Have you ever wondered what Satan’s motivation would be?
According to standard Christian dogma, God decides to make some eternal servants--known to us humans as “angels”—and the No. 1 Servant (Lucifer) decides he can stage a coup d’etat and take over God’s position. Of course Lucifer fails, God castigates him to the role of villain, and for millennium thereafter the two bicker and argue. It is all very Greek Tragedy.
Lucifer…or Satan as we shall call him…enters the Garden of Eden with God’s permission and mucks things up for every human thereafter. Satan gets into a bet over Job, and tempts Jesus. Ever since faithfully assuming the role and blame of being Enemy No. 1 on God’s list.
But why would Satan mess around tempting humans, getting involved in human affairs, etc? Look…he would know the book of Revelation as well as we do. It is not some secret code; some hidden language only “true Christians” can read and we have cleverly kept secret from Satan and his spies for the past 2000 years. Satan has read “Left Behind.”
In the end, he is going in the Lake of Fire along with the rest of us heathens. Contrary to popular cartoons, Satan (according to Christian dogma) will not rule Hell. He will not be in charge. He will not be enjoying Jack Chick Torture with sadistic fetish. He will be screaming and whining along with the rest of us heathens.
And Satan…who already tried to take on God once, and has been around since the very beginning…would know this. He doesn’t get reduced time for the more souls that join him; he doesn’t get credit for fewer people in heaven. He does not get more people to rule, the larger the census in hell. He gets the chop with us.
[If some Christian wants to argue Satan thinks he can take on God and win…one wonders what good humans will do in this effort. Does he get a nuclear pitchfork every time an unbeliever dies?]
Oh sure, maybe for the first few centuries, he may have tried to convert a few just to piss God off…but what fun in that? Satan played his biggest trump card in the Garden—now every human is doomed by default to hell. Even better, human nature (again, according to Christian dogma) is such we have a propensity to do more evil.
Satan doesn’t have to do a thing. Heck, God even helps out by occasionally whacking off whole lots of evil people—babies and all—by genocide, tsunamis, earthquakes, flood, famine and volcanoes. Not to mention a war or two. It would be hard for Satan to keep up!
So why would Satan care about tempting humans? Even under Christian dogma…
I ask because Dr. Jones argues the Devil is portraying heaven as boring. That cartoon and modern media’s depiction of heaven, with St. Peter at the Gates, and clouds and harps and singing and time stretching out into tedious infinity is some nefarious plot on the Devil’s part to…I don’t know…keep people from relishing death?
Really? After tempting and observing humans for 1000’s of years (according to Christians) this is the best plan Satan can come up with?
Look, we don’t buy things because we find the competitor’s products undesirable; we buy things because we want them. “Don’t buy Fords—they are only meh.” No, no, no, no. “Buy OUR Car! It will make you Sexy! It will make you go fast! It will save you money!” The only time an advertiser demonstrates the shoddiness of a competitor is to immediately compare it to their own—“Look at how much stain is left when you use theirs; our product removed it better! Faster! Safer! Cleaner!”
If Satan is running down heaven, this is only half the job. The Devil would need to replace it with an alternative even better than heaven. Which got me to thinking…assuming arguendo there was a demi-god Satan, in competition with God, what would Satan do to keep as many people out of heaven as possible (assuming Satan had such a goal?)
What would I do?
Well…obviously one would need to develop on alternative religion. One that was close enough to the truth to sound legitimate, but not sufficient to get one into real heaven. One that claimed a greater reward than real heaven…with less work.
So first we would make it simple to get in. Not too simple—then no one would believe it. Further, make it a little uncertain, so humans keep reassessing their position and re-confirming the little thing they must do. Manufacturers long know the real money is in replacement parts; not just the original purchase.
Make the humans feel good about themselves to further solidify the belief. For example, create the concept of really, REALLY big sins, and as long as they are not doing those…why…the human is just fine. Be willing to mold with the times; as long as the person acts within the current societal norms, they qualify.
Never explicitly quantify a promise. Be opaque. Don’t say, “I will be there at noon on Tuesday;” say, “I am coming soon.” Don’t promise to heal them if they perform the correct ritual; explain you will comfort them. And if (Satan Forbid) they expect some response, make it so it is their fault when the response doesn’t arrive. They are too stupid, too insincere, desire the wrong things, too immature, too human.
Put the reward out of verification…only once you die you will have candy and health and love and peace and money and adulation and power and whatever you want.
In short…if I was Satan and I wanted to create an alternative religion to keep people out of heaven…I would create Christianity. The perfect placebo.
Author Archive for DagoodS
And so we come to the final chapter in the book. The one cited by Christian apologists most often. It is broken into two (2) sections—the first on Roman Citizenship (this is the third time Sherwin-White has discussed it) and the second on what he titles, “The Historicity of the Gospels and Graeco-Roman Historiography.”
I just finished an extremely long discussion regarding this section over at Grace and Miracles blog, and am thankful for that discussion to clarify my thoughts. First what Sherwin-White states (with my notations in brackets):
As we have seen throughout this review, Sherwin-White’s method is arguing by example—he makes an argument, and then finds an example supporting this argument. Of course, the huge error in doing so is that it only takes one (1) counter-example to undermine the argument!
It was pointed out to me that Dr. Richard Carrier addresses Sherwin-White’s claims in The Empty Tomb: (again my clarifying thoughts in brackets)
An analogy to Sherwin-White’s method: “Cars do not rust within two years. Here is a two-year-old Ford with no rust.” This claim is proven incorrect by one (1) car less than two years old with rust. It only takes one counter-example to undermine the argument. (Why it is such a poor method to begin with.)
Conforming to his typical methodology, Sherwin-White claims “even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition” and then provides the example of Herodotus and Hipparchus.
Carrier provides numerous counter-examples. Including examples within Herodotus, examples with the contemporary writer Josephus, and examples with other historical events—Saint Genevieve and Roswell.
“Here’s a rusty one-year-old car; here’s a rusty one-year-old car; here’s a rusty one-year-old car.”
(Craig’s claim Herodotus made numerous other mythical accounts [and Sherwin-White was aware] only hurts Sherwin-White’s method; it doesn’t help it! Being aware of counter-examples is insufficient; one must address the counter-example!
“Sure Herodotus also claimed PLENTY of cars less than two-years-old had rust.”)
It gets worse. Carrier points out, even in the Herodotus example Sherwin-White utilized, there were counter-examples—legends arising surrounding the Hipparchus’ murder—and that Herodotus’ ability to maintain historicity in the face of these myths is the exception. to the legend. What about the very counter-example in the same account?
“Herodotus was able to pick out the two-year-old Ford without rust amongst all the rusty two-year-old cars.”
It gets even worse. Carrier points out the gospels correlate closer to legendary accounts than Herodotus’ historical accounts:
1) Herodotus challenges conventional legend; the gospels make no challenges.
2) Herodotus names sources; gospels do not.
3) Herodotus weighs evidence; gospels do not.
4) Event in Herodotus’ city; Gospel accounts not in author’s city.
5) Inscription regarding the actual history existed; gospels have no such inscription.
6) Herodotus consciously wrote history; Mark’s Gospel is more akin to didactic hagiography.
“The gospels are 1978 Datsuns, and Herodotus picked out a ’78 Ford amongst ’78 Toyota’s. Toyota’s are more similar to Datsuns than Fords.”*
*The late 70’s Japanese cars were notorious for rust issues.
In short, Sherwin-White (as typical) uses argument by example for this point. Carrier demonstrates how Sherwin-White fails to address counter-examples (made even worse by Craig’s emphasizing Sherwin-White knew counter-examples), fails to address the counter-example implicit in the example used, and fails to correlate the example to the documents in question to see if they parallel the example or the counter-example.
Now how Sherwin-White has been abused…
Christian Apologist authors have assumed, as style, taking quotes from perceived non-Christians to bolster their argument (presumably to claim lack of bias.) Any skeptic discussing the resurrection is certain to hear the Gerd Ludemann (a known atheist!) quote. Discuss Acts, and Sir William Ramsay will make his appearance. Crack open a creationist book; the quotes come spewing forth.
Poor Sherwin-White receives the same treatment. The rest of his book is discarded, overlooked or forgotten. (How many internet Christian apologists who cite Sherwin-White agree with his assessment on Quirinius? Or that Luke disagrees with Mark on the Sanhedrin and is probably incorrect?) But Sherwin-White is not blatantly writing a Christian apologetic book. He is a (perceived non-Christian) historian. And he writes this one itty-bitty line about timing, myth development and “hard historic core.”
Now the Christian apologist author can do what s/he always does: Take the quote from Sherwin-White, tack on some timing and…voila!—they have an “unbiased source” supporting their claim:
P1: Sherwin-White says two generations is ‘too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core.’
P2: Mark’s Gospel was written within 2 generations:
Conclusion: Jesus walked on water.
or
Conclusion: Jesus fed 5000.
or
Conclusion: Jesus’ Tomb was empty on Sunday.
or
Conclusion: [insert whatever one pleases]
That’s the con. The conclusion does not follow from the premises because the person is extrapolating far too much from Sherwin-White.
The question is this:
Define “hard historic core.”
Think about it; really contemplate it. It must be something that feasibly (under the Sherwin-White “formula”) will completely and utterly disappear in 3 or more generations. What could it be?
Or look at it another way. Take a myth, like Robin Hood. What is the “hard historic core” of Robin Hood? A brigand? A brigand good with a bow? A brigand, good with a bow who leads men? What requirements are there for the “hard historic core” within Robin Hood? At what point do we differentiate the Robin Hood story from other highwaymen?
Carrier raises this point admirably within the Roswell Alien story. What is the “hard historic core” in that story? Do you know? What was it causing people to believe a saucer crash landed? If there was an actual item from the sky, does that constitute a “hard historical core” not eliminated by years of alien stories?
See…this isn’t how myth-making works! Myths can take actual events and/or people and do one (or more) of three things:
1) Add;
2) Subtract: or
3) Modify.
How can we determine “hard historical core” when one can feasibly argue EVERY myth has a “hard historical core”? (Again, I would point out, under Sherwin-White, it must be something that could disappear in three or more generations, if this is a hard-and-fast formula.) Animals walk in the woods—BAM! Big Foot has a hard historical core. Pontius Pilate really governed in Judea—BAM! The Gospels have a hard historical core.
This is what I thought about Herodotus. What is the “hard historical core” in his fantastical stories? One could argue EVERY story has a historical core. There was Athens, hence the burned Olive tree has historical core. Troy fell, the Trojan horse has historical core.
Do you see what I mean? “Hard historical core” is sophistry giving no real definition and no insight.
This small sentence is “full of sound and fury. Signifying nothing.” I understand the Dr. Craig’s want to utilize it. We should ignore the con and ask this one question: Define “hard historic core” with specificity so we can see how it would be utterly lost by the third generation.
It is not how myth-making works. Sherwin-White is not to blame; those trying to bolster this sentence into a formula are.
The reason for this long (and dull) review was to once again dispel the claims made by Christian apologists, once brought to full light.
I just finished an extremely long discussion regarding this section over at Grace and Miracles blog, and am thankful for that discussion to clarify my thoughts. First what Sherwin-White states (with my notations in brackets):
Another example. The internal synoptic divergences, such as arise in the narrative of the trial of Christ, are very similar to those that Roman historians meet in the study of the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus.
…
The objection will be raised to this line of argument that the Roman historical writers and the Gospels belong to different kinds of literature. Whatever the defects of our sources, their authors were trying to write history, but the authors of the Gospels had a different aim. Yet however one accepts form-criticism, its principles do not inevitably contradict the notion of the basic historicity of the particular stories of which the Gospel narratives are composed, even if these were not shored up and confirmed by the external guarantee of their fabric and setting. That the degree of confirmation in Graeco-Roman terms is less for the Gospels than for Acts is due, as these lectures have tried to show, to the differences in their regional settings. As soon as Christ enters the Roman orbit at Jerusalem [i.e. the Trial], the confirmation begins. For Acts, the confirmation of historicity is over-whelming. Yet Acts is, in simple terms and judged externally, no less of a propaganda narrative than the Gospels, liable to similar distortions. But any attempt to reject its basic historicity even in matters of detail must now appear absurd. Roman historians have long taken it for granted.
What to an ancient historian is most surprising in the basic assumption of form-criticism of the extremer sort, is the presumed tempo of the development of the didactic myths—if one may use that term to sum up the matter. We are not unacquainted with this type of writing in ancient historiography, as will shortly appear. The agnostic type of form-criticism would be much more credible if the compilation of the Gospels were much later in time, much more remote from the events themselves, than can be the case. Certainly a deal of distortion can affect a story that is given literary form a generation or two after the event, whether for national glorification or political spite, or for the didactic or symbolic exposition of ideas. But in the material of ancient history the historical content is not hopelessly lost.
…
Herodotus enables us to test the tempo of myth-making, and the tests suggest that even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition.
…
The impression of historical tradition is nowhere more strongly felt than in the various accounts of the trial of Christ, analysed in Roman terms in the second lecture. Consider the close interdependence of Mark and Matthew, supplementing each other even in particular phrases, yet each with his particular contribution, then Luke with his more coherent and explicit account of the charges and less clear version of the activity of the Sanhedrin, finally John, who despite many improbabilities and obscurities yet gives a convincingly contemporary vision of the political pressure on Pilate in the age of Tiberius.
Taking the synoptic writers quite generally as primitive historians, there is a remarkable parallel between their technique and that of Herodotus, the father of history, in their anecdotal conception of a narrative. [emphasis added]
As we have seen throughout this review, Sherwin-White’s method is arguing by example—he makes an argument, and then finds an example supporting this argument. Of course, the huge error in doing so is that it only takes one (1) counter-example to undermine the argument!
It was pointed out to me that Dr. Richard Carrier addresses Sherwin-White’s claims in The Empty Tomb: (again my clarifying thoughts in brackets)
To be exact, Sherwin-White never used the word ‘legend’ in the chapter [where Sherwin-White discusses historicity in documents and myth development] Craig quotes. Nor does he [Sherwin-White] discuss the empty tomb narrative, or any miracle at all—his [Sherwin-White’s] remarks are confined solely to the trial of Jesus. In this context [the chapter on general historicity and myth development timing] Sherwin-White talks mainly about ‘myth’ (pp. 189,190, 191, 193), case sometimes as ‘propaganda’ (pg. 186), ‘contradictions’ (p. 188), ‘falsification’ (p191), the ‘didactic or symbolic exposition of ideas’ (p. 189), or ‘deliberate…embroidery’ (p. 193), all of which he [Sherwin-White] admits can arise within two generations. He [Sherwin-White] generally has in mind any false story, of whatever origin, that is later believed to be true. Yet his [Sherwin-White’s] argument from Herodotus rests merely on a single case, and even that contains the full admission that a legend was widely believed true at the time. The only difference is that Herodotus challenges it as he [Herodotus] did many claims. But we have not even a single example of such a method or approach being employed by the Gospel authors; they never challenge or even question anything they report, and unlike Herodotus they never once name a single source, or consciously weigh the evidence for or against any claim.
