the Christians who will tell you, in a single sentence, that they were once an atheist AND hated God at the same time! But as the nun on “House” said, you can’t be angry at God and not believe in him at the same time. To hate a thing is to acknowledge implicitly the existence of that thing. The same applies with wanting revenge against a thing, or rebelling against a thing, or wanting to avoid being accountable to a thing.

Atheists are routinely accused of all these things by Christians who can’t truly imagine what it’s like to not acknowledge God’s existence, and so use dystheists as a conceptual stand-in. A number of apologists are fully aware of this failure of imagination, and cheerfully admit its presence, albeit in the guise of universal divine knowledge. Their position, often accompanied by an out-of-context passage from Romans, is that all atheists are quite aware that God exists, they just pretend he doesn’t due to their dystheism. (My response: If you can convince me that you’re not just pretending to believe in God, I’ll give your suggestion some thought.)

With regard to the second question, as I have stated, I have very rarely encountered someone who was an atheist for the right reasons — and whereas the first error is mostly to be found among amateur evangelists and apologists, the second is common to both amateurs and professionals.

Lee Strobel, for instance — perhaps the most famous atheist-turned-Christian — claimed that the idea of God was “just silly,” and he believed that “evolution was where life came from, so what do you need God for?” This might be considered a prima facie, albeit quite weak by itself, anchor for atheism, but was it the real reason for Strobel’s atheism? Strobel’s own words suggest otherwise; he states he “had a lot of self-motivation for living an atheistic lifestyle” and proceeds at length how he drank, caroused, stole documents, had friends fired, arranged for girlfriends to have abortions, and was just generally an asshole. As any intellectual atheist can tell you, a person who thinks that there is such a thing as “an atheistic lifestyle” is probably confused as to what atheism is; that aside, however, it is clear from Strobel’s words that his “atheism” was anchored on his desire to remain an asshole, and that while he may or may not have been a dystheist, he certainly was never an atheist for the right reasons.

Nor was Josh McDowell, author of such popular apologetic works as Evidence That Demands A Verdict and More Than A Carpenter. If he was indeed an atheist, then he seemed to have an even poorer idea of what his own position was than Strobel did, as Brian Holtz points out:

McDowell claims he “used to wait for a Christian to speak up in the classroom so I could tear him or her up one side and down the other”, but at the beginning of his conversion he “found out that Buddha, Mohammed and Confucius never claimed to be God, but Jesus did.” McDowell doesn’t specify how he ever “tore up” Christians while being ignorant of their fundamental claim.

Or one of their claims, at any rate; to be fair, McDowell could have been familiar with equally fundamental claims, such as God’s sacrifice of himself to himself. But there is nothing to suggest that McDowell’s “atheism” was any more rational, or less pragmatic, than Strobel’s. Quite the contrary: as McDowell states, “I’m very practical, and when something doesn’t work, I chuck it. So, I gave up religion.” He later re-adopted it for the same reason: his irreligiousness wasn’t “working” for him — insert even more verbiage of what an asshole he was as an atheist — and he saw that religion was “working” for others, so he made it “work” for him. No one disputes that Christianity can make people happier and more moral, but so can many other things, most of which are perfectly compatible with atheism.

C.S. Lewis also readily comes to the lips of Christians who like talking about former atheists, as he claimed to have been one. Not much is known about his atheism, but there is no indication that he considered himself an atheist until after the fact, and from what he writes about that period, he was not so much an atheist as he was an apathetic Anglican, as well as an occultist — the influence of which can be seen in The Chronicles of Narnia and The Screwtape Letters. Nothing is known about what his rational grounding was for atheism, if indeed he had any.

What is known, however, is that Lewis, like Strobel and McDowell and every other “former atheist” I’ve ever come across, are all a firm “no” with regard to the third question. None of them had any rational reasons for becoming a Christian that would overcome reasons for atheism, either theirs (such as they were) or my own. Strobel’s conversion appears to have been just has pragmatic as his “atheism,” and by his own admission, his famous journalistic investigation into the claims of Christianity was not antagonistic; rather, “I did it with a journalist’s attitude. I said give me the facts.” Given that professed attitude, it is quite revealing that most of his The Case For… books do not include a single interview with a non-Christian. Whatever Strobel was before he became a Christian, he converted for the sake of his own happiness.

Same with McDowell; when his non-Christianity no longer “worked” for him, he traded it in for something that would, he figured, make him “disgustingly happy.” As for Lewis, he made no secret about the fact that he loved mythology, and the book which he credits for changing his mind, Chesterson’s The Everlasting Man, has as its theme “