“Thus the analogy with Herodotus fails. The Gospel writers are much more akin to the people who believed the legends, than they are to a careful crucial historian like Herodotus himself, who often doubts them. And yet even Herodotus believed without question many obvious legends (as we shall see), a point Sherwin-White curiously neglects to mention, probably because it would have undermined his argument for the historicity of Christ’s trial. Worst still, Sherwin-White’s one case study [of Herodotus] is so dissimilar to the empty tomb story that no analogy can be drawn between them, and thus it is inappropriate for Craig to employ it in such a way. [emphasis in the original]
An analogy to Sherwin-White’s method: “Cars do not rust within two years. Here is a two-year-old Ford with no rust.” This claim is proven incorrect by one (1) car less than two years old with rust. It only takes one counter-example to undermine the argument. (Why it is such a poor method to begin with.)
Conforming to his typical methodology, Sherwin-White claims “even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition” and then provides the example of Herodotus and Hipparchus.
Carrier provides numerous counter-examples. Including examples within Herodotus, examples with the contemporary writer Josephus, and examples with other historical events—Saint Genevieve and Roswell.
“Here’s a rusty one-year-old car; here’s a rusty one-year-old car; here’s a rusty one-year-old car.”
(Craig’s claim Herodotus made numerous other mythical accounts [and Sherwin-White was aware] only hurts Sherwin-White’s method; it doesn’t help it! Being aware of counter-examples is insufficient; one must address the counter-example!
“Sure Herodotus also claimed PLENTY of cars less than two-years-old had rust.”)
It gets worse. Carrier points out, even in the Herodotus example Sherwin-White utilized, there were counter-examples—legends arising surrounding the Hipparchus’ murder—and that Herodotus’ ability to maintain historicity in the face of these myths is the exception. to the legend. What about the very counter-example in the same account?
“Herodotus was able to pick out the two-year-old Ford without rust amongst all the rusty two-year-old cars.”
It gets even worse. Carrier points out the gospels correlate closer to legendary accounts than Herodotus’ historical accounts:
1) Herodotus challenges conventional legend; the gospels make no challenges.
2) Herodotus names sources; gospels do not.
3) Herodotus weighs evidence; gospels do not.
4) Event in Herodotus’ city; Gospel accounts not in author’s city.
5) Inscription regarding the actual history existed; gospels have no such inscription.
6) Herodotus consciously wrote history; Mark’s Gospel is more akin to didactic hagiography.
“The gospels are 1978 Datsuns, and Herodotus picked out a ’78 Ford amongst ’78 Toyota’s. Toyota’s are more similar to Datsuns than Fords.”*
*The late 70’s Japanese cars were notorious for rust issues.
In short, Sherwin-White (as typical) uses argument by example for this point. Carrier demonstrates how Sherwin-White fails to address counter-examples (made even worse by Craig’s emphasizing Sherwin-White knew counter-examples), fails to address the counter-example implicit in the example used, and fails to correlate the example to the documents in question to see if they parallel the example or the counter-example.
Now how Sherwin-White has been abused…
Christian Apologist authors have assumed, as style, taking quotes from perceived non-Christians to bolster their argument (presumably to claim lack of bias.) Any skeptic discussing the resurrection is certain to hear the Gerd Ludemann (a known atheist!) quote. Discuss Acts, and Sir William Ramsay will make his appearance. Crack open a creationist book; the quotes come spewing forth.
Poor Sherwin-White receives the same treatment. The rest of his book is discarded, overlooked or forgotten. (How many internet Christian apologists who cite Sherwin-White agree with his assessment on Quirinius? Or that Luke disagrees with Mark on the Sanhedrin and is probably incorrect?) But Sherwin-White is not blatantly writing a Christian apologetic book. He is a (perceived non-Christian) historian. And he writes this one itty-bitty line about timing, myth development and “hard historic core.”
Now the Christian apologist author can do what s/he always does: Take the quote from Sherwin-White, tack on some timing and…voila!—they have an “unbiased source” supporting their claim:
P1: Sherwin-White says two generations is ‘too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core.’
P2: Mark’s Gospel was written within 2 generations:
Conclusion: Jesus walked on water.
or
Conclusion: Jesus fed 5000.
or
Conclusion: Jesus’ Tomb was empty on Sunday.
or
Conclusion: [insert whatever one pleases]
That’s the con. The conclusion does not follow from the premises because the person is extrapolating far too much from Sherwin-White.
The question is this:
Define “hard historic core.”
Think about it; really contemplate it. It must be something that feasibly (under the Sherwin-White “formula”) will completely and utterly disappear in 3 or more generations. What could it be?
Or look at it another way. Take a myth, like Robin Hood. What is the “hard historic core” of Robin Hood? A brigand? A brigand good with a bow? A brigand, good with a bow who leads men? What requirements are there for the “hard historic core” within Robin Hood? At what point do we differentiate the Robin Hood story from other highwaymen?
Carrier raises this point admirably within the Roswell Alien story. What is the “hard historic core” in that story? Do you know? What was it causing people to believe a saucer crash landed? If there was an actual item from the sky, does that constitute a “hard historical core” not eliminated by years of alien stories?
See…this isn’t how myth-making works! Myths can take actual events and/or people and do one (or more) of three things:
1) Add;
2) Subtract: or
3) Modify.
How can we determine “hard historical core” when one can feasibly argue EVERY myth has a “hard historical core”? (Again, I would point out, under Sherwin-White, it must be something that could disappear in three or more generations, if this is a hard-and-fast formula.) Animals walk in the woods—BAM! Big Foot has a hard historical core. Pontius Pilate really governed in Judea—BAM! The Gospels have a hard historical core.
This is what I thought about Herodotus. What is the “hard historical core” in his fantastical stories? One could argue EVERY story has a historical core. There was Athens, hence the burned Olive tree has historical core. Troy fell, the Trojan horse has historical core.
Do you see what I mean? “Hard historical core” is sophistry giving no real definition and no insight.
This small sentence is “full of sound and fury. Signifying nothing.” I understand the Dr. Craig’s want to utilize it. We should ignore the con and ask this one question: Define “hard historic core” with specificity so we can see how it would be utterly lost by the third generation.
It is not how myth-making works. Sherwin-White is not to blame; those trying to bolster this sentence into a formula are.
The reason for this long (and dull) review was to once again dispel the claims made by Christian apologists, once brought to full light.
I came across a blog entry , written by a fellow who is:
1) Christian.
2) Gay.
3) Celibate.
When the basis for the morality—including the forbidding of homosexual acts—is so poor to begin with…it is human-made…I find it impossible to see how charity work performed by Christians out-weighs the abuse doled out by the same hands.
1) Christian.
2) Gay.
3) Celibate.
And I’d burn every earthly possession I have, empty my bank accounts, quit my job, and terminate every relationship I have for a pill to change over—in a heartbeat—I’d walk away from that pyre buck-naked, unemployed, broke, but straight.
But unlike my heroes of my youth, my secret identity clings to me and I am forced to hide from what is called to be most loving, compassionate place on the planet—the church.
When the basis for the morality—including the forbidding of homosexual acts—is so poor to begin with…it is human-made…I find it impossible to see how charity work performed by Christians out-weighs the abuse doled out by the same hands.
In Lecture Six, Sherwin-White enters the Galilean world, stating “The material of the Gospels is not capable of the sort of treatment that historians since [William] Ramsay have given to the Acts. From the Graeco-Roman point of view, this poses a problem.” Pg. 123. Sherwin-White then highlights certain aspects of the Gospels.
I found this the most interesting chapter by far.
First, he notes specific historical references are few, and (with one exception) are concentrated at the beginning and the end. The beginning with King Herod the Great, and the end with Pilate.
But even those references give us issue, as Sherwin-White indicates—the “reference to Herod and Archelaus [Herod’s son] keeps bad company in Mathew, is absent from Mark, and even in Luke is involved with the difficult question of Quirinius and his census.” Pg. 123. Sherwin-White will deal with Quirinius in a latter lecture. The sole exception in the middle is reference to Herod the Tetrarch of Galilee with John the Baptist (Matthew & Mark) and appearance four times in Luke.
Sherwin-White continues, “Not only are there no other precise historical cross-references inside the narrative, but he narrative of all three Gospels is largely devoid of other material references that might tie to the Roman period.” Pg 123. For example, the “centurion” with the palsied servant at Capernaum. (Matt. 8:5-13; Luke 7:1-10). He can’t be a Roman centurion, Galilee was not part of Rome until 44 CE. But he is not Jewish either. Sherwin-White concludes (without providing us a reason) he is one of Tetrarch Herod’s soldiers who affected Roman terminology.
He then notes the various coins listed throughout the Gospels. Mark has Roman denarii and Roman quadrans. Matthew has Roman as, Greek didrachma and Greek stater. Luke has denarii, as, Greek drachmae, mina,and lepta. No wonder they needed money-changers in the temple! (Especially, as Sherwin-White notes, the Jewish Temple only took Jewish coins.)
Sherwin-White also discusses taxes, noting the peculiarity of tax-gatherers in Capernaum (Galilee) in Matthew 17:24-27. Curiously the term is ”cesum” (in Greek form) meaning a Roman tax, yet Galilee is not in a Roman province. Other authors have suggested this was a Jewish temple tax, but what is curious is Matthew has Peter obtain a sater--a Greek coin to pay the tax. It is possible the coin could be changed, but if Jesus was performing a miracle, why not get the Jewish coin in the first place?
Sherwin-White does not discuss this anomaly.
He goes on to discuss villages and cities, noting most villages were concern solely with internal affairs. Only a very few cities controlled (by governmental means) areas outside their specific walls. Sherwin-White notes Matthew and Luke “sadly confuse” the terms of city and villages.
By the way, Joesphus notes villages could consist of 15,000 people.
Sherwin-White contrasts the Roman city with the agricultural villages of Galilee in terms of government, topography, and “little kings.” By the end of the First Century (the conquest of Galilee and Judea) the area became more Roman in nature. Thus, Sherwin-White argues, the Galilean parables of Jesus regarding kings, servants and cities reflect a first century Palestine.
Sherwin-White provided interesting information in this chapter, despite Galilee and Jewish history being outside his expertise comfort.
Lecture Seven
Sherwin-White goes over some specifics regarding Roman Citizenship as a whole. Roman citizens obtained a proof of citizenship or registration of birth made before a magistrate and seven (7) witnesses. “Whether Romans carried such certificates about with them…we simply do not know. They were convenient in shape and size, being small wooden diptychs. But it is more likely that they were normally kept in the family archives.” Pg. 148-9. If they were not carried about, Sherwin-White speculates this could be a reason Paul rarely asserted his citizenship rights.
Sherwin-White concludes speculating how and when Paul’s family obtained its citizenship is a fruitless task.
He spends some time, going through Roman nomenclature, and how the various names in Acts do not provide much information as to the status, citizenship or class of individuals, due to lack of specifics. Again, Sherwin-White addresses various scholars’ opinions in this regard. A very dry topic in my opinion, with a great deal of “it is possible” and speculation.
Sherwin-White closes the lecture with a short section on Quirinius. “Luke dates the birth of Christ by connecting it with the census of Judaea taken, as is made abundantly clear in Josephus, when Sulpicius Quirinius was governor of Judaea after the annexation of the province in A.D. 6. This date conflicts with that of Matthew, who connects the nativity with the last years of Herod and the accession of Archelaus, ten years earlier. [4 BCE]. Luke’s date also conflicts with his own setting of the nativity of John in the ‘days of Herod the King of Judea.” PG. 163.
Sherwin-White dispenses with the apologetic Quirinus was governor of Syria twice—finding it lacks plausibility. He finds Luke is explicit with dates—such as Luke 3:1, “in the fifteenth year of Tiberius”—and believes Luke is equally deliberate with the dating of the birth. Sherwin-White says, “The taking of the Roman census in Judaea made a tremendous impact in Jewish history. The author of Luke cannot have been under any doubt or confusion when he selected that date. But its selection was a deliberate rejection of the tradition of Matthew, which connects the nativity with Herod and Archelaus.” Pg. 167.
All would be well and good, but Luke confuses the date with John the Baptist’s birth at the time of Herod.
Sherwin-White gives no solution to this problem, except saying Luke may be trying to “link” the Messiah’s birth to the last Messianic Prophet—John the Baptist. Sherwin-White concludes, “Luke should mean what he wrote.” Pg. 171. It would appear Sherwin-White would place Jesus’ birth in 6 CE, according to Luke, and decide it is beyond his acumen to find a way to explain the problem of Luke referring to John the Baptist being born around the same time, yet in a period 10 years later.
And this is typical Sherwin-White. Say one thing, note the counter argument and then “Harumph. Aren’t we glad that is settled?” leaving you to scratch your head as to what the conclusion is, or how he reached it.
I found this the most interesting chapter by far.
First, he notes specific historical references are few, and (with one exception) are concentrated at the beginning and the end. The beginning with King Herod the Great, and the end with Pilate.
But even those references give us issue, as Sherwin-White indicates—the “reference to Herod and Archelaus [Herod’s son] keeps bad company in Mathew, is absent from Mark, and even in Luke is involved with the difficult question of Quirinius and his census.” Pg. 123. Sherwin-White will deal with Quirinius in a latter lecture. The sole exception in the middle is reference to Herod the Tetrarch of Galilee with John the Baptist (Matthew & Mark) and appearance four times in Luke.
Sherwin-White continues, “Not only are there no other precise historical cross-references inside the narrative, but he narrative of all three Gospels is largely devoid of other material references that might tie to the Roman period.” Pg 123. For example, the “centurion” with the palsied servant at Capernaum. (Matt. 8:5-13; Luke 7:1-10). He can’t be a Roman centurion, Galilee was not part of Rome until 44 CE. But he is not Jewish either. Sherwin-White concludes (without providing us a reason) he is one of Tetrarch Herod’s soldiers who affected Roman terminology.
He then notes the various coins listed throughout the Gospels. Mark has Roman denarii and Roman quadrans. Matthew has Roman as, Greek didrachma and Greek stater. Luke has denarii, as, Greek drachmae, mina,and lepta. No wonder they needed money-changers in the temple! (Especially, as Sherwin-White notes, the Jewish Temple only took Jewish coins.)
Sherwin-White also discusses taxes, noting the peculiarity of tax-gatherers in Capernaum (Galilee) in Matthew 17:24-27. Curiously the term is ”cesum” (in Greek form) meaning a Roman tax, yet Galilee is not in a Roman province. Other authors have suggested this was a Jewish temple tax, but what is curious is Matthew has Peter obtain a sater--a Greek coin to pay the tax. It is possible the coin could be changed, but if Jesus was performing a miracle, why not get the Jewish coin in the first place?
Sherwin-White does not discuss this anomaly.
He goes on to discuss villages and cities, noting most villages were concern solely with internal affairs. Only a very few cities controlled (by governmental means) areas outside their specific walls. Sherwin-White notes Matthew and Luke “sadly confuse” the terms of city and villages.
By the way, Joesphus notes villages could consist of 15,000 people.
Sherwin-White contrasts the Roman city with the agricultural villages of Galilee in terms of government, topography, and “little kings.” By the end of the First Century (the conquest of Galilee and Judea) the area became more Roman in nature. Thus, Sherwin-White argues, the Galilean parables of Jesus regarding kings, servants and cities reflect a first century Palestine.
Sherwin-White provided interesting information in this chapter, despite Galilee and Jewish history being outside his expertise comfort.
Lecture Seven
Sherwin-White goes over some specifics regarding Roman Citizenship as a whole. Roman citizens obtained a proof of citizenship or registration of birth made before a magistrate and seven (7) witnesses. “Whether Romans carried such certificates about with them…we simply do not know. They were convenient in shape and size, being small wooden diptychs. But it is more likely that they were normally kept in the family archives.” Pg. 148-9. If they were not carried about, Sherwin-White speculates this could be a reason Paul rarely asserted his citizenship rights.
Sherwin-White concludes speculating how and when Paul’s family obtained its citizenship is a fruitless task.
He spends some time, going through Roman nomenclature, and how the various names in Acts do not provide much information as to the status, citizenship or class of individuals, due to lack of specifics. Again, Sherwin-White addresses various scholars’ opinions in this regard. A very dry topic in my opinion, with a great deal of “it is possible” and speculation.
Sherwin-White closes the lecture with a short section on Quirinius. “Luke dates the birth of Christ by connecting it with the census of Judaea taken, as is made abundantly clear in Josephus, when Sulpicius Quirinius was governor of Judaea after the annexation of the province in A.D. 6. This date conflicts with that of Matthew, who connects the nativity with the last years of Herod and the accession of Archelaus, ten years earlier. [4 BCE]. Luke’s date also conflicts with his own setting of the nativity of John in the ‘days of Herod the King of Judea.” PG. 163.
Sherwin-White dispenses with the apologetic Quirinus was governor of Syria twice—finding it lacks plausibility. He finds Luke is explicit with dates—such as Luke 3:1, “in the fifteenth year of Tiberius”—and believes Luke is equally deliberate with the dating of the birth. Sherwin-White says, “The taking of the Roman census in Judaea made a tremendous impact in Jewish history. The author of Luke cannot have been under any doubt or confusion when he selected that date. But its selection was a deliberate rejection of the tradition of Matthew, which connects the nativity with Herod and Archelaus.” Pg. 167.
All would be well and good, but Luke confuses the date with John the Baptist’s birth at the time of Herod.
Sherwin-White gives no solution to this problem, except saying Luke may be trying to “link” the Messiah’s birth to the last Messianic Prophet—John the Baptist. Sherwin-White concludes, “Luke should mean what he wrote.” Pg. 171. It would appear Sherwin-White would place Jesus’ birth in 6 CE, according to Luke, and decide it is beyond his acumen to find a way to explain the problem of Luke referring to John the Baptist being born around the same time, yet in a period 10 years later.
And this is typical Sherwin-White. Say one thing, note the counter argument and then “Harumph. Aren’t we glad that is settled?” leaving you to scratch your head as to what the conclusion is, or how he reached it.
Sherwin-White enters the next lecture about Paul’s various trips to cities, as recorded in Acts. The first anachronism Sherwin-White addresses is the question of how Paul could be beaten by authorities (Acts 16:22 & 2 Cor. 11:25) when Paul indicates it is unlawful to beat him as a Roman Citizen. (Acts 22:25).
Sherwin-White goes through a number of examples regarding various communities, their authorities and their jurisdiction to impose law. He notes it is possible authorities could exceed their powers and concludes, “the narrative agrees with the evidence of the earlier period that a Roman Citizen of any social class was protected against a casual beating (without trial), whereas the humiliores of the late empire had lost this protection.” Pg. 76 I had great difficulty following Sherwin-White’s analysis, nor how he came to this particular conclusion. I finally gave up.
Sherwin-White notes the charge in Philippi was in two forms: 1) causing a riot and 2) introduction of alien religion. However, Sherwin-White correctly indicate the official position of Rome was to prohibit certain religious practices, typically if such practices did not cause a disturbance, they were allowed to continue. With occasional crack-downs. This charge, Sherwin-White says, “…though it is unusual, it is not entirely unparalleled in Julio-Claudian usage.” (pg 82)
Sherwin-White states the procedure followed in Ephesus was that reminiscent of the first and Second Century. Acts does not show detailed knowledge of any other city, as compared to Ephesus. When discussing the other cities, Acts uses far less specifics, and general titles, rather than the correct term for Clerk of the City, etc. Although Acts is aware of the correct and fairly unusual title of Thessalonica’s city magistrates.
I found Sherwin-White quite dry at this point, in referring to these events. It did seem he generally wanted to favor Acts, rather than be critical. Where Acts was accurate, it was highlighted. Where Acts was not, it was excused.
The next Lecture dealt with Paul appearing before the proconsul Gallio. (Acts 18:12-17) Where the proconsul actually turns on the accusers and drives them out. Sherwin-White says, “It is not certain that the charge made against Paul at Corinth was intended to refer primarily to Hebraic Law, though Gallio found it convenient to take it that way….It is the way of Acts to summarize and at times to garble the charges variously brought against Paul.” Pg. 101
Sherwin-White responds to many claims by critics, including the lack of specific charges, and that we do not know a proconsul Gallio of Achaia. (It is unlikely such a minor official would be recorded within the histories we have.)
And finally, within this lecture, Sherwin-White addresses who Paul would see in his appeal to Rome. It is extremely unlikely he would have been taken to Nero himself, as Nero avoided all jurisdictional functions. He also addresses criticism regarding the two-year delay, concluding it was possible for such a delay to occur.
Curiously, Sherwin-White notes Seneca, one of Nero’s principal advisors, attempted to instill clemency in Nero, and states, “Perhaps Paul benefited from the clemency of Nero, and secured merely a casual release. But there is no necessity to construe Acts to mean that he was released at all.” (pg 119)
Sherwin-White gives us no information as to who Paul would have seen in Rome, or what would have happened to him.
Sherwin-White goes through a number of examples regarding various communities, their authorities and their jurisdiction to impose law. He notes it is possible authorities could exceed their powers and concludes, “the narrative agrees with the evidence of the earlier period that a Roman Citizen of any social class was protected against a casual beating (without trial), whereas the humiliores of the late empire had lost this protection.” Pg. 76 I had great difficulty following Sherwin-White’s analysis, nor how he came to this particular conclusion. I finally gave up.
Sherwin-White notes the charge in Philippi was in two forms: 1) causing a riot and 2) introduction of alien religion. However, Sherwin-White correctly indicate the official position of Rome was to prohibit certain religious practices, typically if such practices did not cause a disturbance, they were allowed to continue. With occasional crack-downs. This charge, Sherwin-White says, “…though it is unusual, it is not entirely unparalleled in Julio-Claudian usage.” (pg 82)
Sherwin-White states the procedure followed in Ephesus was that reminiscent of the first and Second Century. Acts does not show detailed knowledge of any other city, as compared to Ephesus. When discussing the other cities, Acts uses far less specifics, and general titles, rather than the correct term for Clerk of the City, etc. Although Acts is aware of the correct and fairly unusual title of Thessalonica’s city magistrates.
I found Sherwin-White quite dry at this point, in referring to these events. It did seem he generally wanted to favor Acts, rather than be critical. Where Acts was accurate, it was highlighted. Where Acts was not, it was excused.
The next Lecture dealt with Paul appearing before the proconsul Gallio. (Acts 18:12-17) Where the proconsul actually turns on the accusers and drives them out. Sherwin-White says, “It is not certain that the charge made against Paul at Corinth was intended to refer primarily to Hebraic Law, though Gallio found it convenient to take it that way….It is the way of Acts to summarize and at times to garble the charges variously brought against Paul.” Pg. 101
Sherwin-White responds to many claims by critics, including the lack of specific charges, and that we do not know a proconsul Gallio of Achaia. (It is unlikely such a minor official would be recorded within the histories we have.)
And finally, within this lecture, Sherwin-White addresses who Paul would see in his appeal to Rome. It is extremely unlikely he would have been taken to Nero himself, as Nero avoided all jurisdictional functions. He also addresses criticism regarding the two-year delay, concluding it was possible for such a delay to occur.
Curiously, Sherwin-White notes Seneca, one of Nero’s principal advisors, attempted to instill clemency in Nero, and states, “Perhaps Paul benefited from the clemency of Nero, and secured merely a casual release. But there is no necessity to construe Acts to mean that he was released at all.” (pg 119)
Sherwin-White gives us no information as to who Paul would have seen in Rome, or what would have happened to him.
Stumbled upon this blog post: Why I am Not a Christian over at dia pente blog that has some good information. My favorite line: “The Holiday Season is schizophrenic. Hanukkah celebrates the defeat of a guy who got rid of the laws of Moses, but Christmas celebrates the birth of a guy who got rid of the laws of Moses “
Before I continue on with Paul’s interaction in Acts of the Apostles—a brief interlude to remind us of two obvious concepts. In fact, so obvious, you will immediately read it, and only one word will come to mind. “Obvious.” Yet for some reason we enter biblical studies and become muddled, foggy and eventually ignored.
1) Just because it is historically accurate, does not make it historical. Just because an event is historical, does not mean we have a historically accurate account.
I enjoy reading the background on movies at Internet Movie Database. All sorts of information—actors, budget, gross revenues, quotes, trivia—including a section on “goofs.” One goof often listed is anachronisms—items, quotes or events in movies out of place.
For example, the action/adventure Where Eagles Dare is a World War II drama. Yet imdb notes, “If you look really carefully you can make out that the timer used on the bombs (in particular the one on the cable car) is a Heuer Sebring, a model that wasn't made until around 1958.”
Obviously they were not using 1958 timers in 1944. It is a mistake. Now, the movie has 1000’s of details correct—uniforms, salutes, trucks, cars, motorcycles, parachutes, radio rooms, etc.—yet all those correct details do not make the story factual. It does not become historical if the movie maker used correctly dated times.
We understand it is these anachronisms cluing us in as to errors in the story.
Secondly, even though we know something happened, we may not have historically accurate information. We have differing copies of the Gettysburg Address, and are not certain what Lincoln’s precise words were. Does that mean he did not give the Gettysburg Address? Of course not. And we can be reasonably certain of being extremely close to what he said. Just not 100% accurate.
Because a story has correct details does not make it history. Because a story has incorrect details does not make it completely fiction.
I point this out, because at times it seems we battle two extremes within biblical studies. On the one hand, there are those who insist every detail MUST be true, or the whole thing should be thrown out as a shame. “Jesus couldn’t be born when King Herod the Great was alive and Quirinius was governor, therefore Jesus was never born.” On the other, there are those who claim some details are accurate, so the whole thing must be true. “Since there really was Pontius Pilate, heaven has golden streets.”
This “all-or-nothing” would seem to be part of what Sherwin-White is battling. Scholars who indicate not knowing what Paul was precisely charged with on certain occasions so it never happened. However, Sherwin-White then pendulums too far (in my opinion) to excusing anachronisms calling into question the account’s historicity.
It seems to me we approach these stories just like any other historical account. Provisionally, understanding errors do not eliminate the necessity of it being historical, but give us pause as to why the errors occurred.
Christians would be far better served if they avoided Herculean twists to align Jesus’ birthdate, accept Luke modified the date to conform to Luke’s intended point, and move on. Jesus could still exist. Jesus could still be the Son of God. Jesus could still have been crucified, buried and rose again. Just Luke got it wrong when it came to Jesus’ birth. (Coincidentally, this is exactly what evangelical Christians do with the Second Century gospels on Jesus. Still claim he was a child at one point, and could do extraordinary things, and was the son of God, etc. Just that the author of the Infancy Gospel of Thomas was wrong. Alas, they avoid making the same claim about Luke, because it is within the covers of their leather-bound, family heirloom.)
2) Is it remarkable Luke got details correct?
Imagine I told you to write a Batman comic including a storyline about Bruce Wayne being on trial. I suspect you would include things like a prosecutor, attorneys, a judge, possibly a jury. It would be in a courtroom, there would be counsel tables, perhaps a court reporter and bailiff. You would include words like “Objection!” and “Sustained!” Phrases like “Call your next witness” and “Please be seated.”
Thanks to books, television, plays and movies, most people have general knowledge how a trial runs. 2000 years from now, I would review it and could point out dozens, if not 100’s of details you got precisely correct. The correct general charge, the correct order, the correct language, the correct players, the correct system.
Yet we know it is a story about Batman—a completely fictional account.
The question I have is this—given a person who could read/write Greek, was generally knowledgeable regarding governorships, travel, and geography of the First Century Mediterranean, would we equally expect such a person to have general knowledge regarding legal actions sufficient to provide the broad details we have?
Simply put, could Luke have the knowledge to completely make-up the legal inter-workings with Paul, the same as you could make up a trial about Batman? If so, how remarkable is it he gets these broad concepts correct?
Keeping this in mind, the next two (2) lectures Sherwin-White deals with Paul’s trial before Felix and Festus in Judea.
Sherwin-White addresses “moderns” (pg. 49) regarding question as to what the specific charges would be. “In the scene before the Sanhedrin, Paul defends himself sophistically from charges of what one may call heresy….” (pg. 49) or stirring up civil disturbances.
This accusation—“stirring up civil disturbances”—is supported by letter from Claudius against Alexandrians, “stirring up a plague and disturbances for the Jews throughout the world..” (pg. 51)
Paul’s accusers (Asian Greeks) disappear, thus putting the case on “cold storage” for two years. Also interesting the inquiry into Paul’s province, as this could well be forum domicilii but Felix keeps the case. Perhaps because Cilicia did not have Roman authority at the time (it was under client-kings.) By the 4th year of Nero it did. (Did Luke place this event too early? If so, Sherwin-White excuses it: “If Acts has made a slip in implying that Cilicia was already a separate province, the slip is venial, because within two or three years that was the situation.” (pg 57) This is what I mean by Sherwin-White excusing what could be an anachronism revealing lack of historicity.)
Sherwin-White makes only brief mention of Paul’s citizenship; he will deal with Roman Citizenship in a later lecture.
The next lecture regards Paul’s interactions at the cities. The pattern is roughly the same: Paul enters the city, starts to preach in the synagogue. Jews bring complaints to the city leaders, Paul skips town. Repeat at the next stop.
Sherwin-White makes the point the accounts, including the punishments, the persons involved, etc. conform to what would probably happen in the latter 1st century. There is nothing reflecting late Second Century here. I do think this is a stronger point to support Acts was not a late 2nd Century work. In other words, Luke did not put a 190 CE timer in a 60 CE event.
Basically, Sherwin-White notes the stories contain broad general knowledge, conforming to the broad general knowledge we have of the period. With an occasional anachronism that Sherwin-White excuses, and I question what direction it would point us in.
1) Just because it is historically accurate, does not make it historical. Just because an event is historical, does not mean we have a historically accurate account.
I enjoy reading the background on movies at Internet Movie Database. All sorts of information—actors, budget, gross revenues, quotes, trivia—including a section on “goofs.” One goof often listed is anachronisms—items, quotes or events in movies out of place.
For example, the action/adventure Where Eagles Dare is a World War II drama. Yet imdb notes, “If you look really carefully you can make out that the timer used on the bombs (in particular the one on the cable car) is a Heuer Sebring, a model that wasn't made until around 1958.”
Obviously they were not using 1958 timers in 1944. It is a mistake. Now, the movie has 1000’s of details correct—uniforms, salutes, trucks, cars, motorcycles, parachutes, radio rooms, etc.—yet all those correct details do not make the story factual. It does not become historical if the movie maker used correctly dated times.
We understand it is these anachronisms cluing us in as to errors in the story.
Secondly, even though we know something happened, we may not have historically accurate information. We have differing copies of the Gettysburg Address, and are not certain what Lincoln’s precise words were. Does that mean he did not give the Gettysburg Address? Of course not. And we can be reasonably certain of being extremely close to what he said. Just not 100% accurate.
Because a story has correct details does not make it history. Because a story has incorrect details does not make it completely fiction.
I point this out, because at times it seems we battle two extremes within biblical studies. On the one hand, there are those who insist every detail MUST be true, or the whole thing should be thrown out as a shame. “Jesus couldn’t be born when King Herod the Great was alive and Quirinius was governor, therefore Jesus was never born.” On the other, there are those who claim some details are accurate, so the whole thing must be true. “Since there really was Pontius Pilate, heaven has golden streets.”
This “all-or-nothing” would seem to be part of what Sherwin-White is battling. Scholars who indicate not knowing what Paul was precisely charged with on certain occasions so it never happened. However, Sherwin-White then pendulums too far (in my opinion) to excusing anachronisms calling into question the account’s historicity.
It seems to me we approach these stories just like any other historical account. Provisionally, understanding errors do not eliminate the necessity of it being historical, but give us pause as to why the errors occurred.
Christians would be far better served if they avoided Herculean twists to align Jesus’ birthdate, accept Luke modified the date to conform to Luke’s intended point, and move on. Jesus could still exist. Jesus could still be the Son of God. Jesus could still have been crucified, buried and rose again. Just Luke got it wrong when it came to Jesus’ birth. (Coincidentally, this is exactly what evangelical Christians do with the Second Century gospels on Jesus. Still claim he was a child at one point, and could do extraordinary things, and was the son of God, etc. Just that the author of the Infancy Gospel of Thomas was wrong. Alas, they avoid making the same claim about Luke, because it is within the covers of their leather-bound, family heirloom.)
2) Is it remarkable Luke got details correct?
Imagine I told you to write a Batman comic including a storyline about Bruce Wayne being on trial. I suspect you would include things like a prosecutor, attorneys, a judge, possibly a jury. It would be in a courtroom, there would be counsel tables, perhaps a court reporter and bailiff. You would include words like “Objection!” and “Sustained!” Phrases like “Call your next witness” and “Please be seated.”
Thanks to books, television, plays and movies, most people have general knowledge how a trial runs. 2000 years from now, I would review it and could point out dozens, if not 100’s of details you got precisely correct. The correct general charge, the correct order, the correct language, the correct players, the correct system.
Yet we know it is a story about Batman—a completely fictional account.
The question I have is this—given a person who could read/write Greek, was generally knowledgeable regarding governorships, travel, and geography of the First Century Mediterranean, would we equally expect such a person to have general knowledge regarding legal actions sufficient to provide the broad details we have?
Simply put, could Luke have the knowledge to completely make-up the legal inter-workings with Paul, the same as you could make up a trial about Batman? If so, how remarkable is it he gets these broad concepts correct?
Keeping this in mind, the next two (2) lectures Sherwin-White deals with Paul’s trial before Felix and Festus in Judea.
Sherwin-White addresses “moderns” (pg. 49) regarding question as to what the specific charges would be. “In the scene before the Sanhedrin, Paul defends himself sophistically from charges of what one may call heresy….” (pg. 49) or stirring up civil disturbances.
This accusation—“stirring up civil disturbances”—is supported by letter from Claudius against Alexandrians, “stirring up a plague and disturbances for the Jews throughout the world..” (pg. 51)
Paul’s accusers (Asian Greeks) disappear, thus putting the case on “cold storage” for two years. Also interesting the inquiry into Paul’s province, as this could well be forum domicilii but Felix keeps the case. Perhaps because Cilicia did not have Roman authority at the time (it was under client-kings.) By the 4th year of Nero it did. (Did Luke place this event too early? If so, Sherwin-White excuses it: “If Acts has made a slip in implying that Cilicia was already a separate province, the slip is venial, because within two or three years that was the situation.” (pg 57) This is what I mean by Sherwin-White excusing what could be an anachronism revealing lack of historicity.)
Sherwin-White makes only brief mention of Paul’s citizenship; he will deal with Roman Citizenship in a later lecture.
The next lecture regards Paul’s interactions at the cities. The pattern is roughly the same: Paul enters the city, starts to preach in the synagogue. Jews bring complaints to the city leaders, Paul skips town. Repeat at the next stop.
Sherwin-White makes the point the accounts, including the punishments, the persons involved, etc. conform to what would probably happen in the latter 1st century. There is nothing reflecting late Second Century here. I do think this is a stronger point to support Acts was not a late 2nd Century work. In other words, Luke did not put a 190 CE timer in a 60 CE event.
Basically, Sherwin-White notes the stories contain broad general knowledge, conforming to the broad general knowledge we have of the period. With an occasional anachronism that Sherwin-White excuses, and I question what direction it would point us in.
Trial of Jesus
There were two (2) trials: one before the Jewish authorities—the Sanhedrin, the other before the Roman Authority—Prefect Pontius Pilate.
Sanhedrin
Sherwin-White responds to two (2) claims:
1) Whether the Sanhedrin could take place at night; and
2) Whether the Sanhedrin had the power of capital punishment.
Some quick background, if the reader is not familiar. (Again, Sherwin-White presumes the reader is, and provides little insight.) I will use our traditional day/night, not the Jewish system of sundown to sundown.
Jesus has the last supper, Passover sedar, which lasts until midnight on Thursday night. Extremely early Friday morning (traditional “Good Friday) Jesus is praying. The famous “take this cup from me” and “sweat like blood” scene. Still wee hours of morning, Jesus is arrested, and taken before the Sanhedrin. He is then tried before the Sanhedrin, allegedly for blasphemy. Friday morning (sunrise) the Sanhedrin takes Jesus to Pilate for sentencing.
Both Matthew (Matt. 27:1) and Mark (Mark 15:1) indicate Jesus’ appearance before the council occurred in the Thursday night-Friday early morning period. Luke, however, has Jesus held by the guards until the morning and then commences the council. (Luke 22:66)
Sherwin-White states Matthew-Mark’s timing is more accurate, and Luke’s is “less probable.” (Sherwin-White’s words.) He bases this on two things:
1) He cites numerous anecdotes where Roman officials got up early in the morning to perform their work. If the Jewish authorities wanted to get Jesus to Pilate in time, they would have to complete their trial process before Pilate was “done for the day” if you will.
2) The fire. Luke 22:55 states a fire was kindled to keep warm. (Where Peter commences his three-part betrayal of Jesus.) If the trial was to not take place until the morning, reasons Sherwin-White, why have a fire?
Unfortunately, I found this analysis unsubstantial for a number of reasons:
a) Sherwin-White never addresses the issue about Luke copying Matthew and/or Mark. If Luke deliberately changed the timing of the council—where did he get his information from? If it is “less probable,” doesn’t this impact Luke’s credibility? Where else did Luke take more certain data and make it less likely?
b) Sherwin-White never addresses the fact this took place during Passover. Jerusalem would have been busting at the seams with people. This is a large Jewish holiday, involving preparation, (removing the leaven from the house) and a family ritualistic feast ending at midnight. Frankly, the timing (prayer, arrest, council and conviction from midnight to 6 a.m.) would be inconceivable within such a short time frame during this period.
Arguably the reason Pilate was in Jerusalem, rather than the capital of Caesarea, was heightened security concern. Pilate was not “working a regular day” and then finishing up for an early round of golf on Friday—Pilate was there to handle concerns like this, anticipated to occur.
c) The fire could easily be fatigue by Luke, or Luke copying Mark with little thought as to why it would be noteworthy to start a fire.
d) Sherwin-White never refers to the Tracate Sanhedrin that lays out explicit rules for trials, and condemning an individual. The Tracate Sanhedrin was violated numerous times and ways in the Gospel accounts, yet Sherwin-White never responds to it. More on this in a minute.
The second issue regarding the Sanhedrin was whether they had the power to commit capital punishment. Specifically John 18:31 indicates the Jews did not have the authority to kill as punishment.
Sherwin-White notes other provinces where only the Roman governor could execute the accused. He indicates this power was jealously guarded by Rome.
Now, Sherwin-White does recognize the story of Stephen (Acts 7) and James, the brother of Christ in Josephus. Both accounts regarding the council ordering death. Sherwin-White excuses both as anomalies for differing reasons. Stephen because it was more a lynching than an execution, and James because it was done explicitly when no governor was present—Judea was between Procurators.
Although I think those are reasonable explanations, one does wonder which it was—were Stephen and James exceptions or anecdotes? Was John wrong and Acts correct or Acts correct and John wrong? Further, what happens in one province does not necessarily prevail in another. The story indicates Jews had the ability to determine who would die or live within the Barabbas story. If Rome was willing to allow this “custom” (dealing with capital punishment) how can we be so certain it did not allow the Sanhedrin to have the right to capital punishment in violation of its religious laws, albeit not in Roman civil laws?
But most importantly, I was disappointed and would like to have questioned Sherwin-White about the Tracate Sanhedrin. This document gives specific outline regarding how to try different types of cases—specifically crimes involving death as a punishment. How to execute (hanging or stoning) and specifics about how to perform the execution.
It very clearly anticipates the Sanhedrin had the power to inflict capital punishment. Now, the document is dated to the later part of the Second Century. BUT, as I stated earlier, if Sherwin-White utilizes Second Century documents, to claim a basis in the first Century, couldn’t we do that as well with the Tracate Sanhedrin? Claim it was utilized earlier, but not codified until the Second Century?
Trial before Pilate
Sherwin-White was better here. The ground was more familiar for him.
Accusers were the priests, Pilate “investigated” the charges of Jesus being an instigator, as “King of the Judeans,” and without a response from Jesus, was forced to convict. Sherwin-White (as I stated in the earlier blog entry) notes accused where asked thrice as to their innocence and guilt. Sherwin-White relies upon Pliny the Younger (early Second Century) and presumes this was a continued practice from the First Century. However, Sherwin-White notes question put twice to Jesus in Matt. and Mark, once in Luke and thrice to accusers in Luke.
He makes no notation as to whether this is an exception to the “3 times” rule or a development of the “3 times” rule, so we are left puzzling to the significance.
Sherwin-White indicates there were three graduated levels of beating - fustes, flagella, verbera where fustes would mean a warning or threat, and Sherwin-White praises Luke for being historically accurate when Luke records Pilate offering fustes. (Luke 23:14-16)
Sherwin-White also discusses the curious side trip of Pilate sending Jesus to Herod, only recorded in Luke.
Under Roman law (as well as our own), “venue” is the determination where the legal proceedings must occur, given the parameters of the action. In America, this is more important in civil matters than criminal matters—we are all familiar with criminal actions taking place where the crime occurred. If you rob a bank in Florida, the trial will be in Florida, regardless if you are from Kansas, or Virginia or Iowa.
The Roman law recognized two (2) possible venues: forum delecti (where crime occurred) as compared to forum domicilii (where one lived). This charge—causing insurrection by claiming to be King of the Judeans, would be forum delecti --where the crime occurred.
Thus it is curious why Pilate would ever involve Herod Antipas. According to the accusers, Jesus claimed to be King of the Judeans, and was stirring up trouble throughout “all of Judea, beginning with Galilee.” (Luke 23:5). Luke then states, “And as soon as Pilate knew that Jesus belonged to Herod Antipas’ jurisdiction, Pilate sent Jesus to Herod, who was also in Jerusalem at that time.” (Luke 23:7)
But wait a minute…according to Sherwin-White, this crime would be forum delecti--where the crime occurred. According to the accusers, Jesus claimed to be “King of the Judeans” and while Jesus may have started in Galilee, this insurrectionist action was taking place in Judea. The very obvious venue would be…Judea.
Herod Antipas was tetrarch over Galilee—a completely separate country. Why would Herod Antipas have jurisdiction over Jesus? The crime was in Judea, the venue for the crime is where it was committed…finding out Jesus was from a different country would make no difference.
Sherwin-White fails to adequately deal with this conflict. Why would Pilate not follow forum delecti? (Sherwin-White does mention Herod the Great had the unusual right to extradite [bring back] offenders who fled Herod’s jurisdiction, but here Herod Antipas was not requesting for extradition. Further, Herod the Great could ONLY extradite for crimes committed within Herod’s jurisdiction. Again, this was a crime alleged to occur in Judea. Even Sherwin-White recognizes Pilate’s authority over Galileans for such crimes. [Luke 13:2])
The reason I bring all this up, is that Sherwin-White concludes: “But Luke is remarkable in that his additional materials—the full formation of the charges before Pilate, the reference to Herod, and the proposed acquittal with admonition—are all technically correct.” (pg. 32)
I did not see how that followed, given the blatant violation of venue by even sending Jesus to Herod in the first place.
While interesting from a very broad aspect regarding legal actions within Jesus’ trial account, there were too many anomalies left unanswered for me to be satisfied with Sherwin-White’s account.
There were two (2) trials: one before the Jewish authorities—the Sanhedrin, the other before the Roman Authority—Prefect Pontius Pilate.
Sanhedrin
Sherwin-White responds to two (2) claims:
1) Whether the Sanhedrin could take place at night; and
2) Whether the Sanhedrin had the power of capital punishment.
Some quick background, if the reader is not familiar. (Again, Sherwin-White presumes the reader is, and provides little insight.) I will use our traditional day/night, not the Jewish system of sundown to sundown.
Jesus has the last supper, Passover sedar, which lasts until midnight on Thursday night. Extremely early Friday morning (traditional “Good Friday) Jesus is praying. The famous “take this cup from me” and “sweat like blood” scene. Still wee hours of morning, Jesus is arrested, and taken before the Sanhedrin. He is then tried before the Sanhedrin, allegedly for blasphemy. Friday morning (sunrise) the Sanhedrin takes Jesus to Pilate for sentencing.
Both Matthew (Matt. 27:1) and Mark (Mark 15:1) indicate Jesus’ appearance before the council occurred in the Thursday night-Friday early morning period. Luke, however, has Jesus held by the guards until the morning and then commences the council. (Luke 22:66)
Sherwin-White states Matthew-Mark’s timing is more accurate, and Luke’s is “less probable.” (Sherwin-White’s words.) He bases this on two things:
1) He cites numerous anecdotes where Roman officials got up early in the morning to perform their work. If the Jewish authorities wanted to get Jesus to Pilate in time, they would have to complete their trial process before Pilate was “done for the day” if you will.
2) The fire. Luke 22:55 states a fire was kindled to keep warm. (Where Peter commences his three-part betrayal of Jesus.) If the trial was to not take place until the morning, reasons Sherwin-White, why have a fire?
Unfortunately, I found this analysis unsubstantial for a number of reasons:
a) Sherwin-White never addresses the issue about Luke copying Matthew and/or Mark. If Luke deliberately changed the timing of the council—where did he get his information from? If it is “less probable,” doesn’t this impact Luke’s credibility? Where else did Luke take more certain data and make it less likely?
b) Sherwin-White never addresses the fact this took place during Passover. Jerusalem would have been busting at the seams with people. This is a large Jewish holiday, involving preparation, (removing the leaven from the house) and a family ritualistic feast ending at midnight. Frankly, the timing (prayer, arrest, council and conviction from midnight to 6 a.m.) would be inconceivable within such a short time frame during this period.
Arguably the reason Pilate was in Jerusalem, rather than the capital of Caesarea, was heightened security concern. Pilate was not “working a regular day” and then finishing up for an early round of golf on Friday—Pilate was there to handle concerns like this, anticipated to occur.
c) The fire could easily be fatigue by Luke, or Luke copying Mark with little thought as to why it would be noteworthy to start a fire.
d) Sherwin-White never refers to the Tracate Sanhedrin that lays out explicit rules for trials, and condemning an individual. The Tracate Sanhedrin was violated numerous times and ways in the Gospel accounts, yet Sherwin-White never responds to it. More on this in a minute.
The second issue regarding the Sanhedrin was whether they had the power to commit capital punishment. Specifically John 18:31 indicates the Jews did not have the authority to kill as punishment.
Sherwin-White notes other provinces where only the Roman governor could execute the accused. He indicates this power was jealously guarded by Rome.
Now, Sherwin-White does recognize the story of Stephen (Acts 7) and James, the brother of Christ in Josephus. Both accounts regarding the council ordering death. Sherwin-White excuses both as anomalies for differing reasons. Stephen because it was more a lynching than an execution, and James because it was done explicitly when no governor was present—Judea was between Procurators.
Although I think those are reasonable explanations, one does wonder which it was—were Stephen and James exceptions or anecdotes? Was John wrong and Acts correct or Acts correct and John wrong? Further, what happens in one province does not necessarily prevail in another. The story indicates Jews had the ability to determine who would die or live within the Barabbas story. If Rome was willing to allow this “custom” (dealing with capital punishment) how can we be so certain it did not allow the Sanhedrin to have the right to capital punishment in violation of its religious laws, albeit not in Roman civil laws?
But most importantly, I was disappointed and would like to have questioned Sherwin-White about the Tracate Sanhedrin. This document gives specific outline regarding how to try different types of cases—specifically crimes involving death as a punishment. How to execute (hanging or stoning) and specifics about how to perform the execution.
It very clearly anticipates the Sanhedrin had the power to inflict capital punishment. Now, the document is dated to the later part of the Second Century. BUT, as I stated earlier, if Sherwin-White utilizes Second Century documents, to claim a basis in the first Century, couldn’t we do that as well with the Tracate Sanhedrin? Claim it was utilized earlier, but not codified until the Second Century?
Trial before Pilate
Sherwin-White was better here. The ground was more familiar for him.
Accusers were the priests, Pilate “investigated” the charges of Jesus being an instigator, as “King of the Judeans,” and without a response from Jesus, was forced to convict. Sherwin-White (as I stated in the earlier blog entry) notes accused where asked thrice as to their innocence and guilt. Sherwin-White relies upon Pliny the Younger (early Second Century) and presumes this was a continued practice from the First Century. However, Sherwin-White notes question put twice to Jesus in Matt. and Mark, once in Luke and thrice to accusers in Luke.
He makes no notation as to whether this is an exception to the “3 times” rule or a development of the “3 times” rule, so we are left puzzling to the significance.
Sherwin-White indicates there were three graduated levels of beating - fustes, flagella, verbera where fustes would mean a warning or threat, and Sherwin-White praises Luke for being historically accurate when Luke records Pilate offering fustes. (Luke 23:14-16)
Sherwin-White also discusses the curious side trip of Pilate sending Jesus to Herod, only recorded in Luke.
Under Roman law (as well as our own), “venue” is the determination where the legal proceedings must occur, given the parameters of the action. In America, this is more important in civil matters than criminal matters—we are all familiar with criminal actions taking place where the crime occurred. If you rob a bank in Florida, the trial will be in Florida, regardless if you are from Kansas, or Virginia or Iowa.
The Roman law recognized two (2) possible venues: forum delecti (where crime occurred) as compared to forum domicilii (where one lived). This charge—causing insurrection by claiming to be King of the Judeans, would be forum delecti --where the crime occurred.
Thus it is curious why Pilate would ever involve Herod Antipas. According to the accusers, Jesus claimed to be King of the Judeans, and was stirring up trouble throughout “all of Judea, beginning with Galilee.” (Luke 23:5). Luke then states, “And as soon as Pilate knew that Jesus belonged to Herod Antipas’ jurisdiction, Pilate sent Jesus to Herod, who was also in Jerusalem at that time.” (Luke 23:7)
But wait a minute…according to Sherwin-White, this crime would be forum delecti--where the crime occurred. According to the accusers, Jesus claimed to be “King of the Judeans” and while Jesus may have started in Galilee, this insurrectionist action was taking place in Judea. The very obvious venue would be…Judea.
Herod Antipas was tetrarch over Galilee—a completely separate country. Why would Herod Antipas have jurisdiction over Jesus? The crime was in Judea, the venue for the crime is where it was committed…finding out Jesus was from a different country would make no difference.
Sherwin-White fails to adequately deal with this conflict. Why would Pilate not follow forum delecti? (Sherwin-White does mention Herod the Great had the unusual right to extradite [bring back] offenders who fled Herod’s jurisdiction, but here Herod Antipas was not requesting for extradition. Further, Herod the Great could ONLY extradite for crimes committed within Herod’s jurisdiction. Again, this was a crime alleged to occur in Judea. Even Sherwin-White recognizes Pilate’s authority over Galileans for such crimes. [Luke 13:2])
The reason I bring all this up, is that Sherwin-White concludes: “But Luke is remarkable in that his additional materials—the full formation of the charges before Pilate, the reference to Herod, and the proposed acquittal with admonition—are all technically correct.” (pg. 32)
I did not see how that followed, given the blatant violation of venue by even sending Jesus to Herod in the first place.
While interesting from a very broad aspect regarding legal actions within Jesus’ trial account, there were too many anomalies left unanswered for me to be satisfied with Sherwin-White’s account.
Over at Tough Questions Answered, I was discussing various topics with Walter Tucker, and this subject came up. I have always wanted to a person who held to Matthean priority respond to some questions I had, Walter Tucker is a pleasant person, so I am posting this up for him to respond. When he has an opportunity—no rush.
In brief, Matthew, Mark and Luke are called the Synoptic Gospels (because they present the same “view” or “synoptic” of Jesus’ ministry) and it has long been noted there is literary dependence amongst them. They copied each other in some way, Dr. Wallace has written a good introductory article on the subject.
Of course, the question immediately followed—who copied whom? Various solutions have been presented. Although a few die-hard adherents hold Luke was the first, the others copied from his Gospel, and even fewer hold to John being first (although not copied by the Synoptic Gospels), the real fight is whether Matthew was first—Matthew Priority—copied by Mark, or Mark was first—Markan Priority—copied by Matthew.
Two primary reasons I cannot be convinced by Matthean Priority, are: 1) harder readings and 2) fatigue.
Harder Readings
There is a premise in higher criticism (what this study is generally called) that the Harder reading is the primary reading. The thought behind it being subsequent editors or copiers would modify the reading to make it less difficult. I cannot improve on Dr. Wallace’s statements:
Fatigue
Here I cannot improve on Mark Goodacre’s article regarding fatigue:
So my second question to Walter Tucker: Fatigue makes sense when looking at Mark --> Matthew. But not Matthew --> Mark. Why would Mark incorrectly refer to Herod as King, if copying from Matthew and he saw “tetrarch”? Doesn’t this infer Matthew (and Luke if one reads the entire article) were copying and demonstrating fatigue?
Thanks, look forward to your responses.
In brief, Matthew, Mark and Luke are called the Synoptic Gospels (because they present the same “view” or “synoptic” of Jesus’ ministry) and it has long been noted there is literary dependence amongst them. They copied each other in some way, Dr. Wallace has written a good introductory article on the subject.
Of course, the question immediately followed—who copied whom? Various solutions have been presented. Although a few die-hard adherents hold Luke was the first, the others copied from his Gospel, and even fewer hold to John being first (although not copied by the Synoptic Gospels), the real fight is whether Matthew was first—Matthew Priority—copied by Mark, or Mark was first—Markan Priority—copied by Matthew.
Two primary reasons I cannot be convinced by Matthean Priority, are: 1) harder readings and 2) fatigue.
Harder Readings
There is a premise in higher criticism (what this study is generally called) that the Harder reading is the primary reading. The thought behind it being subsequent editors or copiers would modify the reading to make it less difficult. I cannot improve on Dr. Wallace’s statements:
There are several passages in Mark which paint a portrait of Jesus (or the disciples, etc.) that could be misunderstood. These passages have been altered in either Matthew or Luke or both on every occasion. It is the conviction of many NT scholars that this category is a very strong blow to the Griesbach hypothesis—and one which has not been handled adequately by Matthean prioritists.29 Among the several possible passages which scholars have noticed, the following are particularly impressive to me. Still, the cumulative effect is what makes the biggest impression.My First question to Walter Tucker: Why would Mark make the readings harder?
(1) Mark 6:5-6/Matt 13:58—“he could not do any mighty work there except . . . ”/“he did not do many works there . . . because of their unbelief.” On this text Farmer comments: “the passage offers no clear indication that . . . Matthew has ‘toned down’ a phrase in Mark which ‘might cause offense or suggest difficulties’.”30 But this ignores the verbs used, for Mark suggests inability on Jesus’ part, while Matthew simply indicates unwillingness (oujk ejduvnato vs. oujk ejpoivhsen). Cf. also Mark 1:32-34/Matt 8:16/Luke 4:40 for a similar text.
(2) Mark 10:18/Matt 19:17/Luke 18:19—“Good teacher . . . Why do you call me good?” (in Mark and Luke) vs. “Teacher . . . Why do you ask me about what is good?” (Matthew). The text, as Mark has it, might imply that Jesus denies his own deity. It is apparent that Luke did not read it that way, but Matthew probably did. Indeed, in the Holtzmann/Streeter view, Matthew and Luke copied Mark independently of one another. Thus what might offend one would not necessarily offend the other.31
(3) Mark 3:5/Luke 6:10—“he looked around at them with anger/he looked around on them all.” Matthew omits the verse entirely, though he includes material both before and after it (12:12-13). That Luke would omit a statement regarding Jesus’ anger is perfectly understandable.
(4) Mark 1:12/Matt 4:1/Luke 4:1—“the Spirit drove him into the desert” (Mark)/ “Jesus was led into the desert by the Spirit” (Matthew and Luke). Mark uses the very harsh ejkbavllw, while Matthew and Luke use (ajn)avgw, a much gentler term, to describe the Spirit’s role in bringing Jesus to the desert for temptation.
(5) Mark 8:24-26—the different stages of a particular healing story, omitted in Matthew and Luke. The blind man is partially healed the first time by Jesus, then fully the second time. This is the only healing story in the synoptic gospels which required two stages. Perhaps this was the reason for its omission in Matthew/Luke, or perhaps it was the fact that saliva was used as the means of healing.32
(6) Mark 3:20-21—The statement that Jesus’ mother and brothers tried to seize him because they said that he was insane (ejxevsth). Neither Matthew nor Luke have this verse, apparently because it would cast aspersions on Jesus’ mother and brothers.
Fatigue
Here I cannot improve on Mark Goodacre’s article regarding fatigue:
Editorial fatigue is a phenomenon that will inevitably occur when a writer is heavily dependent on another's work. In telling the same story as his predecessor, a writer makes changes in the early stages which he is unable to sustain throughout. Like continuity errors in film and television, examples of fatigue will be unconscious mistakes, small errors of detail which naturally arise in the course of constructing a narrative. They are interesting because they can betray an author's hand, most particularly in revealing to us the identity of his sources.
The clearest way to explain the phenomenon is to illustrate it. Though he did not use the term 'fatigue', G. M. Styler, in his famous article on Marcan priority, draws attention to a strong example, the Death of John the Baptist (Mark 6.14-29 // Matt 14.1-12). (5). For Mark, Herod is always 'king', four times in the passage (vv. 22, 25, 26 and 27). Matthew apparently corrects this to 'tetrarch'. This is a good move: Herod Antipas was not a king but a petty dependent prince and he is called 'tetrarch' by Josephus (Ant. 17. 188; 18. 102, 109, 122) (6). More is the shame, then, that Matthew lapses into calling Herod 'the king' halfway through the story (Matt 14.9), in agreement with Mark (6.26).
Styler points further to a more serious inconsistency in the same verse. The story in Mark is that Herodias wanted to kill John because she had a grudge against him,
'But she could not because Herod feared John, knowing that he was a righteous and holy man, and he protected him. When he heard him, he was greatly perplexed; and yet he liked to listen to him.' (Mark 6.19f).
In Matthew's version of the story, this element has dropped out: now it is Herod and not Herodias who wants him killed (Matt [47] 14.5). When Mark, then, speaks of Herod's 'grief' (perilupoV) at the request for John's head, it is coherent and understandable: Herodias demanded something that Herod did not want. But when Matthew in parallel speaks of the king's grief (kai luphqeiV o basileuV, Matt 14.9), it makes no sense at all. Matthew had told us, after all, that 'Herod wanted to put him to death' (14.5).
The obvious explanation for the inconsistencies of Matthew's account is that he is working from a source. He has made changes in the early stages which he fails to sustain throughout, thus betraying his knowledge of Mark. (7) This is particularly plausible when one notes that Matthew's account is considerably shorter than Mark's: Matthew has overlooked important details in the act of abbreviating. (8) It would be difficult, one would imagine, to forge a convincing argument against this from the perspective of Matthean priority. (9)
Of course the evidence of one pericope alone will not do to establish Marcan priority. It will be helpful, therefore, to turn to Michael Goulder who, in two inspired but brief surveys, draws attention to this 'widespread' phenomenon and lists several examples. (10) One of the most striking is the story of The Cleansing of the Leper (Matt 8.1-4 // Mark 1.40-45 // Luke 5.12-16). (11) Here, just after the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5-7), Matthew is returning to triple tradition material. He resets the scene by introducing, as often, 'many crowds' (8.1). This soon leads Matthew into difficulties since, like Mark, he has Jesus' injunction to the leper, 'Tell no-one, but go, show yourself to the priest . . . ' (Matt [48] 8.4 // Mark 1.44). As it stands in Matthew this is inexplicable: a miracle that has been witnessed by many crowds is to be kept secret. The parallel in Mark makes it clear how Matthew has become involved in the contradiction: Mark does not have crowds; the leper meets Jesus privately and the command to silence is coherent. That Matthew is involved in docile reproduction here is all the more plausible given the little stress in his Gospel on the secrecy theme that is so prominent a feature of Mark.
We might add a third example that equally points to Matthew's use of Mark, the story of Jesus' Mother and Brothers (Matt 12.46-50 // Mark 3.31-35 // Luke 8.19-21). Here Matthew has returned, once more, to triple tradition material after a section of double tradition material (Matt 12.33-45). The transition between the different kinds of material is smooth, with Matthew's characteristic, 'While he was still speaking to the crowds, behold . . . ' (Matt 12.46). However, the apparent ease of progression from one pericope to the next masks an incongruity, a genuine continuity error in Matthew's account. As in Mark, the mother and the brothers of Jesus are 'standing outside' (eisthkeisan exw, Matt 12.46; Mark 3.31: exw sthkonteV). This makes perfect sense in Mark where Jesus and his disciples are in a house (3.20: kai ercetai eiV oikon) (12) but it makes no sense in Matthew in which no house has been entered and the most recent scene change was a departure from the synagogue, with many following Jesus, in 12.15.
So my second question to Walter Tucker: Fatigue makes sense when looking at Mark --> Matthew. But not Matthew --> Mark. Why would Mark incorrectly refer to Herod as King, if copying from Matthew and he saw “tetrarch”? Doesn’t this infer Matthew (and Luke if one reads the entire article) were copying and demonstrating fatigue?
Thanks, look forward to your responses.
The first chapter. (They are titled “Lecture” and presumably align with the Lectures Sherwin-White gave in 1960-61) For obvious reasons, the first thing Sherwin-White presents is the Roman legal system.
He notes the Proconsul (or principal Roman authority—in the Trial of Jesus, the Prefect Pontius Pilate) had imperium--ability to wield power. Specifically capital punishment. The legal proceedings had three phases:
1) Formulation of charges and penalties.
2) Proper formal accusation by interested party.
3) Case heard by person holding imperium in tribunal, assisted by advisory committee and friends (consilium) (pr. 17)
Sherwin-White indicates, of the three legal systems listed in Wikipedia, the one he will utilize in comparing the New Testament accounts is cognitio extraordinarem. (If you are interested, you can review a rough Outline of Roman Legal Systems)
If you read the Wikipedia article, you may note the cognitio system, within the article, is dated to the late Second Century CE. Which is a problem as the events in the New Testament are in the mid-First Century CE.
Sherwin-White, however, dates the system back to the relevant time frame, by first relying upon Pliny the Younger to indicate Pliny used cognitio when interrogating Christians, and therefore—according to Sherwin-White—the system was in place as early as 111-112 CE. Ah…but this doesn’t quite move it back to mid-First Century, does it?
To do that, Sherwin –White refers to an incident with the Proconsul of Sardinia in 69CE where the proconsul appeared to use the three (3) elements of cognitio. He also uses a document that he refers to “a mixture of party journalism and historical novelette” (pg. 22) to claim there remains a historical core within that document to believe cognitio was used as early as Claudius. (41-54 CE)
However, I found inconsistency within this approach. First, how do we know what was practiced in the Second Century necessarily correlates with the First Century? We will deal more with this in the future, but to give an example, Pliny the Younger gives the accused three (3) opportunities to recant. Shewin-White notes Jesus was questioned twice in Matthew and Mark, and only once in Luke. Was there a triple attestation required, but incorrectly recorded in the Gospels? Had the triple attestation not developed yet? Although Sherwin-White refers to Pliny the Younger, and the repeated questions, he fails to address the difference between Christ’s trial and Pliny.
Or another example, when (later) discussing the Sanhedrin not having the ability to perform capital punishment, the two examples of Stephen and James the Just are excused by Sherwin-White as anomalies. Exceptions to the rule.
Notice the convenience in this method. If I want to relate something back from the Second to the First Century, I claim it was long tradition, only recorded in the Second with barest elusive references in the first. If I do NOT want to relate it back, I call the previous counter-examples as exceptions. It is a win-win; either way I can claim historicity. Why isn’t the “historical novelette” and Sardinia examples equally anomalies? Why aren’t Stephen and James’ death elusive references to the Sanhedrin’s ability to doll out capital punishment?
Notice how one can take either position. Sherwin-White wants his cake and eat it, too.
There are two (2) problems needing discussion. I will touch more on this in my next blog entry, to give some background before hitting the next chapter—Trial of Jesus.
(1) We don’t have a great deal of information about the legal proceedings within this period. We are piecing together what procedures are required from stories, accounts, some legal documents. But even this is sporadic. Worse, the events in outlying countries could vary, depending on the country, its own legal systems, its status with Rome, etc.
(2) These accounts are not trying to give us rigorous legal scenarios. They mention legal interactions only within the scope of a much larger picture. Jesus’ story is about his ministry—not “The Trial of Jesus.” Acts is about continuity between Christian generations, including Paul’s trials and tribulations. While this involves legal wrangling, the author is not attempting a full legal analysis of what happened to Paul.
Sherwin-White attempts to pull too much out of too little.
He notes the Proconsul (or principal Roman authority—in the Trial of Jesus, the Prefect Pontius Pilate) had imperium--ability to wield power. Specifically capital punishment. The legal proceedings had three phases:
1) Formulation of charges and penalties.
2) Proper formal accusation by interested party.
3) Case heard by person holding imperium in tribunal, assisted by advisory committee and friends (consilium) (pr. 17)
Sherwin-White indicates, of the three legal systems listed in Wikipedia, the one he will utilize in comparing the New Testament accounts is cognitio extraordinarem. (If you are interested, you can review a rough Outline of Roman Legal Systems)
If you read the Wikipedia article, you may note the cognitio system, within the article, is dated to the late Second Century CE. Which is a problem as the events in the New Testament are in the mid-First Century CE.
Sherwin-White, however, dates the system back to the relevant time frame, by first relying upon Pliny the Younger to indicate Pliny used cognitio when interrogating Christians, and therefore—according to Sherwin-White—the system was in place as early as 111-112 CE. Ah…but this doesn’t quite move it back to mid-First Century, does it?
To do that, Sherwin –White refers to an incident with the Proconsul of Sardinia in 69CE where the proconsul appeared to use the three (3) elements of cognitio. He also uses a document that he refers to “a mixture of party journalism and historical novelette” (pg. 22) to claim there remains a historical core within that document to believe cognitio was used as early as Claudius. (41-54 CE)
However, I found inconsistency within this approach. First, how do we know what was practiced in the Second Century necessarily correlates with the First Century? We will deal more with this in the future, but to give an example, Pliny the Younger gives the accused three (3) opportunities to recant. Shewin-White notes Jesus was questioned twice in Matthew and Mark, and only once in Luke. Was there a triple attestation required, but incorrectly recorded in the Gospels? Had the triple attestation not developed yet? Although Sherwin-White refers to Pliny the Younger, and the repeated questions, he fails to address the difference between Christ’s trial and Pliny.
Or another example, when (later) discussing the Sanhedrin not having the ability to perform capital punishment, the two examples of Stephen and James the Just are excused by Sherwin-White as anomalies. Exceptions to the rule.
Notice the convenience in this method. If I want to relate something back from the Second to the First Century, I claim it was long tradition, only recorded in the Second with barest elusive references in the first. If I do NOT want to relate it back, I call the previous counter-examples as exceptions. It is a win-win; either way I can claim historicity. Why isn’t the “historical novelette” and Sardinia examples equally anomalies? Why aren’t Stephen and James’ death elusive references to the Sanhedrin’s ability to doll out capital punishment?
Notice how one can take either position. Sherwin-White wants his cake and eat it, too.
There are two (2) problems needing discussion. I will touch more on this in my next blog entry, to give some background before hitting the next chapter—Trial of Jesus.
(1) We don’t have a great deal of information about the legal proceedings within this period. We are piecing together what procedures are required from stories, accounts, some legal documents. But even this is sporadic. Worse, the events in outlying countries could vary, depending on the country, its own legal systems, its status with Rome, etc.
(2) These accounts are not trying to give us rigorous legal scenarios. They mention legal interactions only within the scope of a much larger picture. Jesus’ story is about his ministry—not “The Trial of Jesus.” Acts is about continuity between Christian generations, including Paul’s trials and tribulations. While this involves legal wrangling, the author is not attempting a full legal analysis of what happened to Paul.
Sherwin-White attempts to pull too much out of too little.
As I’ve discussed the Gospel accounts with Christian, I keep running into a certain book--A.N. Sherwin-White’s Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament.
Dr. William Craig refers to Sherwin-White. Norm Geisler refers to him. Dr. Gary Habermas cites Sherwin-White. Dr. Mike Licona does as well.
Vinny, over at Do You Ever Think About the Things You Do Think About? has written
a number of blog entries regarding apologists’ abuse of Sherwin-White.
Primarily, Sherwin-White is cited for two reasons:
1) To support the historicity of the New Testament documents when he says, “So it is astonishing that while Graeco-Roman historians have been growing in confidence, the twentieth-century study of the Gospels narratives, starting from no less promising material, has taken so gloomy a turn in the development of form-criticism that the more advanced exponents of it apparently maintain—as far as an amateur can understand the matter—that the historical Christ is unknowable and the history of his mission cannot be written.” Pg. 187.
2) The accounts were written too close to the events to be entirely mythical. “Herodotus enables us to test the tempo of myth-making, and the tests suggest that even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition.” Pg. 190.
As the book is 192 pages, and these oft-quoted sections are at the very end, I thought it would be enlightening to go through the book and report my findings. See what led Sherwin-White to this conclusion.
Unfortunately, this was not the easiest book to follow, and it became difficult for me to cohesively present what was precisely being stated, and any thoughts on the subject. Therefore, I will start somewhere in the middle and work my way around, hopefully covering most of the issues presented.
What makes this book difficult to follow?
1) Because Sherwin-White was replying to various scholars’ positions. (the book was originally published in 1962.) He would often respond to “Mommsen” (wrote in 1897-1907) or “Juster” (1914) or “Lake” (1920). It was like hearing one side of a telephone conversation. One could pick out the claims of these authors, but only by the response. Sherwin-White was not laying out his own case for a proposition—he was explaining why other’s propositions were not accurate. He was reacting.
He presumed the reader was familiar with these authors, and their positions, and therefore only provided their stance by reference.
2) He presumed the reader had ready access to other material. For example, on page 79, he states, “This is not the place for yet another discussion of the rather hackneyed theme of the relation between the Roman State and foreign cults.” With a footnote, “JTS, n.s. iii (1952), 194 ff. contains my own views, to which I have nothing to add.”
3) He presumed the reader knows Latin. One can expect to read:
“The law itself belonged to the period of the Principate of Augustus. The text runs in Ulpian: “lege Iulia de vi publica tenetur qui cum imperium potestatemve habetet civem Romanum adversus provocationem nacaverit verberaverit iusseritve quid fieri aut quid in collum iniecerit ut torqueretur.” This text is a summary of something much longer, but uses the terminology of Republican legislation. A citation from Marican adds: “lege Iulia de vi davetur ne quis reum vinciate impediatve quominus Romae intra certum tempus adsit.” The text in the Sententia Pauli substitutes the terminology of a later age in some places, but adds in somewhat convincing early phraseology: “qui…condemnaverit inve publica vincula duci iusserit” among the forbidden acts. It also adds a list of exceptions, beginning: “qui artem ludicram faciunt, iudicati etiam et confessi.” These are unlikely to belong to the original law, but the first item, the exclusion of actors should belong to early Principate.” Pg 57-58.
I’ll confess--my Latin is beyond rusty. It is non-existent, except for pro bono (free legal work.)
4. Finally, Sherwin-White was not precise in his conclusions. He left open-ended statements, and I was often scratching my head thinking, “What are you saying here? Is it correct? Not correct? More likely, less likely?” I will provide examples throughout this review.
Sherwin-White indicates his purpose in his Preface, “It may be useful if someone from the Roman side looks again at the old evidence, even where there is no new material and appraises the New Testament setting in terms of modern Romanist developments. No doubt I in turn will be quickly found to suffer from just that same lack of focus in dealing with Judaic and Christian material which is outside my sphere.
“Scholars attempting to deal with two worlds of this magnitude need two lives. We must appear as amateurs in each other’s fields. A Roman public law and administration man such as myself cannot be fully acquainted with New Testament scholarship and bibliography over so great an area I must venture to trespass on. But one may learn what are the questions requiring answers, and one may show how the various historical and legal and social problems raised by the Gospels and Acts now look to a Roman historian. That, and only that, is the intention of these lectures.” Pg. v-vi.
What surprised me after reading this book was how little he talked about generational requirements in myth development (not at all until the very end) and how qualified he made his statements regarding the historicity of the Gospels and Acts. In other words, the very things he is cited for, are not the primary focus of his book.
Dr. William Craig refers to Sherwin-White. Norm Geisler refers to him. Dr. Gary Habermas cites Sherwin-White. Dr. Mike Licona does as well.
Vinny, over at Do You Ever Think About the Things You Do Think About? has written
a number of blog entries regarding apologists’ abuse of Sherwin-White.
Primarily, Sherwin-White is cited for two reasons:
1) To support the historicity of the New Testament documents when he says, “So it is astonishing that while Graeco-Roman historians have been growing in confidence, the twentieth-century study of the Gospels narratives, starting from no less promising material, has taken so gloomy a turn in the development of form-criticism that the more advanced exponents of it apparently maintain—as far as an amateur can understand the matter—that the historical Christ is unknowable and the history of his mission cannot be written.” Pg. 187.
2) The accounts were written too close to the events to be entirely mythical. “Herodotus enables us to test the tempo of myth-making, and the tests suggest that even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition.” Pg. 190.
As the book is 192 pages, and these oft-quoted sections are at the very end, I thought it would be enlightening to go through the book and report my findings. See what led Sherwin-White to this conclusion.
Unfortunately, this was not the easiest book to follow, and it became difficult for me to cohesively present what was precisely being stated, and any thoughts on the subject. Therefore, I will start somewhere in the middle and work my way around, hopefully covering most of the issues presented.
What makes this book difficult to follow?
1) Because Sherwin-White was replying to various scholars’ positions. (the book was originally published in 1962.) He would often respond to “Mommsen” (wrote in 1897-1907) or “Juster” (1914) or “Lake” (1920). It was like hearing one side of a telephone conversation. One could pick out the claims of these authors, but only by the response. Sherwin-White was not laying out his own case for a proposition—he was explaining why other’s propositions were not accurate. He was reacting.
He presumed the reader was familiar with these authors, and their positions, and therefore only provided their stance by reference.
2) He presumed the reader had ready access to other material. For example, on page 79, he states, “This is not the place for yet another discussion of the rather hackneyed theme of the relation between the Roman State and foreign cults.” With a footnote, “JTS, n.s. iii (1952), 194 ff. contains my own views, to which I have nothing to add.”
3) He presumed the reader knows Latin. One can expect to read:
“The law itself belonged to the period of the Principate of Augustus. The text runs in Ulpian: “lege Iulia de vi publica tenetur qui cum imperium potestatemve habetet civem Romanum adversus provocationem nacaverit verberaverit iusseritve quid fieri aut quid in collum iniecerit ut torqueretur.” This text is a summary of something much longer, but uses the terminology of Republican legislation. A citation from Marican adds: “lege Iulia de vi davetur ne quis reum vinciate impediatve quominus Romae intra certum tempus adsit.” The text in the Sententia Pauli substitutes the terminology of a later age in some places, but adds in somewhat convincing early phraseology: “qui…condemnaverit inve publica vincula duci iusserit” among the forbidden acts. It also adds a list of exceptions, beginning: “qui artem ludicram faciunt, iudicati etiam et confessi.” These are unlikely to belong to the original law, but the first item, the exclusion of actors should belong to early Principate.” Pg 57-58.
I’ll confess--my Latin is beyond rusty. It is non-existent, except for pro bono (free legal work.)
4. Finally, Sherwin-White was not precise in his conclusions. He left open-ended statements, and I was often scratching my head thinking, “What are you saying here? Is it correct? Not correct? More likely, less likely?” I will provide examples throughout this review.
Sherwin-White indicates his purpose in his Preface, “It may be useful if someone from the Roman side looks again at the old evidence, even where there is no new material and appraises the New Testament setting in terms of modern Romanist developments. No doubt I in turn will be quickly found to suffer from just that same lack of focus in dealing with Judaic and Christian material which is outside my sphere.
“Scholars attempting to deal with two worlds of this magnitude need two lives. We must appear as amateurs in each other’s fields. A Roman public law and administration man such as myself cannot be fully acquainted with New Testament scholarship and bibliography over so great an area I must venture to trespass on. But one may learn what are the questions requiring answers, and one may show how the various historical and legal and social problems raised by the Gospels and Acts now look to a Roman historian. That, and only that, is the intention of these lectures.” Pg. v-vi.
What surprised me after reading this book was how little he talked about generational requirements in myth development (not at all until the very end) and how qualified he made his statements regarding the historicity of the Gospels and Acts. In other words, the very things he is cited for, are not the primary focus of his book.
“I love you.”
Do you remember the first time you ever hear that sentence? Probably not—most likely it was first spoken by a parent or loved one when you were just a baby. It is doubtful you would remember the first 100 times you heard those words. And even if you recall, you didn’t know what it meant at the time.
As you grew, you heard it over and over. Books, plays, movies, real life. Sometimes directed at you—often overheard throughout living. And with the re-telling, the phrase’s significance grew—we understood it meant something. We learned in the second-grade it was a weapon: “Johnnie loves Sally! Johnnie loves Sally!” We learned as teenagers it had consequence, avoiding the “L” word until one’s relationship reached a certain commitment level. We learned it had impact.
Eventually learning it can be a hard word to implement.
Growing up, we understood (even when we didn’t like it) our parents loved us when they punished us. They explained it. They didn’t give us everything we wanted when we wanted it, but there was love. Once we had children of our own, we understood (and hopefully attempted to communicate) we love them when distributing punishment or withholding their demands.
We learned it loving others romantically. It is the reason we cry (or some of us) when the climatic scene finally arrives in the movie: “Because……….I love you!”
Certain phrases are jarring contrasted with “love;” when the wife claims her husband loves her, even though he beats her, we think, “That is wrong!” The boyfriend who stays with a girl after she sleeps around with other guys, claiming he knows she loves him. We shake our head.
All of us, in observing relationships, understand there is a point where we categorize the action as “loving” and where we would claim it is not.
Growing up Christian, we are told, “God Loves you.” We had buttons and bumper stickers; signs and bookmarks. Our No. 1 Hit starts off, “For God so Loved the World…” “Jesus Loves you.” “Jesus Loves the little Children; all the Children of the world.” [Funny, I don’t remember the Holy Spirit doing much loving.] It was the first verse we learned; it was the first song we sung.
It should therefore come with no surprise we reached a point where we thought….well….God loved us. With all that entails within the resounding reverberation and pitch of the word.
Does that mean we thought God would give us whatever we wanted? Of course not—we understood our parents did not, yet still loved. Does that mean we expected to always be happy? Don’t be silly, we understand the commitment of love within a marriage, even though we aren’t always giddy and giggling.
We truly, truly get it—when it comes to love, there would be times God would have to make hard decisions, causing us to not like the results, but we would still be loved. When we were told, “God Loves You”—we didn’t expect an ATM Machine; we expected the word “love” to mean what it means in other similar contexts.
However there is one significant difference. In all our other relationships, we can communicate, with those involved, or with others, to learn, grow and differentiate as to what is love. With God there was only silence. We are left in continual speculation—guessing how this or that conforms to what we understand is love. Sure, others provide their own (conflicting) guesses, but that is all it is—conjecture on the human’s part.
“God, why did my 16 year old son have to die?”
Silence.
“Is it because he had lived long enough, and you wanted him home?”
Silence.
“Was it a testimony to others, giving them a chance to get right with you?”
Silence.
So we grapple and postulate; others giving their own theories, and arrive at some queasy solution. An uneasy restlessness, often wondering if we got it quite right. Always willing to re-evaluate and guess again.
For many deconverts this silence grew into a disconnect; it become more and more difficult to use a word so well understood—“love”—that when applied to God held little-to-no relation to everything we understood the word to mean. A “loving” God would allow ten-year-old boys to be raped by football coaches? And allow it to continue for years because the person involved were people of privilege? That is the BEST a “loving” God could do?
And already I hear some Christian say, “We can’t explain it….but maybe _________” and then provide some poor excuse for God’s absence. If you can’t explain it—shut up. Shut up with your easy explanation of “Why God allows kids to starve in Africa” when your car is strewn with McDonald’s wrappers. Shut up with your theologically overbearing rationalization as to why a “loving God” allows this atrocity or that tragedy because we are too insignificant to understand such a infinite creature.
If that is your excuse, stop saying “God loves you.” Because even you aren’t buying the product.
Over at Black, White and Gray, ,Bradley Wright is doing a series of posts regarding deconversion. (The first is here.) In this recent installment, he discusses an observed reason for deconversion—namely a “God who Failed Deconverts” by not answering prayer.
He states:
As usual with Christians attempting to understand deconversion, (and with genuine respect) Bradley Wright doesn’t get it.
We didn’t gauge God as, “I didn’t get enough for what I put into it.” We realized it made no sense to call God “loving” when the results we saw were nothing but. It is the abused spouse coming to terms that one doesn’t beat one’s wife, and receive approval for being “loving.” They must stop making excuses for the spouse.
In the same way, we came to terms with the fact we were making excuses for God. We, too, were trying to explain away these actions as loving—actions we would never accept the label of “love” in any other relationship. We, too, tried to apologize for God, using weighty meaningless terms, but our own words were now ringing as hollow.
We didn’t abandoned belief in God, because we weren’t getting what we wanted; we came to realize the patent ridiculousness of fitting the word “love” (and a whole host of other words) to a creature we immediately and in complete contradiction, claimed we did not understand. One who was silent when asked. One who allows any human, anywhere to make excuses for it, without support, disapproval or response of any kind.
We realized the true difference between the Christian’s “loving God” without plausible explanation and a God who doesn’t exist. None. No difference at all, except the growing recognition “no God” makes a whole lot more sense than “a loving God who doesn’t act loving, but we assume he IS loving, because any other possibility is too scary to even contemplate.”
It was not a divorce. In a divorce, the other person is still alive. There is still a relationship, an understanding of past love, and the possibility of future love with another.
This is a death. We see now God was never there.
God is gone, not an ex-spouse.
Do you remember the first time you ever hear that sentence? Probably not—most likely it was first spoken by a parent or loved one when you were just a baby. It is doubtful you would remember the first 100 times you heard those words. And even if you recall, you didn’t know what it meant at the time.
As you grew, you heard it over and over. Books, plays, movies, real life. Sometimes directed at you—often overheard throughout living. And with the re-telling, the phrase’s significance grew—we understood it meant something. We learned in the second-grade it was a weapon: “Johnnie loves Sally! Johnnie loves Sally!” We learned as teenagers it had consequence, avoiding the “L” word until one’s relationship reached a certain commitment level. We learned it had impact.
Eventually learning it can be a hard word to implement.
Growing up, we understood (even when we didn’t like it) our parents loved us when they punished us. They explained it. They didn’t give us everything we wanted when we wanted it, but there was love. Once we had children of our own, we understood (and hopefully attempted to communicate) we love them when distributing punishment or withholding their demands.
We learned it loving others romantically. It is the reason we cry (or some of us) when the climatic scene finally arrives in the movie: “Because……….I love you!”
Certain phrases are jarring contrasted with “love;” when the wife claims her husband loves her, even though he beats her, we think, “That is wrong!” The boyfriend who stays with a girl after she sleeps around with other guys, claiming he knows she loves him. We shake our head.
All of us, in observing relationships, understand there is a point where we categorize the action as “loving” and where we would claim it is not.
Growing up Christian, we are told, “God Loves you.” We had buttons and bumper stickers; signs and bookmarks. Our No. 1 Hit starts off, “For God so Loved the World…” “Jesus Loves you.” “Jesus Loves the little Children; all the Children of the world.” [Funny, I don’t remember the Holy Spirit doing much loving.] It was the first verse we learned; it was the first song we sung.
It should therefore come with no surprise we reached a point where we thought….well….God loved us. With all that entails within the resounding reverberation and pitch of the word.
Does that mean we thought God would give us whatever we wanted? Of course not—we understood our parents did not, yet still loved. Does that mean we expected to always be happy? Don’t be silly, we understand the commitment of love within a marriage, even though we aren’t always giddy and giggling.
We truly, truly get it—when it comes to love, there would be times God would have to make hard decisions, causing us to not like the results, but we would still be loved. When we were told, “God Loves You”—we didn’t expect an ATM Machine; we expected the word “love” to mean what it means in other similar contexts.
However there is one significant difference. In all our other relationships, we can communicate, with those involved, or with others, to learn, grow and differentiate as to what is love. With God there was only silence. We are left in continual speculation—guessing how this or that conforms to what we understand is love. Sure, others provide their own (conflicting) guesses, but that is all it is—conjecture on the human’s part.
“God, why did my 16 year old son have to die?”
Silence.
“Is it because he had lived long enough, and you wanted him home?”
Silence.
“Was it a testimony to others, giving them a chance to get right with you?”
Silence.
So we grapple and postulate; others giving their own theories, and arrive at some queasy solution. An uneasy restlessness, often wondering if we got it quite right. Always willing to re-evaluate and guess again.
For many deconverts this silence grew into a disconnect; it become more and more difficult to use a word so well understood—“love”—that when applied to God held little-to-no relation to everything we understood the word to mean. A “loving” God would allow ten-year-old boys to be raped by football coaches? And allow it to continue for years because the person involved were people of privilege? That is the BEST a “loving” God could do?
And already I hear some Christian say, “We can’t explain it….but maybe _________” and then provide some poor excuse for God’s absence. If you can’t explain it—shut up. Shut up with your easy explanation of “Why God allows kids to starve in Africa” when your car is strewn with McDonald’s wrappers. Shut up with your theologically overbearing rationalization as to why a “loving God” allows this atrocity or that tragedy because we are too insignificant to understand such a infinite creature.
If that is your excuse, stop saying “God loves you.” Because even you aren’t buying the product.
Over at Black, White and Gray, ,Bradley Wright is doing a series of posts regarding deconversion. (The first is here.) In this recent installment, he discusses an observed reason for deconversion—namely a “God who Failed Deconverts” by not answering prayer.
He states:
I am struck by how much these accounts resonate with sociological theories of human relationships, especially those coming from social exchange theory. This theory describes humans as judging the value of relationships in terms of costs and benefits. One variation of social exchange theory, termed equity theory, holds that people are satisfied with their relationships when they get the rewards that they feel are proportional to the costs that they bear. An inequitable is unstable, and it usually occurs because a person thinks they receive too little for how much they give.
Many of the testimonies given by former Christians described a broken relationship with God as one might talk about a marital divorce. They are emotional, even bitter at times. They contain the language of inequality. The writers did so much for God – praying, attending church, following God – but God did not do enough in return.
As usual with Christians attempting to understand deconversion, (and with genuine respect) Bradley Wright doesn’t get it.
We didn’t gauge God as, “I didn’t get enough for what I put into it.” We realized it made no sense to call God “loving” when the results we saw were nothing but. It is the abused spouse coming to terms that one doesn’t beat one’s wife, and receive approval for being “loving.” They must stop making excuses for the spouse.
In the same way, we came to terms with the fact we were making excuses for God. We, too, were trying to explain away these actions as loving—actions we would never accept the label of “love” in any other relationship. We, too, tried to apologize for God, using weighty meaningless terms, but our own words were now ringing as hollow.
We didn’t abandoned belief in God, because we weren’t getting what we wanted; we came to realize the patent ridiculousness of fitting the word “love” (and a whole host of other words) to a creature we immediately and in complete contradiction, claimed we did not understand. One who was silent when asked. One who allows any human, anywhere to make excuses for it, without support, disapproval or response of any kind.
We realized the true difference between the Christian’s “loving God” without plausible explanation and a God who doesn’t exist. None. No difference at all, except the growing recognition “no God” makes a whole lot more sense than “a loving God who doesn’t act loving, but we assume he IS loving, because any other possibility is too scary to even contemplate.”
It was not a divorce. In a divorce, the other person is still alive. There is still a relationship, an understanding of past love, and the possibility of future love with another.
This is a death. We see now God was never there.
God is gone, not an ex-spouse.
I remain on Credo House’s mailing list, receiving notification of C. Michael Patton’s recent blog entry concerning doubt.
What struck me was how the response proposed was one-sided when doubts arise regarding Christianity. The first point, recommended focusing on the Resurrection, rather than minor issues such as inerrancy or evolution vs. creationism. (Curiously, this came across as a concession minor issues were a lost cause.) He states:
(I was secretly pleased I guessed the books before clicking on the link. Habermas & Licona’s “Case for the Resurrection” then Licona’s “Historiography of Resurrection” and finally N.T. Wright’s “Resurrection of Jesus.”)
Notice what is missing from the list? Yeah…any skeptical books. Now I will grant you, there are not many non-theists writing on the Resurrection, but even a mention of “The Empty Tomb” or possible Loftus’ work, or Erhman’s concerns would have been interesting. What was more interesting was the suggestion to “set down” conversations “with those who are representing another religion.”
Why? Why, when doubting, must one only look to one side of the issue?
The third point Patton makes solidifies his intentions—he recommended “fellowshipping” (that’s Christianize for “socializing” or “relationshiping.”) He notes:
I believe his concern is for Christians to begin assuming the beliefs of non-Christians because of emotional attachment. Ironically, the very action he fears is the very action he suggests the Christian engage—only hang around flat earth society….er….Christians…and one will become emotionally attached to the arguments one assumes.
I find it very telling skeptics not only encourage fellow skeptics to read non-theist literature, but ALSO theistic literature. I, too, would recommend Licona if one wants to study the Resurrection. I, too, would recommend non-believers engage with Christians, or “fellowship” with them. But I go farther and recommend one also engages and reads people holding to alternate views.
What would you think if I told you to ONLY read what non-theists write, or ONLY associate with non-theists? Does that sound like a person who is confident regarding the strength of their position or one who fears weaknesses would be exposed if someone dares inform themselves?
What struck me was how the response proposed was one-sided when doubts arise regarding Christianity. The first point, recommended focusing on the Resurrection, rather than minor issues such as inerrancy or evolution vs. creationism. (Curiously, this came across as a concession minor issues were a lost cause.) He states:
Therefore, from a purely intellectual standpoint, I would set down all other studies, including conversations with those who are representing another religion, books about atheism, or the destiny of the unevangelized. Just to focus on this central issue of Christianity. There is so much good stuff out there on this subject, but I would start here and graduate tohere and here . Listen or watch to the debates with William Lane Craig about the historicity of the resurrection.
(I was secretly pleased I guessed the books before clicking on the link. Habermas & Licona’s “Case for the Resurrection” then Licona’s “Historiography of Resurrection” and finally N.T. Wright’s “Resurrection of Jesus.”)
Notice what is missing from the list? Yeah…any skeptical books. Now I will grant you, there are not many non-theists writing on the Resurrection, but even a mention of “The Empty Tomb” or possible Loftus’ work, or Erhman’s concerns would have been interesting. What was more interesting was the suggestion to “set down” conversations “with those who are representing another religion.”
Why? Why, when doubting, must one only look to one side of the issue?
The third point Patton makes solidifies his intentions—he recommended “fellowshipping” (that’s Christianize for “socializing” or “relationshiping.”) He notes:
One normally becomes emotionally predisposed to those of their immediate fellowship. “Following the crowed” is a very effective means of being persuaded of the most unlikely beliefs. In fact, I have often said that if I hung around the flat-earth society members too long (and there is a flat earth society!), I may begin to doubt that the world is round. This is not because the arguments or evidence is persuasive, but simply because of implicit emotional control of belief that such constant fellowship affords.
I believe his concern is for Christians to begin assuming the beliefs of non-Christians because of emotional attachment. Ironically, the very action he fears is the very action he suggests the Christian engage—only hang around flat earth society….er….Christians…and one will become emotionally attached to the arguments one assumes.
I find it very telling skeptics not only encourage fellow skeptics to read non-theist literature, but ALSO theistic literature. I, too, would recommend Licona if one wants to study the Resurrection. I, too, would recommend non-believers engage with Christians, or “fellowship” with them. But I go farther and recommend one also engages and reads people holding to alternate views.
What would you think if I told you to ONLY read what non-theists write, or ONLY associate with non-theists? Does that sound like a person who is confident regarding the strength of their position or one who fears weaknesses would be exposed if someone dares inform themselves?
How are lawyers like nuclear weapons? Because if the other side has one, you have to get your own; once launched they can never be recalled and when they hit the ground, they screw everything up forever.
Michigan, being on the forefront of nothing, has no anti-bullying law. The State Board of Education does provide for a Michigan Anti-Bullying Policy, however, no legislation mandates even a single school district adopt the policy. There have been previous attempts to pass such legislation, all having quietly dropped from sight.
“…that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression; or a mental, physical, or sensory disability or impairment; or by any other distinguishing characteristic.”
However, this year the State Senate has decided to correct this oversight, and yesterday passed Senate Bill 137 mandating each school district implement and enforce a policy on bullying.
Good for us, right? Well…as the saying goes, the two things you should never see getting made are sausages and laws.
I suspect (with no confirmation of any sort, mind you), someone in committee worried that a statement such as “I think being gay is immoral” may be interpreted as bullying, and feared a Student stating a religious conviction would be considered a “bully” for having done so.
Stories such as this: Student expressing their opinion regarding homosexuality being immoral could generate such concern.
Therefore, SB 137 added a clause never seen in any previous submissions of the bill, providing the following exception:
“This section does not prohibit a statement of a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction of a school employee, school volunteer, pupil, or a pupil's parent or guardian.”
The (Democrat) minority leader expressed her frustration with the exception. Her statement on video is recorded at the Huffington Post article.
On the one hand, I understand the reason behind the exception. We do not want to temper or quash a student’s freedom of expression. However, the minority leader is precisely correct, by creating this exception, the law opens a HUGE loophole that every single lawyer, even the ones fresh from law school, understand can allow for bullying.
This exception does not protect a person from striking, kicking or beating, but so what? Those actions are criminal anyway, without the necessity of a new law. The concern is (since everyone has experienced it, either by being a bully, by being bullied or observation of bullying) how to prohibit this action. And verbal bullying is what this law is designed to prohibit. (There are provisions regarding using telecommunication devices. You can’t hit someone across Facebook.)
Yet now, if the bully continues to berate the student, “Hey, gaywad. You’re so gay. What’s up, faggot?” They can cite their religious belief and this is merely freedom of expression.
The law literally gives them to provision (and arguably the endorsement) to do so.
This is a bad law. We shall see how the Michigan House addresses it.
UPDATE: Looks like the language will not stay in the bill. Shows what a different world we live in, with the internet causing such an outcry the Michigan Senate Republicans agree to back down on this.
Michigan, being on the forefront of nothing, has no anti-bullying law. The State Board of Education does provide for a Michigan Anti-Bullying Policy, however, no legislation mandates even a single school district adopt the policy. There have been previous attempts to pass such legislation, all having quietly dropped from sight.
“…that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression; or a mental, physical, or sensory disability or impairment; or by any other distinguishing characteristic.”
However, this year the State Senate has decided to correct this oversight, and yesterday passed Senate Bill 137 mandating each school district implement and enforce a policy on bullying.
Good for us, right? Well…as the saying goes, the two things you should never see getting made are sausages and laws.
I suspect (with no confirmation of any sort, mind you), someone in committee worried that a statement such as “I think being gay is immoral” may be interpreted as bullying, and feared a Student stating a religious conviction would be considered a “bully” for having done so.
Stories such as this: Student expressing their opinion regarding homosexuality being immoral could generate such concern.
Therefore, SB 137 added a clause never seen in any previous submissions of the bill, providing the following exception:
“This section does not prohibit a statement of a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction of a school employee, school volunteer, pupil, or a pupil's parent or guardian.”
The (Democrat) minority leader expressed her frustration with the exception. Her statement on video is recorded at the Huffington Post article.
On the one hand, I understand the reason behind the exception. We do not want to temper or quash a student’s freedom of expression. However, the minority leader is precisely correct, by creating this exception, the law opens a HUGE loophole that every single lawyer, even the ones fresh from law school, understand can allow for bullying.
This exception does not protect a person from striking, kicking or beating, but so what? Those actions are criminal anyway, without the necessity of a new law. The concern is (since everyone has experienced it, either by being a bully, by being bullied or observation of bullying) how to prohibit this action. And verbal bullying is what this law is designed to prohibit. (There are provisions regarding using telecommunication devices. You can’t hit someone across Facebook.)
Yet now, if the bully continues to berate the student, “Hey, gaywad. You’re so gay. What’s up, faggot?” They can cite their religious belief and this is merely freedom of expression.
The law literally gives them to provision (and arguably the endorsement) to do so.
This is a bad law. We shall see how the Michigan House addresses it.
UPDATE: Looks like the language will not stay in the bill. Shows what a different world we live in, with the internet causing such an outcry the Michigan Senate Republicans agree to back down on this.
So you ask me to write a contract. After considerable time (and even more considerable cost) I present a 54 page, bound document with embossed paper. It includes every clause imaginable, taking into consideration every contingency; it even includes a section on the Rule Against Perpetuities, Dower, Curtsey and Nuclear War. There are headings and definitions and an index, and, notarized signature lines with triple attestation.
The notice requirements are detailed as to means, time, place, with intricate specificity. Everything anyone could ever hope to be in a contract is included. You are suitably impressed.
However, you see a small section at the very end stating the other party can modify any provision in the contract at any time for any reason--it doesn’t have to be in writing--without any notice to you.
Now how impressed are you? What good are all those sections, clauses and words, if the person can take it all away with a mere thought? Why bother with specific notice requirements as to time, date, means, etc. when the other person can say tomorrow, “Meh. I can change that” or even “I don’t have to send any notice at all.”
Makes the other 53 ¾ pages pretty worthless, doesn’t it? Somehow, I don’t think I will be paid for preparing such a contract!
I noticed a similar approach recently where the Christian apologist makes this long argument, but at the end says, “Unless God convinces you, this argument won’t be persuasive.” So why bother with the argument in the first place?
If your argument won’t convince absent Divine Intervention; what good the argument? If a God decides to get involved, why waste time with the puny humans’ words?
Dr. Clay Jones wrote a blog entry entitled Let’s Connect the Moral Dots for “Good” non-Christians where his stated goal was:
Boz correctly pointed out using Bible verses to convince a non-Christian they are really a murderer is probably not the most effective means. Dr. Jones replied “The Holy Spirit does the convicting. We just speak the truth.”
I see. So all that quoting of verses, and words and framing of thoughts was 53 ¾ pages of detail. All of which is irrelevant if the last sentence is, “but none of this matters if the Holy Spirit isn’t interested in giving you the secret handshake.”
This was later reiterated when Vinny questioned the splitting of hairs between the difference of a person refraining from an immoral action for selfish reasons (which according to Dr. Jones was bad) as compared to a person repenting of an immoral action for selfish reasons (which according to Dr. Jones was good.)
And what is the difference between those two persons? Simple—God picked one over the other according to Dr. Jones.
There you have it. All the words, argument, theories, discussions and interactions in the world won’t make a bit of difference.
If God wants you—you get it. If He doesn’t—you are screwed.
This creates an incredible exclusion for the apologist. They never have to fear regarding the quality of their arguments. No matter how bad the claims are made, if we aren’t convinced, it is God’s doing.
The notice requirements are detailed as to means, time, place, with intricate specificity. Everything anyone could ever hope to be in a contract is included. You are suitably impressed.
However, you see a small section at the very end stating the other party can modify any provision in the contract at any time for any reason--it doesn’t have to be in writing--without any notice to you.
Now how impressed are you? What good are all those sections, clauses and words, if the person can take it all away with a mere thought? Why bother with specific notice requirements as to time, date, means, etc. when the other person can say tomorrow, “Meh. I can change that” or even “I don’t have to send any notice at all.”
Makes the other 53 ¾ pages pretty worthless, doesn’t it? Somehow, I don’t think I will be paid for preparing such a contract!
I noticed a similar approach recently where the Christian apologist makes this long argument, but at the end says, “Unless God convinces you, this argument won’t be persuasive.” So why bother with the argument in the first place?
If your argument won’t convince absent Divine Intervention; what good the argument? If a God decides to get involved, why waste time with the puny humans’ words?
Dr. Clay Jones wrote a blog entry entitled Let’s Connect the Moral Dots for “Good” non-Christians where his stated goal was:
We need to connect these dots for the non-Christians who are adulterous murderers in their hearts but still believe they are good people. If we do, they might recognize their sinful condition and cry out for the grace available through Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross.
Boz correctly pointed out using Bible verses to convince a non-Christian they are really a murderer is probably not the most effective means. Dr. Jones replied “The Holy Spirit does the convicting. We just speak the truth.”
I see. So all that quoting of verses, and words and framing of thoughts was 53 ¾ pages of detail. All of which is irrelevant if the last sentence is, “but none of this matters if the Holy Spirit isn’t interested in giving you the secret handshake.”
This was later reiterated when Vinny questioned the splitting of hairs between the difference of a person refraining from an immoral action for selfish reasons (which according to Dr. Jones was bad) as compared to a person repenting of an immoral action for selfish reasons (which according to Dr. Jones was good.)
And what is the difference between those two persons? Simple—God picked one over the other according to Dr. Jones.
There you have it. All the words, argument, theories, discussions and interactions in the world won’t make a bit of difference.
If God wants you—you get it. If He doesn’t—you are screwed.
This creates an incredible exclusion for the apologist. They never have to fear regarding the quality of their arguments. No matter how bad the claims are made, if we aren’t convinced, it is God’s doing.
Humans believe what motivates themselves would motivate others. Therefore, they often advertise a product with what they think is compelling. A man who likes fast cars will advertise the speed a car accelerates. A soccer mother, however, would advertise convenience in carrying multiple children and their paraphernalia. A cost-conscious person focuses on gas mileage; another may point out luxury.
If, however, the person buying is not motivated the same as the seller, no matter how much the seller emphasizes what the seller thinks important…it won’t work.
This point was brought home to me recently when a distant in-law wrote the following on their Facebook:
Or course Snopes.com ferrets out how unverifiable this story is.
Normally, I would shrug and think it another Christian meme being spread, but he added an interesting comment. “Why we share our faith.”
Huh?
I can understand why another Christian would be self-righteously pleased with how God protects one of their own—but do they realize what this comes across to a non-Christian?
This is a story about a young girl being raped. There is nothing “wonderful” to share here, nothing uplifting, nothing compelling us non-Christians to cry out, “What a benevolent God!” This story might be half-way interesting if it had Diane call the police, who picked up the guy admitting he was going to rape someone but didn’t. How God intervened to prevent a terrible crime. (Although even that is problematic.)
Instead what this says, if you pray the right prayer and God is happy with it, you won’t get raped. Too bad for the women whose heart isn’t right with Jesus. Or (because Christian females are raped too) doesn’t pray the right prayer.
This doesn’t make non-Christians pause and think, “Hey, there’s a God I want to know more about.” Rather, it poignantly raises the Problem of Evil—a perennial thorn in the Christian’s side.
The story, of course, is fake. Why a Christian thinks it is remotely compelling to a non-Christian is beyond me.
If, however, the person buying is not motivated the same as the seller, no matter how much the seller emphasizes what the seller thinks important…it won’t work.
This point was brought home to me recently when a distant in-law wrote the following on their Facebook:
A teenage girl about 17 had gone to visit some friends one nite & time passed quickly as each shared stories of the past year . She ended up staying longer than planned & had to walk home alone. She wasn't afraid because it was a small town & she lived only a few blocks away . As she walked along under the elm trees Diane asked God to keep her safe from harm or danger . When she reached the alley ............which ... was a short cut to her house she decided to take it. However halfway down the alley she noticed a man standing at the end as though he was waiting for her . She became uneasy & began to pray asking for God's protection . Instantly a comforting feeling of quietness & security wrapped around her . When she reached the end of the alley she walked right passed the man & arrived home safely . The following day she read in the newspaper that a young girl had been raped in the same alley just 20 mins . after she had been there . Feeling overwhelmed by this tragedy & the fact that it could have been her she began to weep . Thanking the Lord for her safety & to help this young woman she decided to go to the police station . She felt she could recognize the man so she told them her story. The police asked her if she would be willing to look at a line up to see if she could identify him . She agreed & immediately pointed out the man she had seen in the alley the night before . When the man was told that he had been identified he immediately broke down & confessed. The officer thanked Diane for her bravery & asked her if there was anything they could do for her . She asked if they would ask the man 1 question . Diane was curious as to why he did not attack her . When the police asked him he answered " Because she wasn't alone , she had two tall men walking on either side of her ." Amazingly whether you believe or not , you're never alone. Did u know that 98% of teenagers will not stand up for God ? God is always there in your heart & loves you no matter what & if you stand up for him he will stand up for you !! I bet 93% of the ppl who read this wont re post
Or course Snopes.com ferrets out how unverifiable this story is.
Normally, I would shrug and think it another Christian meme being spread, but he added an interesting comment. “Why we share our faith.”
Huh?
I can understand why another Christian would be self-righteously pleased with how God protects one of their own—but do they realize what this comes across to a non-Christian?
This is a story about a young girl being raped. There is nothing “wonderful” to share here, nothing uplifting, nothing compelling us non-Christians to cry out, “What a benevolent God!” This story might be half-way interesting if it had Diane call the police, who picked up the guy admitting he was going to rape someone but didn’t. How God intervened to prevent a terrible crime. (Although even that is problematic.)
Instead what this says, if you pray the right prayer and God is happy with it, you won’t get raped. Too bad for the women whose heart isn’t right with Jesus. Or (because Christian females are raped too) doesn’t pray the right prayer.
This doesn’t make non-Christians pause and think, “Hey, there’s a God I want to know more about.” Rather, it poignantly raises the Problem of Evil—a perennial thorn in the Christian’s side.
The story, of course, is fake. Why a Christian thinks it is remotely compelling to a non-Christian is beyond me.

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